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Preface 
The doctoral portfolio is about in-between spaces: about how the neat either-ors are 
continuously disrupted by our lives and the ways in which we live them. It is 
particularly about how I have come to notice this during my training in counselling 
psychology and the discomfort of the conflicting, competing and contradictory 
positions I have taken up and been positioned in during this process. It also about 
witnessing, sitting with and deconstructing the moments when clients, colleagues and 
research participants have found themselves off course, and stuck in between spaces 
on the roadmap of where they or others think they should be. These are illegitimate 
spaces and places. They do not gel with the way we usually carve things up. They 
deviate from the binaries, boundaries and borders that our dictionaries of normal and 
expected fence us in with. Or rather, they show us how often we step outside of these 
areas, how often we slip into territories that are out of bounds or unwanted. 
Describing these wanderings into the hinterlands between crazy and sane, normal and 
abnormal or strange or native is difficult. It is much easier to be on one side or the 
other. The work in this portfolio is about those moments in the in-between.  
 
The first piece of work, and centrepiece of the portfolio, is original doctoral research. 
It explores the social construction of ‘nervous breakdown.’
1
 This has never been an 
official diagnostic term but functions in a diagnostic way. It comes from psycho-
medical discourse, but has never been ordained as part of it. It is used as a short-hand 
by clinicians and the public alike, but seldom described or defined. It exists between 
the millions of websites devoted to it, and the handful of academic papers that 
subsume it under psychiatric diagnosis. We all seem to understand it, letting it slip 
through conversation as easily as a sprained ankle or a bad hair day. It proliferates the 
popular discourse, and is pertinent to but almost absent from the official diagnostic 
discourse. It is a liminal construct, gathered from the footnotes of Victorian 
nervousness and very much alive in the popular imagination as a kind of diagnosis: a 
                                                
1
 ‘Nervous breakdown’ is the only construct I have emphasized in quotations in this portfolio, given its 
position as the subject of my original research. For ease of reading, I have left other problematic labels 
to the critical gaze of the reader.  
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reason to be positioned as not-normal but not necessarily as abnormal. It chisels out 
territory in between the discursive binaries of sanity and madness, body and mind and 
self-management and personal failure. Yet, it does so quietly, even complicitly, both 
evading and also passing through the expertise of psychological practitioners. This 
study explores its discursive function and how those who use it, find through it, a 
socially acceptable way to fall apart: undeniably, a liminal space. 
 
The second piece of work is a critical literature review of immigration, the immigrant 
and mental health. Immigrants quite clearly transgress all kinds of borders and norms. 
Not only do they cross official borders but they cross socio-cultural ones too: bringing 
the inscriptions of poverty, war and terror into neo-liberal spaces, bringing unfamiliar 
fragrances, flavours and phonetics to the habitual, and bringing the idea of the native 
into question. Mostly though, questions of strangeness are turned onto the immigrant 
not the native. These positions are deemed as polarities: one can be either one or the 
other. Moreover, questions of loneliness, estrangement and trauma that are part of the 
experiences of immigration often become collapsed under the epidemiology of mental 
health profiling.  
 
This critical literature review attempts to problematise the assumptions made about 
immigrants and immigration in the mental health literature. It questions the 
homogeneity that seems to be automatically assigned to the immigrant, immigration 
and to the native. It also questions the role of psychological services for immigrants, 
arguing that while the relationship between the immigrant and mental health is 
problematic, the therapeutic space and its literature is also one of few places where a 
conversation about the discomforts of difference and displacement can be had. The 
space functions simultaneously to diagnose, pathologize and re-colonize the 
immigrant and also to loosen binaries of same and other and to potentially co-create a 
mutual conversation. As such, not only does the construct of immigrant function in 
between geographical borders but it also functions to bring the liminal spaces of 
psychological practice and its cartographies of knowledge and knowing into sharp 
relief.  
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The final piece of work presented is a client study about my work with a woman who 
had miscarried. This case signalled my first foray into a more dilemmatic position 
between the psychodynamic theories of interiorities and the theories of social 
constructionism. It marked a pushing and pulling between the individualism of 
therapeutic practice and the socio-discursive worlds that were shaping what we could 
and could not say about miscarriage, motherhood, and death-in-birth among others. 
The work marked my turning to a more psychosocial practice and trying to find a 
space that could both address a personal history and also ways in which the socio-
discursive shapes how a personal history can be talked about. This is a rather 
uncomfortable and undeniably liminal position. Moreover, the work itself was about 
ambivalence: a position that is also liminal and neither-nor. It was about finding ways 
of talking about ambivalence in miscarriage, ambivalence about being good, 
ambivalence about therapy, and ambivalence about being a daughter and a mother. It 
was about how hard this ambivalence was to articulate: how hard it is to occupy 
positions of both angry and good, for example. This work reflects the discomfort and 
relief of finding a space that can be both-and. It also reflects that this space is rarely 
found – rather that it is an ongoing traversing to and fro between theory and practice, 
between good and angry, and between therapy room and the world beyond.  
 
Almost every rule we have to abide by demands that we occupy a clearly stated 
position. From immigration officials stamping our passports to the doctors deciding 
what sex we are at birth, we have to be something and somewhere definitive. And yet, 
the spaces in between definitives are where we seem to live the most but which, 
understandably, we find the most difficult to articulate. This is the very fodder of 
psychology: the cracks, the slips, the not knowing, the silences and things we would 
rather not say. Yet, psychology too prefers to neatly describe these as particular 
phenomena, techniques or symptoms. The liminal is both the grist of our work and 
also what we prefer to cloak in the safe scaffolding of professional theory. Somehow, 
as psychological professionals we need to be able to travel back and forth. We need to 
go into spaces for which there is no ready language, for which there is no ready map 
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and for which there is no legitimate social space. We also need to return back to 
theory, to regulations, to the rationale for what we do and why and somehow negotiate 
between the two.  
 
Counselling psychology, in particular, is in the liminal bind. It embraces pluralism, 
critique and reflexive and relational practice and yet also seeks a legitimate place in 
the psycho-medical framework, which prefers fixed evidence-based diagnostics. It 
encompasses the pastoral concept of wise counsel, and the psychological legacies of 
Freud, Skinner and Eysenck. It is both the entrepreneur of applied practice and also 
the rigorous clinician. It is party to the imprints of straightjackets and One Flew Over 
the Cuckoo’s Nest and also to Rogerian self-actualisation. At the start of my training, 
an established counselling psychologist told me that I would emerge from training not 
more enlightened but “more comfortable about being in constant flux.” It would seem 
he was right. This professional training has disrupted every singularity of knowing 
that I had previously held onto. I have realised though, that to be able to be in the 
spaces of the in-between, and to be there with other people is a remarkable thing. It 
allows for off-road travel. It allows for new experiences and conversations to emerge 
and for something different to happen, even if momentarily.  
 
This portfolio documents my journey, both academic and clinical, into some of the 
liminal spaces accessible to counselling psychology, its practice and its knowledge. It 
documents my encounters, as a trainee counselling psychologist, with both my own 
and other people’s places of flux, places of no language and new language, and places 
between known fixtures. Most people who violate a binary, border or boundary 
usually suffer in some way. They may simply suffer the confusion of being in a space 
they do not understand, or they may suffer harsher exclusions and penalties. 
Inevitably, all the people who come to be the subjects of psychology’s gaze, or who 
choose to take up a position as client or participant, are a little bit out of bounds and 
are suffering because of it. To foreground the confusion of liminal spaces and liminal 
subjects is also to foreground the often inflexible and oppressive ways that taken-for-
granted binaries, borders and boundaries keep us fenced in. It is also to foreground the 
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myriad of ways in which we are already disrupting their false integrity – bending 
them, stretching them and sliding between them. The way in which we choose to 
engage with the liminal determines the kind of conversations we can have with our 
clients, with one another and with the world that we co-construct. The liminal allows 
for new things to emerge, and it allows for a loosening of the tight corrals of binaries, 
borders and boundaries that determine the possibilities of who we can be and how we 
can be.  
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Part A – Doctoral Research 
An ok way to fall apart: Exploring the social construction of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ 
 
Abstract 
‘Nervous breakdown’ returns over nine million results on an internet search while a 
search of the academic literature returns as few as twenty-two. It has never been an 
official psycho-medical diagnosis but has tended to function as such, for variable 
purposes. This piece of work aims to explore contemporary popular constructions of 
‘nervous breakdown’ and what the term accomplishes for those who use it.  
 
The exploration is in two parts: (i) a mapping of the contemporary discursive terrain 
of ‘nervous breakdown’ through a media analysis and (ii) an exploration of subjective 
constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ through participant interviews. These two sites 
of analysis allowed for exploration of how the discursive terrain positions the subject 
of ‘nervous breakdown,’ and how he/she resists these positions. In order to explore 
this interface, a synthesis of Foucauldian and discursive psychological discourse 
analytic approaches was used.  
 
What emerged from the study was that the discursive terrain tends to position the 
subject of ‘nervous breakdown’ as not coping or as mentally ill, whereas those who 
employ the label do so to carve out a space in between these positions, avoiding their 
associated stigmas. This liminal position of ‘nervous breakdown’ and its 
consequences are discussed.  
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1. Introduction: What’s in a ‘nervous breakdown?’ 
I have toyed with how to craft a compelling entrance for ‘nervous breakdown’ in the 
opening lines of this thesis. I have statistics and meta-analyses, quotations from 18
th
 
century Harley Street and noir-cartoons of post-war housewives in smoky, suburban 
living rooms. None of these are as interesting as the ping of my live Twitter feed, 
alerting me each time someone refers to ‘nervous breakdown’ in a tweet. In the last 
hour, it has pinged over twenty times. The latest tweet reads: “Is it too early in the 
(academic) year for a nervous breakdown?” Within five minutes, four other users 
replied offering solace, deep breaths and tea. Another tweet lights up: “Curled my 
own hair tonight. Was trying to look like Julia Roberts. Might look more like a single 
mom having a nervous breakdown.” In this live conversation, ‘nervous breakdown’ is 
featured as a single-mom’s bad hair day and also a question of timing in student-life. 
In other tweets it extends to coughs, colds, spiders, breakups, Mariah Carey, 
immigration, depression, loneliness, coffee, computer crashes and exam results – to 
name just a smattering. The Pandora’s Box of things ‘nervous breakdown’ is used to 
talk about becomes curiouser and curiouser as I scroll down the page. Ask me to 
precisely define ‘nervous breakdown,’ and I’ll fumble around for words, but I have an 
intuitive understanding of what all the tweets mean. 
 
‘Nervous breakdown’ slides around the discursive terrain as blithely as a canapé tray 
at a cocktail party. Countless celebrities from Cheryl Cole to Oprah Winfrey are 
claiming to have had one. Clients I have seen throughout my training have brought it 
to the therapeutic encounter. Friends, family and acquaintances lay claim to the term. I 
think I used it last week to describe a state of mind when my computer crashed, 
swallowing my work into its blackened pixels, resisting all attempts at resuscitation. It 
is a throwaway remark, a confession, a dark night of the soul. It constituted the subject 
of over nine million hits on a Google search on 11 June 2014
1
. Yet its genesis is 
unclear. ‘Nervous breakdown’ is nowhere to be found in the psycho-medical 
diagnostic taxonomy. It does not grace the pages of The International Classification of 
                                                
1
 The number of hits is subject to change as Google refines its search engine algorithms. 
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Disease (ICD) or The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
and is absent from their Victorian precursors (Shorter, 2013). It has neither been 
invented nor formally used by the conventional diagnosticians. It appears in Albert 
Adams’ treatise to American physicians in 1901, but as a neologism for the subject of 
nervous disease and its starring diagnosis of neurasthenia (Barke, Fribush & Stearns, 
2000). From then on, there is scant reference to the term in the literature: popping up 
here and there in lay texts, diary entries and the arts, such as in The Rolling Stones’ 
1966 hit The 19
th
 Nervous Breakdown and Pedro Almodóvar’s 1988 film Women on 
the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown. 
 
However, ‘nervous breakdown’ has a great deal of psycho-medical purchase in the 
popular conversation. From a rough scan of the smorgasbord of online sites, blogs, 
forums and news articles, talk of ‘nervous breakdown’ seems inextricably bound up 
with the psy-complex
2
. It is peppered with references to diagnoses, states of mind and 
psychiatric and psychological treatments. For example, the first website to come up on 
the Google search is entitled “Signs and symptoms of a nervous breakdown” and is 
hosted on a website called www.professional-counselling.com. Many other websites, 
also positioned as psycho-medical through their branding and their use of expert 
voices, also claim to know about ‘nervous breakdown’ and to help the general public 
diagnose and treat it. For example, The Mayo Clinic, America’s iconic medical 
research institution, has a whole web-page dedicated to ‘nervous breakdown.’ It 
subsumes the label under the rubric of depression, framing it as a common public 
entreé into this diagnostic pool (Hall-Flavin, n.d).  
 
In a parallel conversational thread, the media’s construction of Charlie Sheen’s rather 
theatrical unravelling in 2011 made reference to ‘nervous breakdown’ as a possible 
diagnosis for the movie star’s so-called deviant behaviour. For example, The 
Guardian’s lead article on the story is entitled “Charlie Sheen, a Star on the Verge of 
                                                
2
 I use psy-complex in this piece of work with reference to scholars such as Rose (1985; 1998) who use 
the term to describe “the network of theories and practices concerned with psychological governance 
and self-reflection in Western culture” (Parker, 1998, p. 68).   
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a Nervous Breakdown, Grips and Revulses America” (Harris, 2011). The same slew of 
articles on the nefarious actor also lay claim to terms like “mental and emotional 
crash” (Loinaz, 2012, para. 6), “the demons of mental illness” (Banks, 2011, para. 2), 
and “bi-polar” (Brown, 2011, para. 7). This is but one example. One can find direct 
associations between ‘nervous breakdown’ and the psy-complex in virtually every 
online text that headlines or hashtags the term.  
 
Yet, a search on PsychInfo, the American Psychological Association’s pre-eminent 
database for psychological research, returned only twenty-two hits for ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as the subject of a research title. The disparity between this and the nine 
million plus Google hits for the search term is striking. The figure of nine million does 
not include references to the term on any social media, only on websites. Had the 
analytics I was able to use been more sophisticated, I suspect the nine million mark 
would have been dramatically exceeded. In short, it seems that there are two different, 
and yet closely related, conversations about ‘nervous breakdown’ going on. The 
relevance of ‘nervous breakdown’ to the contemporary subject is not matched by the 
very institution from which it seems to borrow its conceptual capital. Moreover, it 
appears to elude a consistent definition, discretely hidden as a generic, taken-for-
granted thing.  
 
1.1. ‘Nervous breakdown’ in the academic terrain: A short 
conversation  
My curiosity piqued, I started with the academic canon and the twenty-two articles 
that PsychInfo found with ‘nervous breakdown’ as the subject. I broadened the search 
out to include other databases, but the return was still poor and remained in the mid-
twenties. This made a comprehensive literature review challenging. This paucity of 
literature endorses the legitimacy of a piece of work aiming to explore ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ It encourages not only a sortie into the terrain of the term, but also the act 
of exploration. In the following section, I present a review of the literature that I have 
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managed to scour off the shelves. It can be broken down into several broad categories, 
as discussed below.  
 
1.1.1. Subsuming ‘nervous breakdown’ under diagnosis and diagnosticians  
A large cluster of the more recent research that speaks of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
subsumes the term under formal clinical diagnostic criteria that are denoted in various 
volumes of the DSM. These papers incorporate ‘nervous breakdown,’ often without 
any coherent definition, as a colloquial term used to refer to hybrid of diagnoses 
including depression, anxiety and schizophrenia. In these studies, the term is used in 
measurement scales with the aim of establishing either what defines these more 
legitimate diagnoses, or who suffers from them.  
 
For example, Swindle, Heller, Pescosolido & Kikuzawa (2000) aim to investigate 
changes in how the American public conceptualised and responded to mental health 
difficulties between 1957 and 1996. Their rationale was to inform national mental 
health policy by painting an epidemiological picture. In 1996 they replicated the 
Americans View Their Mental Health (AVTMH) surveys used in 1957 and 1976 and 
chose to focus on the question of whether the current population was experiencing “a 
greater sense of impending nervous breakdown than did the previous two generations” 
(Swindle et al., 2000, p. 741). However, the study does not define what a sense of 
“impending nervous breakdown” means. Furthermore, it does not explain how it is 
relevant to its rationale which cites that it is important to understand why and how 
Americans access mental health care because evidence indicates that mental illnesses, 
namely depression, are on the increase. For some reason, unexplained in the paper, the 
authors seem to link this higher prevalence of depression to the question of whether 
the public feels at risk for ‘nervous breakdown.’ Their results are interesting 
nonetheless, concluding that there is a significant increase in the number of people 
who feel at risk for ‘nervous breakdown.’ Yet, the study is ultimately unclear as to 
whether this is because the meaning of the term has changed over time or because 
more people are suffering from depression. What this paper seems to indicate, much 
like my brief reconnaissance with the online world, is that ‘nervous breakdown’ 
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means something to many people, something assumed to do with mental health that is 
taken for granted and not formally defined.  
 
In a similar vein, Rapport, Todd, Lumley & Sebastiano (1998) examine lay meanings 
of the ‘nervous breakdown’ in a large college sample in the USA. Their research 
intention is to map these lay meanings onto specific symptom clusters in order to 
demonstrate their correlation with DSM designated symptoms of depression and 
anxiety. They do so with some success, finding a significant similarity between 
‘nervous breakdown’ and the DSM-IV-TR diagnosis of Adjustment Disorder with 
Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood (Acute). This is unsurprising since they were 
scrutinising the participants’ words with a psychiatric gaze and a honed intention. It 
has been argued that this gaze, when applied uncritically, can diagnose and 
pathologize just about anybody (Rosenhan, 1973). This notwithstanding, the research 
is robust from a within quantitative framework. However, it gives no space for the lay 
meanings of the term to emerge, as purported in its title. Rather, it overrides the term 
‘nervous breakdown’ and its valence to the lay person with psychiatric discourse, 
robbing the term of its significance to its users.  
 
Coulehan (2013) makes a similar move, providing a compelling therapeutic case 
history of his work with a woman who purported to be suffering from ‘nervous 
breakdown’ but who was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia (which 
the DSM-5 now refers to as schizophrenia – having dropped the subtype 
categorisation). Again, in this piece, ‘nervous breakdown’ is not defined but is 
accepted as a meaningful term to the reader. It is also overwritten by the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. Similarly, Oppenheim (1991) in her dissection of nervous disease and 
‘nervous breakdown’ in the Victorian west uses the term ‘nervous breakdown’ as 
synonymously interchangeable with that of the more contemporary diagnosis of 
depression. In this way, she completely overrides the contextual significance of the 
term, in effect subsuming it under the rubric of depression.  
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In his latest book, eminent psychiatric historian Edward Shorter (2013), goes so far as 
to call for ‘nervous breakdown’ to be brought formally into the psychiatric fold. He 
argues for it to act as counter to the blanket diagnosis of depression which he contends 
is a blunt diagnosis that obscures the nuances of the suffering of people who present 
more like the Victorian subject of nervous disease: high in agitation and who do not 
respond to antidepressants. His book is an excellent socio-history on the nervous 
subject, and a comprehensive critique of the increased medicalisation of mental illness 
after the 1950s but still it positions ‘nervous breakdown’ firmly in the clutches of the 
diagnostician and fails to ask what it means to or does for the person who uses it.  
 
Finally, there is a slew of papers that draw on the tradition of cross-cultural psy-
research that find that cultures positioned as non-western or indigenous prefer 
references to ‘nervous breakdown’ in lieu of references to mental illness. Most of 
these papers attempt to map an ethnographic description of these nervous afflictions 
onto western diagnoses. For example, Salmán et al. (1997, p.285) examine a sample 
of 156 Hispanic Americans who self-diagnosed with an “ataque de nervios” which the 
authors translate as ‘nervous breakdown.’ Their study aimed to subsume this 
presentation under formal diagnoses and they concluded with a robust significance 
that these “ataques” were actually incidences of panic disorder, anxiety disorders and 
also affective disorders. Once again, the term is subsumed under a psychiatric gaze – 
erased, corrected and replaced.  
 
Cintrón, Carter and Sbrocco (2005, p. 428) do the same thing as Salmán et al. (1997), 
concluding that “ataques de nervios” in a sample of Puerto Ricans “shares substantial 
variance with panic-related constructs.” Ying and Miller (1992) dissect the help-
seeking behaviours of Chinese Americans claiming to suffer from ‘nervous 
breakdown’ with the intention of understanding barriers to engaging with mental 
health services. Striking again, is their use of ‘nervous breakdown’ as a general term 
for something ‘wrong’ in the land of mental health, although it holds no formal 
diagnostic power. The authors also do not offer a definition of the ‘nervous 
breakdown,’ again slipping it in as a shared and taken-for-granted construct.  
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Askanasy (1974) offers a slightly different take. Although writing from a position 
firmly within the psy-institution, he uses a cross-cultural study to argue that those 
people that western doctors might construe as mentally ill, other cultures preferred to 
designate as having ‘nervous breakdowns.’ His work can clearly be critiqued for 
taking an etic and representative approach to language across cultures and 
communities. He does not specify exactly how he arrived at a translation of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ in each instance, and does not explicitly define the term itself. He also 
does not address the heterogeneity between cultures, let alone between speakers and 
clearly operates from a western centre. However, he does offer some space for the 
term to exist as a subject and not as handmaiden to the DSM. In addition, he situates 
‘nervous breakdown’ in a location that is if not counter to, then at least extra to, a 
western psychiatric purview.  
 
1.1.2. Exploring lay definitions of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
The second research cluster examines ‘nervous breakdown’ as a lay term. Most of 
these papers suggest that it is a folk, lay or culturally-specific term for what western 
taxonomies designate as mental illness. However, these studies differ in tone from 
those described above as they tend to place more emphasis on the lay meanings of the 
term as opposed to automatically nullifying them under a DSM diagnosis. For 
example, Omark (1980) examines the use of the term among a large American 
sample. He concludes that it serves a descriptive function for its users, one that can be 
used to denote significant emotional disturbance. Although Omark does not attempt to 
reclassify the term as a psychiatric diagnosis, he dissects it via the diagnostic 
instruments of aetiology, behavioural traits and treatments, thereby treating it as a psy-
construct. Nonetheless, he makes space for it to hold some ground as a term in and of 
itself and one that people choose to fulfil a social purpose.  
 
The examination of ‘nervous breakdown’ as a construct in a lay space is laden with 
articles that look at problems of nerves in general. I have chosen to include these in 
the literature review as they were returned in a search for ‘nervous breakdown’ and 
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because they shed some light on the terrain in which the term is situated. Moreover, 
these papers tend to be located in a quasi psycho-medical hinterland: seeking to give 
validity to the term as owned by the populations under study but also discussing it 
within a psychiatric framework.  
 
For example, Nations, Camino and Walker (1988) look at nerves as a folk idiom for 
depression and anxiety. They conclude that it needs to be regarded as worthy of the 
gaze of physicians and suggest that these same physicians work with the alternative 
healers (seemingly preferred by the sufferers of nerves) and not in opposition to them. 
Similarly, Jenkins (1988) studies nerves and their breakdown as a lay term used by 
Mexican-Americans that she regards as synonymous with schizophrenia as described 
by an Anglo-American sample. Her contention, however, is that indigenous 
descriptors of mental illness be they nerves or schizophrenia be given equal validity 
by western diagnosticians, and furthermore that this is crucial for the patient’s 
welfare. Davis and Whitten (1988) also contend in their study of nervous complaints 
in a small Newfoundland community that these complaints have had a variable and 
social history and that they counter an attempt to be fixed in diagnoses of anxiety. The 
authors point towards a nervous complaint as having the features of a social construct, 
and one that performs variable social functions for its users.  
 
Gove (2004) continues with this line of thought and begins to explore the idea that 
people might deploy ‘nervous breakdown’ to serve a social purpose. He examines its 
use by subjects who wish to avoid diagnoses of mental illness and concomitant 
hospitalization. This research focus imbues ‘nervous breakdown’ with a sense of 
being an effective lay discursive strategy that is apart from but exists in reference to 
the psy-institution. However, Gove’s focus is on the hospitalization process and he 
does not take his exploration of ‘nervous breakdown’ further than suggesting it has a 
social function within a lay or popular discursive space. 
 
Another feature of the literature that positions ‘nervous breakdown’ as a lay construct 
are those texts that seek to examine survivor narratives: the stories of people who have 
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had a ‘nervous breakdown.’ These tend to be written as first person accounts and 
function primarily as testimonies, and as self-help recovery tools for other members of 
the public who may be in ‘nervous breakdown.’ They position the lay narrator-
survivor as owner, author and expert on ‘nervous breakdown’ and include 
recommendations for psy-practitioners on how best to work with this population 
(Danee, 1975; Lea, 2010; Purdie & McLennan, 1993). Here, the idea of a literature 
review becomes blurry. There are less than a handful of accounts within the canon, 
but a litany of popular texts on the internet and on the self-help shelf of the bookshop 
(e.g. Dent, 2013; Patkin, 2011). I had to pause a moment and think where this piece of 
work stands with regard to who is expert. After some deliberation, and for the 
purposes of this section of the work, which falls under the formal ambit of academic 
literature review, I have limited inclusion to those accounts in the academic literature 
databases. However, the thesis as a whole considers those texts on ‘nervous 
breakdown’ that are extra-academic to be as relevant to the construct and will refer to 
them throughout. This is particularly because of the disparity in volume between 
popular texts on the term and those in the academic literature which has driven the 
research agenda for this project. This suggests, as this review is beginning to indicate, 
that it is necessary to consider how ‘nervous breakdown’ straddles the two spaces, and 
furthermore what this accomplishes and for whom. 
 
1.1.3. ‘Nervous breakdown’ as written for the lay person by clinicians 
There is a significant cluster of books and journal articles that appear in the early 
twentieth century on the topic of ‘nervous breakdown’ and which position ‘nervous 
breakdown’ within the popular realm (Ash, 1920; Loosmore, 1921; Luce, 1935; 
Musgrove, 1913: Wolfe, 1933). These texts, akin to self-help manuals, offer empathy, 
explanation and a gamut of cures for those suffering from ‘nervous breakdown.’ Many 
of these texts are written for the public by clinicians, and tend to deploy ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as a way to bridge the clinical diagnoses of nervous illness, such as 
neurasthenia, with the experience of the common man or woman. For example, 
Loosmore’s (1921) study of nerves and ‘nervous breakdown,’ while a clinical text, is 
also aimed at the public. The very title of his text is Nerves and the Man: A Popular 
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Psychological and Constructive Study of Nervous Breakdown. Loosmore goes to great 
lengths to identify with the sufferer and uses the pronoun “us” frequently, bridging the 
dichotomy between clinician and layperson. Moreover, while he talks about diagnoses 
of neurasthenia, which was the psycho-medical label du jour for the nervous subject, 
he insists on using ‘nervous breakdown’ when speaking of the experience of the 
layperson-reader. For example, in his introduction Loosmore (p.1) notes that “The 
ominous phrase ‘nervous breakdown’ is a painfully familiar one to an increasing 
number of men and women these days. Happily it is merely a phrase to the vast 
majority of us.” Loosmore’s text thus situates ‘nervous breakdown’ in the discursive 
terrain of nervous disease. However, he implies that it is a term more relevant to the 
layperson than the vicissitudes of nervous diagnosis and thus positions himself a bit 
like a clinical translator: explaining this construct to back to the public and explaining 
how they can recover from it. This is different from those more recent clinical texts 
that attempt to explain ‘nervous breakdown’ to psy-professionals and which subsume 
it under psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
Loosmore is in good company. A host of his contemporaries were also trying to 
explain ‘nervous breakdown’ back to the public: to impose a clinical understanding on 
the lay term but to do it for the public. These endeavours did not attempt to wipe out 
the popular term, however. They did quite the opposite by giving it a clinical 
legitimacy in a popular space and arguably also a popular legitimacy in a clinical 
space. For example, in 1913 Charles D. Musgrove M.D. wrote Nervous Breakdowns 
and How to Avoid Them. This is explicitly a self-help book for the public written by a 
medical doctor. Musgrove makes a similar move to Loosmore – a clinician 
appropriating a lay term and then expertly explaining the same term back to the public 
and pronouncing on its correct management. Musgrove’s book would not seem amiss 
on any contemporary self-help bookshelf. He too situates nervous breakdown in the 
ambit of his clinical knowledge of nervous disease and much like a children’s story, 
masks this expertise through personal resonances with this common term. The same 
move is replicated by Ash (1920), Luce (1935) and Wolfe (1933) who aimed to 
compile layman’s guides to ‘nervous breakdown.’ Wolfe begins to assert that 
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‘nervous breakdown’ performs a social function: that of allowing a person with a 
psychiatric disturbance to hide behind the more socially acceptable veil of this term 
and also to hide behind the bed-rest it necessitates. In this regard, he and Gove (2004) 
are not so many worlds apart.  
 
Crucial to all these texts is that they do not reject ‘nervous breakdown’ as an incorrect 
or inferior term to the official diagnoses of nervous disease. Rather, they seem to 
indicate that psycho-medical experts not only accepted it as common parlance but at 
times talked about it as if it were diagnostically valid and of interest to them. They 
vacillate between Wolfe’s (1933) assertion that it is wholly a lay term that belies 
psychiatric disturbance and Musgrove’s (1913) use of the term which seems to 
entertain it as some-thing real and valid within the psycho-medical realm. 
Nonetheless, the term did not exist in the formal taxonomy, but there seemed to be 
greater institutional recognition of its popular significance. There are almost no 
accessible popular texts on the subject from that era probably owing to the inability of 
the public to self-publish at the time. However, diary entries and letters of public 
figures do refer to nervous complaints, including ‘nervous breakdown’ as a relevant 
way of constructing their experiences. For example, Appignanesi (2008, p. 127) 
references the diary kept by Alice James in the late nineteenth century. She was sister 
to the famous Henry and William James. In it, Alice describes many of her encounters 
with the treatments of Silas Weir Mitchell, eminent American specialist in nervous 
diseases, and she constructs herself in terms of the language and motifs of nervous 
disease and breakdown.  
 
1.2. The nervous subject 
Alluded to in all these texts is the discourse of nerves, nervous complaints and the 
nervous subject. The exact genesis of nerves as the primary site of interest to the 
psycho-medical gaze is unclear – talk of nerves extends as far back as Hippocrates in 
4 B.C. (Davis & Whitten, 1988). However, nervous illness emerged as the 
predominant modern western explanation for “neurological and psychiatric illness of a 
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nonpsychotic nature” in both the public and psycho-medical domains from the mid 
18
th
 to the mid 20
th
 centuries (Shorter, 2013, p. 18). In other words, the term was used 
to explain mental and behavioural deviances that were not ascribed to the madness of 
psychosis – deviances that were reducible to an organic, and therefore curable, 
systemic malfunction. In 1684, Thomas Willis, the English physician heralded as the 
father of modern neuroscience, presented his Essay of the Pathology of the Brain and 
Nervous Stock to fellow academics and clinicians. This marked the official debut of 
the nervous into a scientific space (Shorter, 2013). It also shifted the site of interest 
away from the caverns of the mind and humours and vapours of the body to the 
nervous substance of the brain itself (Pryse-Phillips, 2009). This signalled a 
conceptual marriage of the physical and the mental: with the nervous tissue of the 
brain and its subsystems coming to represent both (Appignanesi, 2008).    
 
The subsequent Victorian era saw the import of stress and machinery metaphors from 
the domain of engineering to the domain of the human body (Synnott, 1992). It was 
after all, the Industrial Revolution, and the landscape was filled with the clamouring 
and clattering of machines and the men who operated them. Thus, as Barke et al. 
(2000) contend, it was not a far stretch for the imagery of this landscape’s mechanical 
language – its laws of pressure and corrosion – to be brought to the site of nerves, 
which were being positioned as the seat of human experience. In a world that was 
jumpy, noisy and ever increasing in speed, it was inevitable that this would be 
reflected in the ways in which the public and clinicians alike chose to construct 
experience and the human subject. As such, nerves were inscribed with the irritability, 
jitteriness and electricity of the era (Thraikill, 2010). The nervous subject gained 
popular purchase through its resonance with these motifs, and the idea that the 
impositions of the time could directly affect, via the nerves, the very fibres of one’s 
body (Appignanesi, 2008). This idea was also popular because of its explicit organic 
foundation which distinguished it from the more inexplicable kinds of madness. As 
Shorter (2013, p.17) contends “it is much better, people think, for the nerves than the 
mind to be ill.”  
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As such, the nervous subject was constructed as inherently sensitive and volatile, and 
permanently susceptible to external pressures of the times. It is here that the discourse 
of breakdown finds its way into the space of nerves. Part of the mid nineteenth 
century discursive import from the engineering plant was the metaphor of breaking 
down under strain. Transferred from steam engines to human beings, it became 
increasingly common for the western subject, clinician and layperson alike, to ascribe 
physical or mental collapse to “the stress of his will and the strain of his perseverance” 
(Bucknill & Tuke, 1858, p. 49 as cited in Kugelman, 1992, p. 135). Such subjects 
were frequently described as broken or breaking down, just like the engines that that 
were building the cities and factories around them (Barke et al., 2000). While initially 
applied to cardiac arrest, this kind of embodied collapse owing to overwhelming 
external strain was soon brought to the nerves. Strains of living such as worry and 
working too hard were construed as depleting and corrosive to the nervous system and 
as potentially causing physical and/or mental collapse (Shorter, 2013). This collapse, 
as has been suggested, was increasingly described in the terminology of breakdown. 
Strain was replaced with a preference for the words stress after the 1900s, but the idea 
that the act of living could inevitably corrode embodied nerves, via the inevitable 
strains and stresses it imposed, became firmly implanted in the discursive pool 
(Kugelman, 1992). This implied not only a mechanical construct of nerves but also an 
economic image of them: whose reserves could be shored up or depleted depending 
on exposure to external strains (Appignanesi, 2008).  
 
In addition to this, the toll of Victorian life on the nerves was inevitably depicted as 
gendered. Women’s transgressions of gendered norms, through working or taking up 
positions of independence from their male custodians, were considered to be draining 
of their nerves (Appignanesi, 2008; Logan, 1997). Similarly, men who openly took up 
more feminized positions were described, somewhat disparagingly, as nervous 
(Micale, 2008). Women’s inroads into the masculine domains of intellectual labour 
and public opinion were considered precipitous of collapse and exhaustion owing to 
their depleting the female nervous economy. For women, their nervous reserves were 
considered already in jeopardy owing to the toll of reproductive labour and 
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menstruation (Cayleff, 1992). The resonance with the female hysteric, rendered mad 
and volatile because of her womb, is quite profound. As Davis (1989) points out in her 
socio-historical study of nervous discourse between the late nineteenth century and 
World War I, ideas of the nervous vulnerability of women seem to increase at times of 
dramatic social change when traditional feminine roles are necessarily disrupted.  
  
The construction of the Victorian nervous subject, however, does not include ‘nervous 
breakdown’ in its formal taxonomy. Rather, the diagnostic literature focuses on 
conceptualising the nerves, on distinguishing the nervous subject from the humoral 
subject, and on forging its scientific and popular legitimacy (Beatty, 2012; Hare, 
1991; Shorter, 2013). It must be noted at this point that the distinction between mind 
and body doctors in the nineteenth century was blurry. Psychiatry was still being 
established as a valid field of expertise, thus all manner of physicians, obstetricians 
and spa doctors alike weighed in on the nervous conversation (Shorter, 1997; 2013). 
Perhaps this reflects both the blurriness between medical domains at the time but also 
the liminality of the nervous which was being positioned as both mental and physical, 
albeit with a preference for the physical.  
 
Nerves, the nervous and their treatment had become increasingly popular with 
clinicians and the public from the eighteenth century onwards, housing a panoply of 
diagnostic maladies from dyspepsia to paralysis that all seemed reducible to the 
nervous system (Ishizuka, 2010). However, the nervous coalesced into the formal 
diagnosis of neurasthenia in 1869 when American physician, George M. Beard 
endorsed the diagnosis in various medical journals and addresses to fellow clinicians 
(Gijwijt-Hofstra, 2001). While the diagnosis functioned almost synonymously with 
that of previous ideas of nervous irritability and fatigue, it served to cohere and 
formalise the concept of the nervous into a diagnostic syndrome (Shorter, 2013). 
Neurasthenia fore-grounded the symptom of nervous exhaustion, resulting from day-
to-day toils and strains, and located it in both body and mind. However, it was 
explicitly defined as organic and thus differentiated from madness (Schuster, 2011). 
Neurasthenia’s clinical validation rendered the discourse of nerves and nervous as old-
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fashioned. ‘Nervous breakdown’ as a term was nowhere to be found in this official 
diagnostic lexicon, except as a popular anecdotal expression for moments of nervous 
collapse that precipitated a diagnosis of neurasthenia (Barke et al., 2000). 
 
Nonetheless, despite its position as organic illness, neurasthenia and the nervous 
complaints it housed were located between the mind and the body, between psychiatry 
and an emergent psychoanalysis and the general physician. This is precisely because 
the symptoms that the nervous subject and his/her doctor described were located in 
both the tissues of the body and in the disposition, moods and emotions of the mind: 
organic and psychological (Loughran, 2008). The diagnostic category of hysteria 
suffered a similar predicament (Micale & Lerner, 2001). This ambiguity made it easy 
for the newly developing body of psy-practitioners to encroach on the nervous subject, 
rewriting him/her into their clinical discourses and eroding the grip of neurasthenia 
(Neve, 2001; Wessely, 1991). At the dawn of the twentieth century, many 
neurologists, outside of psychoanalysis, also began to dismiss neurasthenia’s nervous 
substructure, relocating its symptoms purely in the affective and psychic domains 
(Shorter, 2013). The diagnosis and the particularities of the nervous subject it 
constructed started to wane from the clinical and popular conversations.  
 
The dilemmas that the treatment of World War I’s shell-shocked veterans posed acted 
to further dismantle the nervous foundations of the diagnosis. Western clinicians from 
all fields were rapidly forced to reconstruct their understanding of trauma and its 
treatment after 1914. They were forced to revisit their pre-war preference for locating 
nervous complaints in the soma over the psyche (Loughran, 2008). Many in the 
western clinical communities thus became more embracing of Freud’s contention that 
some features of neurasthenia were actually anxiety neuroses hallmarked by variants 
of anxiety, phobias and terrors, and a predominantly psychological aetiology (Stewart, 
1967/2014). Freud re-worked his idea of these neuroses and the neurotic subject they 
described, divorcing them more and more from the somatic and conscripting them into 
the space of psychic and not somatic disturbance (Beer, 1996). The discursive overlap 
of nerves and psychoanalysis is firmly anchored in the use of the term neurosis and 
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the neurotic. Shorter (2013) makes the distinction between neurosis as a general 
adjective for the nervous subject, and one that has continued to be of use in neurology, 
and as a key concept of psychoanalysis. The concept has long since evolved in the 
psychoanalytic tradition, coming to denote all manner of things according to different 
theoretical schools, but crudely put, it denotes a psychological state or structure, 
hallmarked by a capacity for anxiety, worry and self-reflection (Sugarman, 2007). 
Psychological discourse, and particularly that of psychoanalysis, is pervasive in 
contemporary popular constructions of experience and personhood (Parker, 1997). It 
follows therefore, that the nervous subject, while constantly re-written and 
contextually fluid, remains sedimented in the western discursive reservoir. 
 
1.2.1. ‘Nervous breakdown’ after World War I 
Neurasthenia still exists as an ICD diagnostic classification (Buck, 2014). However, it 
has became increasingly marginalised in clinical and popular spaces after 1914. The 
trend to relocate distress from a somatic to a psychological space increased after 
World War I and neurasthenia and nerves were undercut by diagnoses of depression 
and anxiety (Neve, 2001). Yet, the nervous subject remained and as testified to by the 
likes of Loosmore (1921), the clinical literature of the time still reflected reports and 
diagnoses of nervous exhaustion and fatigue, which Shorter (2013, p. 49) contends 
functioned as synonym for the colloquial ‘nervous breakdown.’ The latter still seemed 
to be located in the popular-psy conversation in the first half of the twentieth century, 
and the public used it liberally to refer to their difficulties in managing of all manner 
of tensions, worries and social upheavals. Barke et al. (2000, p. 575) believe that this, 
like the inscription of nerves with the insignia of the Industrial Revolution, was a way 
of capturing the impositions of the “major innovations in the standards for emotion, 
appearance and personal function” that the modern era put upon the individual, and 
particularly, the competing demands they placed upon women. The authors suggest 
that in the mid-twentieth century to have a ‘nervous breakdown’ served the social 
function of being able to bow out of the pressures and contradictions of modern life, 
and to attribute it, much like the neurasthenic, to an embodied not a psychiatric 
malfunction. This resonates with the current position of Gove (2004) who believes 
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that the term serves the social function of allowing people to avoid diagnoses of 
mental illness and consequent hospitalization.  
 
However, what emerges both from this literature review and those conducted by 
Barke et al. (2000) and Shorter (2013) are two things. Firstly, that ‘nervous 
breakdown’ never existed within the formal diagnostic literature, even during the 
zeitgeist of nervous afflictions between 1820 and 1914. It was used as an undefined 
colloquialism, a neologism, and a short-hand for describing a range of experiences. 
While it was used predominantly by the lay person, it was also used by clinicians of 
that era, particularly in their conversations with the public. Secondly, what emerges is 
that ‘nervous breakdown’ remained in psy’s conversation with the public for some 
time after the demise of neurasthenia and its translation from the somatic to the 
psychological. The writings of Loosmore (1921), Wolfe (1933) and Luce (1935) all 
attest to this.  
 
While there is another spike in the psycho-medical literature specifically on the term 
during and immediately after World War II (e.g. Gantt, 1943; Gantt, 1953; Tooth, 
1944), this work is aimed at fellow clinicians only. In Gantt’s case (1943, 1953), he 
borrows the term ‘nervous breakdown’ to describe a behavioural learning process 
much in the vein of Pavlov and Skinner. While this is anomalous in the literature as a 
whole, Gantt, like the arbiters of nervous disease, uses the term to describe an organic 
breakdown situated within nervous tissue. Tooth (1944, p. 358) uses the term, again 
without definition, to refer to the moment of “frank psychiatric collapse” of naval 
officers. He writes as a military psychiatrist for his peers, and like some of his 
contemporary academics such as Swindle et al. (2000), uses the term as an undefined 
short-hand in a conversation between psy-experts about lay people’s experiences. 
Simultaneously, in the mid-twentieth century, psychoanalysts and their cognitive 
behavioural opponents were both writing about and treating neuroses and the neurotic 
(e.g. Ellis, 1957; Eysenck, 1952; Fenichel, 1946; Horney, 1946/2001; 1950/1991), but 
do not appear to deploy the term ‘nervous breakdown’ in their texts. Access to the 
popular discursive terrain of the time is more difficult since there are no databases that 
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have captured the dinner table and corridor conversations. Yet, it would seem that the 
term, in contrast with the psycho-medical literature, remained visible in popular 
discourse. Barke et al., (2000) contend that it was widely-used by middle-class 
Americans from the 1920s to the 1960s, although their paper is scantily referenced in 
this regard. Shorter (2013) finds a few more citations of its popular use in this era, 
including in the accounts that American soldiers returning from World War II gave to 
their doctors.  
 
The psycho-medical literature on ‘nervous breakdown’ diminishes after the meagre 
post-war offerings. References to it in the popular press also decrease after the 1950s 
(Barke et al., 2000; Shorter, 2013). The last stand seems to have been made by 
American doctor Frank Caprio (1969) in his self-help book How to Avoid a Nervous 
Breakdown. His work is resonant of that of Loosmore and his contemporaries, and 
offers tips on self-diagnosis and cure. Positioned as a doctor, Caprio gives ‘nervous 
breakdown’ a psycho-medical legitimacy, even though it still remained a popular 
term. Arguably he co-opted it into the realm of his expert interest and then fed it back, 
transformed by this expertise, to the public. As a self-help manual, it is debatable 
whether this text functions as part of the institutional literature or the popular 
literature. Again, this positions the term as somewhere between psy and popular 
spaces: in transit and liminal.  
 
Barke et al. (2000) and Shorter (2013) contend that there has been a decline in both 
clinical and public popularity of ‘nervous breakdown,’ after the mid-twentieth century 
owing to two major changes in the landscape of western medicine and psychology. 
Firstly, the American Psychiatric Association began publishing its series of official 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals (DSM) from 1952. This served to render the 
polarities between psychiatric and public terminologies highly visible, denoting the 
former as expertly correct and the latter as, if not incorrect, then insubstantial (Barke 
et al., 2000). Many argue that the position of expertise that the DSM taxonomy 
espouses has been reinforced by subsequent editions of the DSM and that this 
language is prioritised as expert in both clinical and popular spaces (e.g. Parker, 1999; 
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Wilson & Beresford, 2002). ‘Nervous breakdown’ is nowhere to be found in the DSM 
I (American Psychiatric Association, 1952). It was therefore explicitly dumped in the 
1950s by virtue of the DSM into a colloquial and inexpert position vis a vis the psy-
institution, and vis a vis the public for whom expert language functions to convey 
knowledge and legitimacy (Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013).  
 
Secondly, at the same time, the diagnoses of depression and anxiety were taking 
centre stage. Psychoanalysts had introduced the term depressive as an adjectival 
precursor to neurosis and as such it had become firmly established in the prevailing 
psy-discourse of the time and its ripple effects into the popular domain (Shorter, 
2013). As has been discussed, the shift from soma to psyche in explaining distress had 
gained momentum after World War I (Loughran, 2008). Non-analytic psychiatry had 
also begun to focus its attention on mood disorders, particularly hybrids of anxiety 
and depression, which they described as mental (and therefore not-physical) disorders 
(Shorter, 2009).  
 
Thus, psy-experts began to diagnose and construct the once nervous public as anxious 
and depressed, leaving little room for the likes of ‘nervous breakdown’ in the socio-
discursive space. The promulgation of the pharmacology for mood disorders, while re-
introducing the physiological into the psychological, has augmented the hegemony of 
these diagnostic constructs by reducing them to a biological determinism (Leader, 
2013; Shorter, 1997; 2009; 2013). Moreover, the re-introduction of a biological 
aetiology into the expert literature has not necessarily acted to diminish the stigma 
attached these diagnoses: while arguably less mad than psychotic diagnoses, they are 
still circumscribed by the stigma of a discourse of mental illness (e.g. Angermeyer & 
Matschinger, 2003).  
 
However, the purported disappearance of ‘nervous breakdown’ from the psycho-
medical literature after the mid-twentieth century is debatable. It has never been 
highly visible in this domain in the first place, except perhaps as a peripheral 
discursive accessory to the Victorian heyday of the nervous subject. Even then, 
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official clinical citations are limited to a handful. The literature that refers to it has 
always been scant, and yet always on the radar. This undermines the absolutism of 
disappearance that Shorter (2013) and Barke et al. (2000) refer to. In fact, Askanasy 
(1974) picks up on the trail that Caprio (1969) left a mere five years later. Omark 
enters the conversation in 1980, and again, while the conversation continues sketchily, 
it still continues. Shorter’s (2013) book marks the latest academic entry into the psy-
literature.  
 
The conversation about nerves and the nervous subject has never waned. Willis’s 
nervous subject of 1684, was transformed by the various Victorian clinicians and their 
patients who picked up on the term. It was never uniformly used nor uniformly 
understood within this era, even when coalesced around the diagnosis of neurasthenia 
(Gijwijt-Hofstra, 2001; Ishizuka, 2010). The nervous subject has been appropriated 
into psychoanalysis and its psychodynamic offshoots, again with huge discursive 
variability from Freud’s early work on neuroses to more recent work that attempts to 
find common ground between psychoanalysis and neuroscience (e.g. Fonagy, 2010; 
Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000).  
 
The nervous subject has also been taken up in different ways by the proliferation of 
specialities that mark the current medical landscape of expertise. For example, 
neuroscience, neurology and even neuropsychology lay claim to a biological 
substructure of the nerves and the brain, also with huge variability in what they mean 
by and do with nerves and the nervous (e.g. Biller, 2012; Heilman & Valenstein, 
2012; Lundy-Ekman, 2013). Other medical specialists from endocrinologists to 
gerontologists also speak of the nerves and the nervous, once again, meaning and 
doing different things with these constructs (e.g. Lee & Notterpeck, 2013; Smith, 
Betancourt & Sun, 2005). Interestingly, some of this medical discourse even deploys 
the terms ‘nervous’ and ‘breakdown’ – never as a discrete term – but nonetheless, 
discursively resonating with it (e.g. O’Toole et al., 2009; Sharma, 2005)  
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The greatest overlap in the contemporary talk of nerves in the medical terrain comes 
perhaps from the discourse of stress. While a highly heterogeneous construct itself 
(e.g. Odgen, 2002), medical and health experts seem conceptually unified in 
extrapolating that stress has a corrosive effect on the body’s nervous system, and that 
this nervous stress is highly predictive of physical and mental illness (e.g. Bennett, 
Rodrigues & Klein, 2013; O’Connor, Moynihan & Caserta, 2014; Vanltallie, 2002). 
This overlap is undoubtedly already present in the Victorian motif of nervous strain, 
but it has been reworked, with a high degree of contextual variability, in the 
contemporary discursive terrain (Brown, 1999). As discussed, the metaphor of 
breakdown, which the Victorian doctors borrowed from their engines, is still knocking 
about and not only under the microscopes of neuroendocrinology. Eminent British 
psychoanalyst, Christopher Bollas, released a book in 2012 entitled Catch Them 
Before They Fall: The Psychoanalysis of Breakdown. The language of breakdown has 
prevailed in the psy-discourse, with reference to a plethora of different subjects 
including self-control (e.g. Dewitte, 2013), relationships (e.g. Boden, Fergusson & 
Horwood, 2013), and foster care (e.g. Olsson, Egelund & Høst, 2012).  
 
The nervous subject also takes centre stage in feminist theory in the social sciences. 
The nervous woman is invoked in studies on gender oppression and mental health, 
ranging from anorexia nervosa (e.g. Malson, 1998) to hysteria (e.g. Briggs, 2000; 
Micale, 2008). She is invoked in literary studies, including in the deconstruction of the 
post-colonial woman (e.g. Shaw, 2007) and the deconstruction of Victorian 
romanticism (e.g. Logan, 1997). The nervous woman is also found in academic 
writing on production and labour (e.g. McRobbie, 2007), sport (e.g. Hargreaves, 
1994), and cyborgs (e.g. Balsamo, 1996) to name but a few more examples. Mainly, 
the ghost of the Victorian nervous woman is invoked in these texts but again, this in 
and of itself is not a homogenous and static construct, let alone when appropriated into 
other spaces, over a century later. Nonetheless, what this goes to show is that while 
references to ‘nervous breakdown’ may be scarce, the nerves and the nervous have 
been going strong. Unquestionably, the nervous subject and its permutations in locale 
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and form are closely related to ‘nervous breakdown.’ Yet, the official conversation on 
the latter term seems far less pervasive and mirrors its anecdotal status. 
 
1.3. In summary: ‘Nervous breakdown’ and this research  
What emerges from this review of the academic literature is that the academic 
literature on ‘nervous breakdown’ as a specific term is scarce. What there is, is both 
overwritten by and yet also created and legitimated by psy-discourse, and the use of 
the term waxes and wanes across this divide. It is intimately related to psycho-medical 
constructions of the nervous and stressed subject, and yet, not quite. It is given a status 
within this psy-discourse that is taken for granted by both the psy-researchers and 
public alike. It is used as an undefined short-hand, regarded as not only relevant to 
mental illness, but often indicative of it, particularly in the more contemporary 
research. Ironically, this same research (e.g. Rapport et al., 1998) tends to negate the 
label under the corrections of DSM taxonomies of depression, anxiety or 
schizophrenia.  
 
In the literature, ‘nervous breakdown’ is positioned as a lay term, and in some cases, 
as a term used by cultures designated as other to the modern west (e.g. Askanasy, 
1974; Cintrón et al., 2006). Yet, it is still rendered an object of interest to the authors 
of this research who, like the intrepid colonial anthropologist, go out to study it in situ 
but rush home to reclassify it according to a higher order taxonomy. Even when such 
authors do not do this, positioning it as a term with contextually-bound relevance for 
the folk, the lay, or the foreign, many of these emic endeavours are subverted by the 
lack of interrogation of the term itself, or its ultimate co-option into care-pathway 
recommendations or diagnostic recommendations (e.g. Jenkins, 1988; Nations et al., 
1988).  
 
Clinicians who have used the ‘nervous breakdown’ to sell self-help books have done 
so by subsuming it under their expertise while simultaneously positioning themselves 
as benign paternal figures in conversation with the public. This friendly duplicity is 
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arguably a more powerful appropriation of the term than that performed by those 
scientist-practitioners who do not pretend to be in dialogue with the public in the first 
place. These self-help authors appropriate the ‘nervous breakdown’ from the academic 
sidebar and the popular space into the realm of their expertise, re-selling it at a price, 
and imbued with the veneer of psy-legitimacy back to the public (e.g. Caprio, 1969; 
Musgrove, 1913). In most cases, they do not pause to signal to the reader that the term 
is not an official diagnosis, but neither do they pause to define it for themselves. 
Again, the term finds resonance with a popular taken-for-grantedness and legitimacy.   
 
This anecdotal, undefined colloquial slipping and sliding of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
across the literature suggests that it is not akin to a fixed thing at all, but rather that it 
is a social construction. It is a construct that is contextually bound and which serves a 
socio-discursive function for its users. Gove (2004) begins to suggest that it 
functioned in an explanatory fashion to avoid diagnoses of mental illness and 
hospitalization in a small sample of people. Wolfe (1933) suggests that it serves a 
similar function. Davis and Whitten (1988) point to the term’s variable socio-
historical discursive functions in a small Newfoundland community. Barke et al. 
(2000)’s social history of the term suggests too, that it served a purpose for the public 
who used it, particularly between World War I and World War II. They suggest it 
functioned to communicate individual difficulties in adapting to the contradictions of 
the modern era, but without suffering the stigma of a psychiatric gaze. Shorter (2013) 
explicitly suggests that it is a term, like the other nervous complaints, that avoids 
categorization into the crazy pole of the psychiatric diagnoses.  
 
The mere fact that nervous complaints have had so many vagaries and re-
appropriations since 1684 is all the more evidence suggesting they function as social 
constructs, and not as fixed things. Moreover, where they have functioned as 
reifications, they have often served the purposes of patriarchy and western 
colonization of the an-other (e.g. Appignanesi, 2008). For example, homosexuality 
functioned as a legitimate diagnosis of psychopathology until it was removed from the 
DSM in 1973 (Drescher, 2010). The racial, cultural and class-based biases in 
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psychometric testing have also had a longstanding role in lending scientific credibility 
to the perpetuation of discrimination against so-called others (Hudson, 1995). 
 
1.3.1. An excursion: Towards exploring current and popular constructions of 
‘nervous breakdown’ 
To return to where we started: the disparity in the use of, and interest in ‘nervous 
breakdown’ between the psy and popular domains is striking. It has currency for over 
nine million people on a Google internet search – more even, if I were able to count 
the number of people using it on forums, Twitter or Facebook. Perhaps it had the same 
or even greater currency a hundred years ago, but there was no space like the internet 
in which to capture a snapshot of its use. Since I started writing this chapter, actor 
Alan Cummings released his memoir, in which he, like Oprah Winfrey and Cheryl 
Cole, confesses to a ‘nervous breakdown’ (Cummings, 2014). Posters have gone up 
across London announcing the launch of a West End theatre production of Pedro 
Almodóvar’s Women on the Edge of a Nervous Breakdown. And yet, the latest 
offering from the meagre pickings of the psy-institution wants to reduce the term to a 
diagnosis of melancholia and thereby reintroduce it into the psychiatric taxonomy 
(Shorter, 2013). This not only reifies the term, nullifying its variable functions across 
space and time, but also remains deaf to the millions of people interested in and using 
the term. 
 
Clearly, given that ‘nervous breakdown’ exists within the socio-discursive 
imagination of so many, including psycho-medical practitioners, even if as a 
neologism or a footnote, it warrants interrogation. This is particularly important 
because it is so imbued with the discursive legacy of psy-diagnoses and also because 
the literature that exists on it tends to co-opt the term back into this taxonomy. The 
psy-institutions have laid claim to diagnosing, treating, and in some cases with-
holding the personal freedoms of those whom they diagnose (Parker, Georgaca, 
Harper, McLaughlin, & Stowell-Smith, 1995). They are supported by larger and more 
powerful institutions of knowledge, government and private sector business. This is an 
empowered cluster of institutions and the ways in which it constructs its patient-client 
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subjects has consequences for those people, who are arguably less empowered in 
interactions with these institutions (Crossley & Crossley, 2001; Foucault, 1965). 
Moreover, the discourses of these institutions carry clout in popular constructions of 
experience and identity, which emerge through dialogical, negotiated processes of 
discursive construction and re-appropriation at the psy-popular interface (Dineen, 
2004; Speed, 2006; Rose, 1985). This is deeply resonant of the liminal position of 
‘nervous breakdown’ that the literature has sketched out so far.  
 
This relational and liminal nature of ‘nervous breakdown’ runs like a red thread 
throughout talk about it. As discussed, it is both part of and extra to a psy-lexicon. 
Flipped the other way, it is both owned by and not owned by the lay subject. It exists, 
like most discursive constructs, somewhere in the elision between institutions, 
histories, and social climates. The current trend in mental health-care has purportedly 
shifted away from an overt psy-hierarchy to one of greater collaboration with subjects 
or service-users in order to address the historical disempowerment of the mad, bad 
and sad by those laying claim to their construction and cure (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999). 
Therefore, a counselling psychological research enterprise that aims to explore 
popular constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ would be consistent with this 
discipline-wide aim (McLeod, 2001; Rennie, 1994).  
 
Furthermore, there is an increasing awareness of the constructed and oppressive 
nature that psy-diagnostic categories and their consequences may hold for those 
subjects who are diagnosed (e.g. Cosgrove, 2005; Kitzinger, 1996). These critiques 
have pointed to the variability in constructions of mental illness over time and space 
(Horwitz, 2002). They have also emphasized the power imbalances and consequences 
thereof when certain subjects’ constructions of their experiences are marginalised, 
silenced or co-opted for distinctly oppressive purposes (Appignanesi, 2008; Hansen, 
2010). Those who are silenced are usually the patient-clients, not the psy-
professionals. As such it makes sense for contemporary counselling psychologists to 
be alert to discursive constructions marginalised from the expert realm especially 
when these constructions, such as that of ‘nervous breakdown,’ seem to be salient to 
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their potential clients
3
. After all, ‘nervous breakdown’ is already situated on the 
discursive door-step of the institution, with one foot in and one foot out of the waiting 
room.  
 
Thus disparities and relationships between the ways in which many would-be clients 
may be constructing their experiences of ‘nervous breakdown’ and the attention and 
credibility that psy-practitioners, including counselling psychologists, give to those 
constructions needs to be addressed. Speaking from a position within counselling 
psychology, this serves not only to understand those would-be clients better but also 
to intentionally not override their language and the social functions it performs for 
them with our so-called expert language (and the social functions this performs for us 
as practitioners). Moreover, even if those who use ‘nervous breakdown’ are not to be 
would-be clients, as the work of Gove (2004) and Barke et al. (2000) might suggest, 
this is of interest in itself. For if as these authors contend, ‘nervous breakdown’ 
performs the discursive function of avoiding being positioned in the psy-domain, then 
we need to ask ourselves why, and we need to ask this with discursive specificity: 
why are these people in this context wanting to avoid interfacing with psy-
practitioners? This would offer us useful critical commentary on our profession and its 
limitations within specific sites of practice. It would also offer insight as to how 
people might resist psy’s all-seeing gaze, and the other spaces and discourses they 
might consult when in distress. This again, is not only of sociological interest, but has 
a direct bearing on how we might direct future psy-practice. It speaks to which 
domains might not be within our purview, but which might still be useful to people in 
mediating distress.  
 
As such, this project aims to explore popular social constructions of ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ Given the paucity of research that is salient to this aim, the project is 
necessarily exploratory and modest. It is concerned primarily with how the subject 
navigates his/her way through the contemporary discursive terrain of ‘nervous 
                                                
3
 I use the word ‘client’ in accordance with counselling psychology’s preference for this nomenclature 
as opposed to psychiatry and psychoanalysis’ preference for ‘patient’  
 39 
breakdown’ and the implications of this for the subject and his/her relationships with 
psycho-medical practices, such as counselling psychology. This warrants a two-step 
research aim and process. Firstly, it necessitates a mapping of the contemporary 
popular discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ in order to have a sense of what 
discourses and positions are available to the subject. Secondly, in order to explore how 
the subject navigates this terrain, which subject positions he/she takes up, when and to 
what purpose, it is necessary to zoom in on subjective constructions of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ and the accounts of people who self-identify with the term. The nuts and 
bolts of this research process will be explained in detail in the following chapter on 
the methodology of this research. But for now, the Twitter feed is lighting up once 
again, and Google, through its all-seeing search engine, is advertising me a tonic 
called “Stress Damage Control,” which somehow its algorithm has linked to my 
perpetual search term of ‘nervous breakdown.’ At this point, it is quite clear that I am 
also positioned as subject in this nebulous discursive hinterland of ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ I am even considering buying the tonic.  
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2. Methodology 
I have divided this chapter into two main parts. The first part outlines the theoretical 
underpinnings that inform this thesis and situates the research within the conversation 
about discourse in psychology. It then elaborates on the main strands of discourse 
analysis that have contributed to the approach taken in this project, namely discursive 
psychology (DP) and Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA).These, while distinctive, 
can also be understood as complementary in allowing for psychological research that 
is both critical and discursive in nature (e.g. Edley, 2001; Wetherell, 1998). From this 
contextual position, the second part of the chapter provides an overview of the 
specific methods used to carry out the research. 
 
2.1. Situating the methodological approach 
As has been discussed in the previous chapter ‘nervous breakdown’ is a discursive 
construction. It appears within text, language and symbol and its meanings, uses and 
consequences differ across institution, speaker and context. By extension, to have a 
‘nervous breakdown’ is a meaning-making enterprise that requires one to draw upon a 
collective semiotic reservoir and is also socially, culturally and politically situated. 
The term can be appropriated, re-appropriated and also ignored by clients (would-be 
or would-not-be), psy-practitioners and institutions alike with variable consequences 
and purposes. Attempting to unpack moments when this happens and the implications 
of this for the subjectivities of people who self-identify with the construct and their 
concomitant relationships with psycho-medical practices, processes and institutions 
(not least of all counselling psychology) is the core aim of this research. 
 
Therefore any attempt to explore the term must deploy more discourse and requires 
me-as-researcher to reflexively engage in this discursive unfolding. As such, this 
research is situated within a critical social constructionist epistemology, and aims to 
use critical discourse analysis to explore the use of the term (i) through analysis of a 
selection of popular media texts to gain a sense of the current constructions of 
‘nervous breakdown’ and related subject positions that are made available in the 
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discursive terrain, and (ii) through the use of semi-structured interviews to explore 
how people who self-identify with the term accomplish this. The research is crucially 
engaged with the relationship between the discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
and how the subject navigates his/her way through, around, into and out of it.   
 
This description of approach implies a particular epistemological lens informing the 
research: social constructionism. Since the late 1970s, psychology has begun to 
engage more with this philosophical position and has produced a buffet of research 
and methodologies informed by it (Blackman, Cromby, Hook, Papadopoulos & 
Walkerdine, 2008). I have chosen to approach data collection and analysis in this 
research by drawing on both discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 
2012a) and Foucauldian discourse analysis (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008; 
Hollway, 1984; Parker, 1992). I elaborate on the rationale for this choice later in this 
chapter. First, though, I provide an overview of the epistemological stance of this 
project. 
 
2.1.1. Discourse, the critical and psychology 
This research is concerned with problematizing the construct of ‘nervous breakdown.’ 
The mere act of problematizing a discursive construct puts the spotlight on discourse 
as the site of investigation. It foregrounds an intention to disrupt a taken-for-granted 
use of this term: a critical intention to look at what it does for the people who use it 
within the contexts in which they use it. Finally, the genealogy of the term ‘nervous 
breakdown’ locates it in psychological territory and when partnered with a critical 
aim, locates it in critical psychological territory. This trifecta can be dissected from a 
number of angles: discourse, critical enterprise and critical psychology. It is beyond 
the scope of this piece of work to pay adequate homage to each of these domains but I 
will attempt to expand on their inter-relationship and their relevance for this piece of 
work in terms of epistemology and subsequent methodology. 
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2.1.2. The crisis in social psychology 
The latter half of the twentieth century has arguably been defined by a challenging of 
white, western and patriarchal hegemony and a concurrent exposing of practices and 
ideologies that act to oppress minorities. While this hegemony still continues in many 
ways, the challenges posed to it have demanded that institution and individual alike, 
not least of all psychology, re-think their relationships with those deemed as other 
(e.g. Gilroy, 2012). The disaffection for the oppressive practices of the western 
canonical status quo began gathering global visibility and velocity from the late 1950s 
onwards. It encompassed many sites of resistance including second-wave feminism, 
post-colonialism, the anti-psychiatry movement and the gay liberation movement (e.g. 
Altman, 1971/2001; Cooper, 1967/2001; Fanon, 1952/1967; Friedan, 1963). 
 
The uneasiness with the way in which the psy-institution addressed the human being 
both individually and socially was echoed in psychology. Key theorists took issue 
with the potentially oppressive and reductionist nature of social psychology’s 
preoccupation with quantitative science, its system of norms and its application of 
experimental methods to categorizing human beings. There was a call for a discipline 
that considered the impact of social, historical and cultural contexts on human 
experience (Armistead, 1974; Gergen, 1973; Reason & Rowan, 1981). This has been 
widely recognized as the crisis in social psychology (e.g. Parker, 1989; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). 
 
This crisis led to a review of the methods of enquiry in social psychology by those 
concerned that the scientific method was missing out on the contextual nature of 
people’s experiences and implicitly colluding with systems of oppression. Qualitative 
methods emerged as an alternative within social psychology and among them, social 
constructionist critiques of the discipline (Parker, 1999b; Smith, Harré & Van 
Langenhove, 1995). Psychology, now seeking alternative ways to theorize and 
research human experience, began borrowing ideas and methods from the other social 
sciences. This heralded psychology’s turn to discourse (Potter, 2012b). 
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From the 1950s, philosophy, sociology and anthropology had begun to show an 
interest in language and symbolic systems. The approach to language shifted. Once 
conceptualized as a realist labelling of the speaker’s internal world, the possibility that 
language might be a performative act that constructed versions of a social reality 
began to be explored. Social psychology, looking to revise its relationship with its 
subjects, began to work with language not as a direct route to discovering people’s 
internal truths but rather as a social resource that people could use to construct 
versions of their realities (Taylor, 2001;Willig, 2013). This included thinking about 
language as a resource that psychology itself could and did use to construct its 
subjects, patients and practitioners (e.g. Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & 
Walkerdine, 1984). 
 
As such, language, how people do language and the consequences of doing language 
became a legitimate focus for psychological investigation and critique. How this was 
done, though, depended on which epistemological paradigm theorists subscribed to 
and what they thought was important in re-writing psychological research. In this 
research, approaches to language informed by a social constructionist epistemology 
have been used. These are broadly termed discourse analysis. Before elaborating on 
these, I will briefly discuss social constructionism so as to flesh out the assumptions 
underpinning the project’s approach to discourse.  
 
2.1.3. Social constructionism  
‘Nervous breakdown’ is a discursive construction. As argued in the introduction, its 
meanings have varied across time, space and context and have been negotiated and re-
negotiated through language and symbol. Therefore an exploration of this construct 
and what it does for those who use it, must necessarily be located in a paradigm of 
knowledge that is also discursive, constructionist, social and to some degree, relativist. 
As such, this research is congruent with a social constructionist epistemology. 
 
Social constructionism is a broad epistemological church and the methods it has 
informed in psychology are varied. However, those who draw on it share a critique of 
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mainstream psychology’s presiding assumption that scientific methods of enquiry lead 
to the knowing of objective truths (Willig, 2013). Social constructionists argue that 
the ways in which we can come to know our world vary across history, society and 
culture. They contend that our knowing changes and is changed by context. This 
variability leads social constructionism to problematise the notion of truth. It suggests 
that what we may construe as truth at any given time depends on the historical, social, 
cultural and political contexts in which the truth-maker finds him/herself. This 
necessitates a relativist stance to reality: one that claims (at least theoretically) that 
there are as many versions of reality as there are subjects capable of constructing them 
(Burr, 2003). 
 
Consonant with this, social constructionists claim that identities and categories of 
person are fluid and variable across context and are also socially constructed (e.g. 
Shotter, 1993). Therefore, a social constructionist approach focuses on the processes 
of constructing realities and identities (Durrheim, 1997). It looks to language as the 
key mediator of the process of social construction and contends that we can only 
construct our realities via the symbolic and language resources (oft termed discourses) 
available to us and suggests that language is therefore constitutive, not representative, 
of these (Gergen, 1985; Danziger, 1997). Since discursive resources are shared within 
a culture or society, constructions of realities and identities are understood as social 
acts of co-construction (Henriques et al., 1984). 
 
Theorists occupying a more critical position contend that not all truths or identities are 
rendered equal or equally available at any given time. They argue that those truths and 
identities constructed and reified by powerful institutions are hegemonic and carry 
more socio-political clout than others and are entrenched in society as if they were 
real. This, it is argued, has important material consequences for the freedom and 
oppression of people (e.g. Burr, 1998; Parker, 1999a). For example, a person can be 
constructed as a patient, diagnosed with (constructed as) “x” and then be treated with 
(or subjected to) “y.” This position alludes to an agenda for social change and 
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suggests that the work of deconstruction has the aim of drawing attention to the 
oppressive practices of hegemonic truth systems (Fairclough, 2001).  
 
Given that the aim of this research is to examine not only the subjective 
construction(s) of ‘nervous breakdown’ by those who self-identify with the term, but 
also the implications of these constructions, it takes a position within social 
constructionism that acknowledges the relativism of truth constructs but situates these 
within relationships of power and aims to at least consider their more material 
consequences. Taking up this position situates my role as active in authoring this text. 
It demands that I be reflexive about my involvement in the interplay between 
constructing a version of knowing something about ‘nervous breakdown’ and doing 
this within the vanguard of a hegemonic institution: psychology.  
 
2.1.4. Discourse and discourse analysis 
Given that social constructionism foregrounds discourse as the site where we 
construct our-selves and our realities, discourse analysis of talk, text or image has 
evolved as the key methodology for research conducted in this paradigm. As Potter, 
Wetherell, Gill and Edwards (1990) discuss, defining discourse can be problematic. 
Definitions of discourse are variable by and within discipline. A definition can also be 
problematic because many discourse analysts are epistemologically opposed to fixing 
anything as inherently truthful. As Antaki, Billig, Edwards and Potter (2003) contend, 
adopting one definition of discourse over another is foremost an indication of one’s 
location in the theoretical terrain and one’s concomitant approach to research 
methodology.  
 
Definitions of discourse used in discourse analysis tend to suggest that a discourse is 
akin to a grouping of statements, ideas or images which together can construct a 
version of an event, a person, or a thing. For example, Fairclough (1996, p. 71), cites 
his use of discourse as referring “to any spoken or written language use conceived of 
as social practice.” He points to its constitutive and intersubjective nature. 
Synonymously, Parker (1992, p. 5) opts for a working definition of discourse as “a 
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system of statements which constructs an object,” thereby suggesting that that 
discourses have a recognizable coherence. Burr (2003, p. 64) suggests discourse to be 
“a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on 
that in some way together produce a particular version of events.” She points out the 
constitutive and variable nature of discourse. Burr, like Parker, also suggests some 
type of internal organization to a discourse. 
 
Approaches to discourse analysis are as variable as definition. They invariably have 
common features but differ in focus (Van Dijk, 1997). Within social psychology, 
Wetherell and Edley (1999, p. 338) observe that it has become increasingly common 
to distinguish between two main “camps” in discourse analysis: those approaches 
more affiliated with the fine-grain style of conversation analysis and 
ethnomethodology and those that sit closer to a post-Foucauldian and more critical 
style of analysis. The former are generally accommodated under the umbrella term of 
discursive psychology and the latter under Foucauldian discourse analysis (Willig, 
2013). 
 
Notably, these approaches have been understood to differ in their theoretical 
foundations, the types of research questions they address (construct), and thus what 
they choose to focus on in the research process (Burr, 2003; Willig, 2013). They differ 
in how they understand and situate discourse and thus offer different possibilities for 
human agency and experience (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). Moreover, they differ in 
how they conceptualize discourse. For example, methods drawn from a Foucauldian 
discourse analytic tradition foreground the constitutive nature of discourse and its 
power to shape and regulate human subjectivity. They seek to deconstruct reified 
discursive constructions of identity, institution or thing in order to highlight the 
constraints and conditions that these put upon people (e.g. Parker 1992). In contrast, 
methods drawn from discursive psychology understand discourse to be the tool 
through which people actively construct versions of reality in situ. They focus on 
deconstructing the localized deployment of discourse and the ways in which 
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discursive actors might negotiate identity, meaning or experience within a specific 
social interaction (e.g. Wiggins & Potter, 2008).   
 
To best address a research question that aims to gain some understanding of the 
construction of ‘nervous breakdown’ and what it does for those who identify with it, I 
have had to consider both the genealogical and regulatory nature of discourse and also 
the localized discursive agent. As such, this research draws on approaches from both 
Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA) and discursive psychology (DP), and then 
moves into the realm of critical discursive psychology (CDP). CDP attempts to 
reconcile a discursive psychology with more a critical endeavour. I will briefly discuss 
these approaches individually before outlining the more synthetic approach to 
discourse analysis taken in this thesis.   
 
2.1.4.1. Foucauldian discourse analysis 
Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA) is heavily influenced by post-structuralism and 
in particular, the work of Michel Foucault (e.g.1965/1988; 1969/2008). In the late 
1970s, many social psychologists began to draw on post-structuralism as a way to 
respond to the crisis in social psychology. They used it to re-theorize subjectivity as 
socially constructed through discourse and began to change the gaze of psychology to 
critically considering its own processes of constructing truths about human experience 
(Henriques et al., 1984). Theorists drew on and developed critiques of psychology 
which highlight what Rose (1985, p. 9) calls the “psy-complex.” This describes how 
the self-referential system of psychology’s truths about human experience, legitimized 
by psychology’s institutionalized status and reified by its foothold in the scientific 
method, shape the possibilities of how people can be and what can happen to them 
(Arribas-Allyon & Walkerdine, 2008). 
 
There is no one way to do Foucauldian discourse analysis and its theoretical 
foundations eschew essentialism. It can be best described as a cluster of approaches to 
deconstructing discourse which agree that discourses are constitutive, not 
representative, of our social realities and that we draw on them, as if from socially 
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available repositories of meaning, to make sense of our worlds, ourselves and one 
another. A discourse is understood to be the coalescence of systems of meaning that 
come together to construct a particular version of an object, experience or person 
(Parker, 1992). 
 
Discourses are differently available to people across space and time, and enable or 
prohibit what can be said and experienced by whom and what can happen to that 
person as a result. In this way, discourses routinely act to position the speaker, author 
or institution in various, even conflicting, discursive spaces. These locations of the 
subject are referred to as subject positions and they signify sites-in-discourse or 
vantage points from which one can produce versions of reality and construct 
renditions of oneself, others and society (Davies & Harré, 1990). A subject position 
carries with it sets of rights, obligations and practices that are commensurate with re-
producing and performing that position or point of view of reality (Harré & Van 
Langenhove, 1999). Therefore, when a person takes up a particular subject position or 
is located in one, it has implications for his or her subjectivity and experience. 
Consider, for example, how a person positioned as immigrant might be treated at the 
border of a country that defines itself as having an immigration problem, such as the 
UK or USA and how this might differ if the same person was to be positioned as 
citizen.  
 
FDA is therefore particularly concerned with how discourses constrain, enable and 
thus “produce” the subjects of which they speak and the material effects of this 
(Carabine, 2001, p. 276). For Foucauldian theorists, discourses and the discursive 
positioning of subjects are intimately tied up with social practices that legitimize 
powerful institutions and promote their interests. Given that discourses offer the 
means for constructing social realities – among them versions of selves, others and 
norms – those espoused and endorsed by powerful socio-political actors become more 
dominant than those of actors and groups who are located on the margins. In this way, 
in a Foucauldian sense, discourses extend beyond the symbolic and into the 
institutional practices that organize and regulate social life. The more dominant 
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discourses often become hegemonic, that is to say they become reified and 
institutionalized as the truth and thus become very difficult to challenge (Willig, 
2013). 
 
Hence, the genealogical interest of FDA: a primary concern with the historic evolution 
of discourses and how the construction of subjectivities has changed over time. This 
allows one to begin to disrupt hegemonic, reified discourses by making explicit the 
shifting meanings, interests and practices on which they have been built (Carabine, 
2001). This is what Foucault (2008/1969) meant when he brought the metaphor of 
archaeology to his work. He sought to show how things such as sexuality, madness 
and justice are not things at all but rather discursive constructions. He argued that the 
more hegemonic constructions of these so-called things have acted to normalize the 
interests of governments, capitalism, patriarchy, heterosexuality, Judeo-Christian 
morality and so on, by positioning those who challenge those interests as other. Those 
people and practices positioned as other to the norm are then able to be subjected to 
practices, discursive and otherwise, of exclusion, correction or punishment. FDA’s 
understanding of the socially and historically constructed nature of hegemonic 
discourses allows for alternative discourses and alternative ways of constructing 
subjectivity to be explicated (Arribas-Allyon &Walkerdine, 2008). 
 
FDA enables a socio-political theorization of subjectivity and reality. It allows one to 
explore the relationship between widely shared symbolic systems, that come together 
as discourses, to construct and thus regulate human experience. Theorizing human 
experience and subjectivity is arguably one of the core purposes of the discipline 
psychology. FDA offers a crucial challenge to the essentialist interiority of the a-
political individual that psychoanalysis and cognitive-behaviourism have constructed. 
 
However, FDA has been critiqued, among others, for the passivity it ascribes to the 
individual and his/her use of use discourse (e.g. Caldwell, 2007). By limiting the 
parameters for the production of subjectivity to pre-existing discourses in the socio-
cultural milieu, it constrains the agency of the discursive subject. It offers little 
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consideration of situated language use or how people might use discourse in specific 
contexts to construct and re-negotiate identities and ideological positions to manage 
interests particular to that interaction. Discursive psychological approaches to 
discourse analysis explicitly address this limitation. 
 
2.1.4.2. Discursive psychology 
Instead of turning to post-structuralism to address the crisis in psychology, discursive 
psychology (DP) drew from the traditions of ethnomethodology and conversation 
analysis. Following these sources, DP’s primary concern and challenge to cognitive 
science lies in its focus on the flexibility and action orientation of people’s use of 
discourse in specific social contexts (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 
1987). As opposed to examining the discursive terrain in which the subject is 
constructed (as in FDA), DP suggests that people construct versions of social reality 
by using discourse as a resource to manage and negotiate their personal investments in 
particular social interactions. Thus DP focuses on how the discursive actor 
accomplishes and performs social action with his or her talk in situ. 
 
DP does not, however, suggest that people intentionally plot and plan ways in which 
to use discourse to achieve their interpersonal interests. DP does not seek out a 
motivation located behind talk. In this sense, it runs counter to the cognitivist and 
realist assumptions which dominate psychology and which understand language to be 
an accurate representation of a person’s internal world. Rather, discursive 
psychologists posit that people draw on psychological constructions such as identity, 
experience or memory in their talk to help them make sense of the world and thus to 
construct versions of reality. DP thus offers a different way to theorize and study 
traditional sites of interest in psychology. DP reconceptualizes psychological activities 
such as justifying, persuading, blaming, justifying, rationalizing etc. as discursive 
strategies that help people further manage their interests in the microcosm of 
conversation (e.g. Edwards, 2006; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 2012a). 
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In order to interrogate what social actions people are accomplishing with their talk and 
how they are doing so, a discursive psychological analysis zooms in on the precise 
discursive and rhetorical devices people use in a specific conversational piece. 
Additionally, given its focus on situated and everyday language use, DP has a 
preference for using naturally occurring talk and has even come to opt out of the 
research interview itself (Potter, 2011). Such a situated approach forecloses the 
analysis to the specific site of the interaction in question and prevents it from 
considering its location within the wider discursive practices that constitute its 
speakers, the space in which they speak: the social, cultural, historical and political 
discursive macrocosm in which they are situated. The specificity of DP also makes the 
position of the discourse analyst problematic, for it is only his/her position within the 
wider discursive terrain that allows him/her meaningful access to the talk in the first 
place. 
 
Notably, Parker (1999b) critiques DP for neglecting to address how structures of 
power have shaped the discursive resources that are made available or unavailable to 
the participants in the conversation under analysis. He contends that DP’s silence 
about the broader discursive context of its analysis offers no platform from which to 
challenge oppressive discourses and potentially colludes in reconstructing the a-
political reductionism of mainstream psychology that it seeks to challenge. Moreover, 
DP’s preoccupation with situated language use also prevents it from theorizing 
subjectivity, arguably the cornerstone of the discipline of psychology (Willig, 2013). 
DP’s molecular gaze allows for identities to be understood only as an immediate 
discursive accomplishment. The same micro-linguistic and situated focus of a 
discursive psychological analysis that allows it to foreground the discursive agency of 
its subjects also handicaps it from addressing how this agency is made possible in the 
first place. 
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2.1.5. A synthetic approach: Combining Foucauldian discourse analysis and 
discursive psychology 
Several discourse analysts have suggested that the differences between FDA and DP 
are not incommensurate (Edley, 2001; Holt, 2011; Wetherell, 1998). Finding a way to 
synthesize these approaches, given their theoretical and methodological contrasts, is 
challenging. The tensions between FDA and DP include different understandings of 
the relationship between language and agency. DP suggests that people have a great 
deal of agency in their everyday language use which they use functionally to 
accomplish intersubjective interests. In contrast, FDA suggests that people are more 
constrained by what wider societal discourses make available to them and their 
subjectivities are consequently regulated and shaped by these discourses. As such they 
differ in their foci of discursive inquiry, with FDA looking to deconstruct broad-based 
discursive practices and DP focusing on the minutiae of situated language use and its 
immediate social functions. As a result of these tensions, FDA and DP tend to sit in 
separate methodological camps and are not generally combined (Wetherell, 1998). 
 
However, both approaches share an epistemological position that aims to challenge 
the cognitive essentialism of psychology and which understands reality to be 
pluralistic and constructed by socially situated and socially pliable discourses. Both 
approaches are hallmarked by a shared interest in understanding how discourse does 
things in the social field and to what effect. In this sense, they can be seen as 
compatible, differing only in the degree of agency and flexibility they accord the 
individual in using discourse to construct versions of a social reality. 
 
Wetherell (1998) and Edley (2001) have suggested that the differences between FDA 
and DP approaches to discourse analysis are reconcilable in the interests of 
responding more productively to a research question that wishes to address the 
interface between the social field that shapes a discursive construct and positions its 
subjects and the discursive agents who can and do repurpose that construct. Edley and 
Wetherell have since produced a number of research pieces which employ a more 
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synthetic methodology (e.g. Wetherell & Edley 1998; 1999; 2009; Edley & Wetherell, 
1996; 1997; 1999; 2008). 
 
2.1.5.1. Critical discursive psychology 
Wetherell (1998) posits that a more flexible methodology that bridges micro and 
macro discursive approaches rather than one constrained by theoretical rigidity proves 
most useful for understanding the relationships between the individual, subjectivity 
and social practice. Wetherell (1998, p. 405) situates these synthetic approaches 
within the realm of critical discursive psychology (CDP) and contends that it “is a 
discipline concerned with the practices which produce persons, notably discursive 
practices, but seeks to put these in a genealogical context.” This approach argues that 
while people have the agency to construct and reconstruct versions of themselves and 
the world within particular social interactions and for particular interactional purposes, 
they can only do so by drawing on the discursive repertoires made available to them 
by their wider contexts (Edley, 2001). In other words, a person’s discursive agency is 
limited by the discursive resources on offer to him or her in a particular context, yet he 
or she has the agency to choose which of these resources to use and when and also has 
the power, perhaps, to re-negotiate them to a certain extent. 
 
As such, CDP explores the dialogue between discursive practices which act to 
constitute subjectivity and the subjects who act to construct and reconstruct their 
positions in the discursive field. It posits that each informs the other and that the 
constructive use of discourse by an agentic subject impacts upon the discourses and 
institutions that also serve to regulate and constitute her or him. To serve this 
understanding of the two-way relationship between subject and discourse, Wetherell 
(1998) and Edley (2001) take an approach to discourse analysis that integrates three 
key foci. These are: interpretive repertoires (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987), ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) and subject positions 
(Davies & Harré, 1990). 
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Interpretative repertoires were first introduced into social psychology by Potter and 
Wetherell’s (1987, p. 138) seminal work which defines them as “a lexicon or register 
of terms and metaphors drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events.” 
They imply more flexibility for the speaker than a strictly Foucauldian definition of 
discourse through their bridging of macro and micro discursive sites: they are “drawn” 
by the speaker from the broader discursive field into the immediacy of situated talk 
for the purpose of constructing some sort of meaning. They allude to smaller and more 
fragmented bytes of discourse than the highly organized Foucauldian notion of 
discourse and thus offer more room for emergent spontaneity, creativity and 
variability in the agent’s construction of meaning across different sites. 
 
There is without a doubt significant conceptual overlap between discourse and the 
term interpretive repertoire (Burman & Parker, 1993; Holt, 2011; Parker, 1992; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Even those who explicitly use interpretative repertoires in 
their discourse analyses admit to using the terms interchangeably (e.g. Potter et al., 
1990). Both terms are constitutive of socially available symbolic reservoirs of 
meaning. However, they signal different approaches to discourse analysis where the 
use of discourse indicates an allegiance with Foucauldian approaches that are more 
preoccupied with the institutionalized nature of discourses and their power to regulate 
selves and social practices (e.g. Parker, 1992). In order to be able to introduce notions 
of the situated nature of discursive practice by a subject who has some discursive 
agency into the analysis, Wetherell and Potter (1992) consider the category of 
interpretative repertoire more useful. 
 
Exploring the variability in constructions of subjects and objects across context is 
crucial to a critical enterprise seeking to destabilize the illusion of unitary truths. 
Wetherell (1998) and Edley (2001) suggest the identification of ideological dilemmas 
in a discourse analysis allows for this. Billig et al. (1988) use the term ideological 
dilemma to highlight the dilemmas inherent in our common-sense constructions of 
reality. They point to the plethora of contradictory and competing common-sense 
constructions of how the world is, and suggest that our daily navigation of these 
 55 
dilemmas in the discursive field involves constant processes of reasoning and re-
negotiation. This is particularly pertinent to this research as identifying ideological 
dilemmas allows some access to the different, even oppositional constructions of 
‘nervous breakdown’ and the people who have them that are prevalent in the 
discursive terrain. In addition, as an analytic concept, ideological dilemmas allow this 
research to examine how these discursive tensions are negotiated in everyday 
interactions and thus in the situated talk of the discursive agent who draws on 
‘nervous breakdown’ to construct versions of subjective experience. 
 
The critical discursive psychology of Wetherell (1998) and Edley (2001) also draws 
on subject positions – a concept borrowed from the more Foucauldian approaches to 
analysis. Its use lies in its conceptual ability to connect broader discourses and 
interpretative repertoires with particular constructions of the individual (Edley, 2001). 
People take up particular positions offered up by interpretative repertoires: these 
repertoires delineate which positions are available to which subjects and thus offer but 
also constrain the possibilities for subjective construction and concomitant social 
action. In other words, the subject is positioned and can position him or herself within 
discourse. Subject positions are fluid and allow people to adapt their positions to some 
extent in order to manage the different contexts they regularly face (Harré, & Van 
Langenhove, 1999). As such, a person can draw on different subject positions made 
available to him/her to achieve a particular social function – perhaps to persuade 
another of competence or to justify an action. 
 
Foucauldian discourse analysis, discursive psychology and the critical discursive 
psychology put forward by Wetherell (1998) and Edley (2001) have greatly 
influenced the approach I have taken in this research. However, I have prioritized 
addressing the research aim as fully as possible over methodological preciousness. 
Many discourse analysts advocate this pragmatic approach and recommend that 
methodology be tailored to research endeavour rather than shoe-horning the research 
into a particular approach (e.g. Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).    
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2.1.6. Developing an analytical approach to explore ‘nervous breakdown’ and its 
subjects 
In order to best answer a research question that aims to explore the discursive 
construction of ‘nervous breakdown’ but which recognizes it to be a construct situated 
both in the wider socio-historical field, and also within the talk of people who self 
identify with the term, I have had to find an approach that is sensitive to both sites and 
which supports a critical gaze. Neither FDA or DP alone is able to adequately 
accomplish this but used complimentarily, they can. FDA informs an approach which 
considers how broader social, historical and political discursive practices shape what 
can be said about ‘nervous breakdown’ and by whom and thereby maps out a 
discursive terrain for ‘nervous breakdown’ and the subjects it constructs. I believe this 
process of mapping to be crucial to a piece of research that is exploratory and for 
which there is little precedent. As discussed, very little work on ‘nervous breakdown’ 
exists in the contemporary academic literature. Yet, it appears to be currently and 
widely used in popular discourse. This necessitates a consideration of the relationship 
between the wider discursive practices that have historically constructed ‘nervous 
breakdown’ and the contemporary subjects they, in turn, construct.  
 
Adopting FDA's wide angle lens on the discursive construction of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ also allows this research to consider the relationship between the 
construct and the subjectivities of those who use it. It enables the research to explore 
the discursive field and concomitant subject positions that ‘nervous breakdown’ 
makes available for a person to construct versions of him or herself. This approach 
further allows the research to explore what having a ‘nervous breakdown’ might 
enable or prevent a person from doing in relation to the institutions in which she or he 
is located. For example, would that person be able to access psychological therapy? 
Would he/she even consider such therapy needed? And would that vary depending on 
how he/she could use the construct and thus his/her subject position relative to 
‘nervous breakdown’? 
 
 57 
However, given the contrast in the ubiquity of the use of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
between the psy-institutions and the popular field, it would seem that individuals have 
repurposed the construct out of its genealogical home. This suggests an agency in the 
individual’s use of the construct. Foucauldian discourse analysis cannot adequately 
address this agency but discursive psychological approaches can. DP allows the 
research to examine the very sites where the individual’s reconstruction of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ occurs. It also allows this research to ask what social function this 
reconstruction might serve for individuals. In combination with FDA, this research 
can extend this question out of immediate talk and into the realm of a social 
subjectivity – and ask what, at the site of interface between individual and institution, 
might motivate or compel a person to draw on a particular construction of ‘nervous 
breakdown’?  
 
Wetherell (1998) and Edley (2001)’s synthetic CDP approach seems most aligned 
with addressing the research aims of this project. In its bridging of the macro and 
micro it considers the dialogical relationship between the discursive field and the 
agents positioned in it. It opens space for these agents to be both regulated by 
discursive practices but also to explore how they resist this regulation. For example, it 
would allow an analysis to consider how having a ‘nervous breakdown’ might 
construct a subject who is seen as unable to handle stress and also how the same 
subject could have a ‘nervous breakdown’ in order to justify a time-out from these 
same stressors.  
 
Moreover, using an approach that can consider both the macro discursive field that 
constitutes and regulates ‘nervous breakdown’ and also the agency with which people 
re-appropriate the construct has a significant critical and reflexive function. This 
research is situated in the psy-domain whose discourses of expertise have often acted 
to mute the agency of the subjects they construct – rendering them passive patients 
awaiting diagnostic enlightenment. Furthermore, as discussed, ‘nervous breakdown’ 
originated in the peripheries of the psy-diagnostic terrain, and was allied to 
constructing all manner of subjects. In addition, the academic literature has tended to 
 58 
subsume the construct under other psy-diagnoses, rendering it a marginal 
colloquialism. Therefore, a purely Foucauldian approach that renders the subject as 
relatively passive in the discursive field, risks re-producing this institutional silencing 
of the individual’s agency in constructing his or her experience of having a ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ However, an approach that only pays homage to individual agency and 
does not acknowledge its constraints would be naïve to the power of institutionalized 
discursive practices, not least of all psy-practices (which include this piece of 
research), to shape people’s experiences. It would thus risk re-locating the site of 
responsibility for ‘nervous breakdown’ with the individual only.  
 
A methodological approach that transitions between these macro and micro discursive 
sites highlights the dilemmatic position of this research. It is both critical but also 
positioned within a psychological doctoral programme and thus capable of re-
appropriating popular constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ into the arms of psy-
discourse. However, this liminal space can be a site of exchange. It brings popular 
discursive constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ as a legitimate site of interest into 
psy-forums and foregrounds its significance for some of the people we purport to 
understand and assist. It also allows for reflexive consideration of the psy-institution’s 
role in shaping their experiences. As psychologists we cannot help but construct 
subjects every time we speak, write or practice. However, we can do so in a more 
dialogical and less prescriptive fashion, allowing for the other’s constructions of 
subjectivity and experience to hold relevance in the conversation. The aims of this 
research are modest but I believe that its position as critical but scripted by a trainee 
counselling psychologist allows for it to contribute to the body of work and 
practitioners that are facilitating a greater sense of dialogue between the psy-
institution and the public.  
 
2.1.7. Analytic approach 
Many researchers advocate prioritizing the research question over methodological 
fealty. They endorse a pragmatic approach to methodology and therefore consider 
pluralism to be a strength (e.g. Frost, 2011). In this research, an approach that 
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combines elements of FDA and DP appears to offer the most productive scaffolding 
from which to explore popular constructions of ‘nervous breakdown.’ I have therefore 
adopted a combined methodological approach that draws significantly from the 
critical discursive psychology of Wetherell (1998) and Edley (2001). This understands 
FDA and DP to be compatible and able together to render a more holistic and 
reflexive account of discourse and its effects. As an approach that synthesizes DP and 
FDA, it addresses both the constitutive and constructive nature of discourse in the 
same analysis, looking at both interpretative repertoires that constitute the discursive 
terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ and the ways in which these are deployed in situ by 
discursive agents constructing contextually-motivated accounts of ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ I detail the specific analytic method adopted in the discussion of research 
methods later in this chapter.  
 
2.2. Overview of methods 
Having outlined the epistemological and methodological position of the critical 
discursive psychological approach taken in this thesis, the rest of this chapter will 
consider how this approach has been applied in the practice of this research. It will 
supply an overview of the methods used for data collection and analysis and the 
rationale for their use. As discussed in the introduction, this research comprises of two 
studies. The first is a mapping of the discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
through an analysis of the ways in which it is constructed by the popular media. The 
second is an analysis of in-depth interviews with people who have self-identified with 
the construction of ‘nervous breakdown.’ A synthesis of the results of these studies is 
presented in subsequent chapters. 
 
2.2.1. Media study 
Mapping the discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown:’ An analysis of popular media  
 
The aim of this study is to map out the discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ as 
constructed by contemporary popular media: to get a sense of the available discursive 
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currency for talking about ‘nervous breakdown’ and its subjects and the potential 
consequences of these repertoires and positions. This is intended to provide a wider 
discursive context in which to situate the following study which examines how people 
who identify with ‘nervous breakdown’ deploy the construct in situ. Given the limited 
scope of this project, the mapping will necessarily be a brief overview, and the focus 
of the research will be on the in-depth interviews where an analysis can consider more 
fully the interface between the discursive agent and the wider discursive field. 
  
As discussed, there is a huge disparity between the popular and psy-sanctioned uses of 
‘nervous breakdown.’ On 11 June 2014, a Google web search returned 9, 860, 000 
results for ‘nervous breakdown.’ The same search on the PsychInfo database returned 
only twenty-two results for ‘nervous breakdown’ as the subject of a research title. For 
a term born and bred in the wings of psy-diagnostic discourses of the nineteenth 
century and then all but obliterated by the hold-alls of depression and anxiety in the 
twentieth century, its contemporary popular currency is as striking as the lack of 
literature on it. As such, this research is exploratory, and as with most exploratory 
work, reconnaissance of the unknown is the first step.  
 
2.2.2. Methods used in media study 
The popular media, because of its relative availability to all and its position as arbiter 
of social truths, is regarded as an extremely powerful regulator of social discourse 
(Silverstone, 2002). Its radical democratization by the internet has allowed local 
media to be accessed across borders and languages, and has also allowed the public to 
self-publish, dialogue with the institutionalized media and regulate the ratings and 
visibility of media stories (Deibert, 2000; Grossman, 1995). As such, an online media 
analysis seemed to offer the most scope for mapping out a popular and contemporary 
discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown.’ 
 
I considered including social media in this part of the analysis, given its increasing 
influence on social discourse (Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy & Silvestre, 2011). 
However, it is a vast territory with rapidly shifting sites of influence and its 
 61 
exploration was thus outside of the scope of this study and merits further study of its 
own. Although the lines between institutionalized media stories and those scripted by 
the public are blurry, research indicates that this can reinforce the illusion of veracity 
of big names such as The Times or CNN as their institutionalized position offers 
recognizable legitimacy in the sea of blogs and Tweets (Gunter, Campbell, Touri & 
Gibson, 2009). In order to access texts that would have the most far-reaching salience 
for as many people as possible, I turned to online articles authored by recognizable 
media institutions.  
 
This choice of media also supports the more critical aim of this research as it 
examines texts produced by powerful institutions who persuasively deploy their 
brands and their rhetoric to position themselves and their texts as truthful and 
supported by rigorous evidence and experts. As such, they are crucibles of dominant 
discourses of ‘nervous breakdown’ and its subjects and warrant a critical gaze.  
  
2.2.2.1. Sampling 
I entered the search term ‘nervous breakdown’ into the Google search engine to find 
articles that cited this exact phrase. I used Google as it is currently the most popular 
and integrated search engine worldwide (Levy, 2011). I used the search term ‘nervous 
breakdown’ initially without any permutations as I wanted to access articles that 
would have had the most direct bearing on the discursive terrain of ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ As indicated, this search retrieved over nine million results in English. I 
filtered these to find articles by recognizable news brands, believing that as a subject 
also situated in the popular field, those brands that I recognized would hold valence 
for many other people. Such overlap can only ever be partial and the brands I 
recognized undoubtedly reflected my position as a media-aware, English-speaking, 
thirty-something academic. However, discourse analysis explicitly acknowledges that 
by also being a discursively constructed subject, the researcher is able to meaningfully 
access at least some of a shared discursive space (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).  
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In the search for articles on ‘nervous breakdown,’ Google threw up many related 
search terms, including breakdown and mental breakdown indicating significant 
overlap in the discursive field. Almost all the articles used ‘nervous breakdown’ and 
breakdown interchangeably, with some using mental breakdown as well. I decided to 
include these articles, believing that this interchangeability was significant in the 
construction of ‘nervous breakdown’ and would prove meaningful in the analysis. 
However, given that this research is on ‘nervous breakdown,’ I excluded articles that 
did not use ‘nervous breakdown’ at all as a discrete term within the text. Another 
significant feature of the search was that it was overwhelmed by reviews of Pedro 
Almodóvar’s 1988 critically acclaimed film Women on the Verge of a Nervous 
Breakdown. I did not include these reviews in this analysis as they were focused on 
reviewing the film, and not on ‘nervous breakdown’ as such. Analyzing the film itself 
was beyond the scope of this research, but I was curious about its title which signalled 
a gendered construction of ‘nervous breakdown.’ 
 
I continued to search for articles until the search was exhaustive: with new articles 
only repeating discourses and rhetoric of those articles already found. At this point, 
twenty articles had been collected for analysis (Appendix A.1). They came from a 
variety of online news sites and magazines. I included The Huffington Post, for 
although it is a blog, it uses journalists from big brand news media. Its online traffic is 
high and averages at 15.6 million pages views per weekday (Silver, 2011). All the 
articles reviewed were published between 2007 and 2014, with one outlier from 2000, 
situating them within contemporary discourse. The content ranged from news stories, 
celebrity gossip and confessionals, and political, lifestyle and health commentary.  
 
The approach to analysis differed from traditional approaches to media analysis which 
are concerned as much with the content as with the political stances of the pieces. I 
acknowledge the articles range in their political persuasions and that this may affect 
the discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ made available to and taken up by their 
different readerships. However, the focus of this study does not lie with the different 
agendas of the media articles but rather with their discursive content and the 
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concomitant interpretative repertoires and subject positions they make available for 
the populace to draw on in constructing ‘nervous breakdown.’ 
 
I provide a description of the analytic procedure itself after supplying an overview of 
the second study as I have used the same method of analysis for both the media 
articles and the interview transcripts. The difference in emphasis of analysis in each 
study is also discussed. The results of the analyses of both studies are provided in 
subsequent chapters.  
 
2.2.2.2. Ethics 
Given that the media texts already exist within the freely accessible online public 
domain, City University’s Research and Ethics Committee advised that ethical 
approval was not needed for this study. 
 
2.2.3. Interview study 
Exploring subjective constructions of having a ‘nervous breakdown’  
 
One might expect the interpretative repertoires identified within the popular media to 
be echoed in the talk of people who self-identify with the ‘nervous breakdown,’ given 
that subjective constructions of meaning both create and are created by the broader 
discursive field. However, the interpretative repertoires invoked by people who self-
identify with the experience of ‘nervous breakdown’ may be very different and might 
be deployed in situ in different ways and to different interactional ends. As discussed, 
a situated exchange exploring subjective constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ offers 
an opportunity to examine the impact that wider discourses of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
have on subjectivity. It also allows for one to explore the ways in which a person’s 
subjective constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ in situ might be resisting or 
refashioning those discourses and offering them some challenge.  
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2.2.4. Methods used in interview study 
2.2.4.1. Interviews 
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were considered the best qualitative method of 
accessing the situated and subjective accounts of people who self-identified with 
‘nervous breakdown.’ Their flexibility enables the interviewer-researcher and 
participant to move around the topic with more freedom than in structured interviews. 
This allows for greater participant agency in shaping his/her account of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ than would be possible under a rigid interview agenda. This facilitates the 
emergence of something new in the interview space: constructions, subject positions 
etc. that may not have been considered by the researcher beforehand (Fontana & Frey, 
1998; Kvale, 1996). The flexibility provided by in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
therefore facilitates an exploration of the meeting of the discursive field of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ and the discursive agent, as it allows him/her greater freedom in 
reconstructing ‘nervous breakdown’ and in negotiating related subject positions. It 
allows space for the researcher to follow emergent threads in the conversation. Semi-
structured qualitative interviews thus provide a co-constructed discursive encounter 
between participant and researcher which must be reflexively addressed in the 
analysis (Potter & Hepburn, 2012; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). It must be noted that 
DA purists have opted out of using the research interview, considering it too contrived 
(e.g. Potter, 2011). They prefer the use of naturally occurring talk. However, both 
FDA and more synthetic discource analytic methods regard the research interview as 
an appropriate and rich source of data (Edley, 2001; Parker, 1992; Wetherell, 1998). 
 
However, the focus provided by broad pre-existing questions assisted the interviews 
to be productive in eliciting discourse about ‘nervous breakdown,’ given that this, not 
the free associations of the participant, is the focus of the research. Arguably, this 
semi-structured focus also serves a containing function for a topic that may have high 
emotional valence for the participants by providing some time and content boundaries 
to the experience while including sufficient flexibility for the participant to be able to 
share and shape his/her account.  
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I conducted a pilot interview with a colleague to see how the proposed interview 
topics held up in real-time, to check my use of materials and evaluate my interview 
style. This raised a few dilemmas for me. Positioned both as a researcher and as a 
trainee counselling psychologist with therapeutic training, negotiating a one-to-one 
encounter in which a person was speaking emotively about their experience proved 
tricky. On the one hand, therapeutic training made interviewing easier: facilitating 
rapport, curiosity and an ability to allow space for the creativity of the participant. It 
also made it harder not to adopt a therapeutic stance. Keeping a researcher’s distance 
from unsolicited therapeutic invasion is ethically crucial (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008) 
and also crucial for the integrity of the research methods. 
 
The feedback garnered from the pilot interview and a subsequent one with another 
colleague allowed me to be conscious of the tensions in my approach to one-on-one 
interviewing and more able to monitor vacillations away from a research focus in my 
interview style. I was able to engage with the debates in the literature on the therapist-
researcher, which are well summarized by Hart & Crawford-Wright (1999). Through 
a consistent process of reflexive evaluation of my position in the later interviews with 
participants, I was able to set a therapeutic style aside and recall my identity and 
position as researcher. This positional tension of therapist-researcher was also relevant 
to the process of analysis and I reflect on this where relevant.   
 
2.2.4.2. Sampling 
This research sought participants from a sample who self-identified with ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ This allowed for subjective accounts of having a ‘nervous breakdown’ to 
be fore-grounded as the act of self-identification suggested that ‘nervous breakdown’ 
held particular relevance for participants in their constructions of themselves and their 
experiences. There is little demographic information available as to who has ‘nervous 
breakdowns’, thus further defining a participant sample was difficult. However, given 
that this research is exploratory and situated in a paradigm aiming not to generalize 
but rather to engage credibly with ‘nervous breakdown’ as a social construction, it 
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matters less who does the telling, and more what in the telling, is identified as 
constructing ‘nervous breakdown’ (Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  
 
The who is seen both as co-constructed in the situated interview and as constructed by 
the discursive field that surrounds it: thus offering critical commentary on the 
relationship between the people who say they have had a ‘nervous breakdown’ and the 
other subject positions they may occupy. This understanding enables the research to 
say something more about the who of the sample of participants at the stage of 
analysis. Other than a subjective identification with ‘nervous breakdown,’ any other 
explicit demographic delineation was considered too limiting for this exploratory 
piece of research and also not in keeping with its epistemological scepticism of 
predefined categories of personhood. This did not, however, prevent a consideration 
of wider discursive categories of identity and their relationships to power that 
emerged in the research: it simply positioned this consideration within the stage of 
analysis and within the processes of methodological and personal reflexivity.  
 
Ethical considerations and the limited scope of the research did, however, shape the 
sample. The inclusion criteria were that participants self-identify with ‘nervous 
breakdown,’ be aged eighteen or above, and available for an interview in English 
within the Greater London area. Sixteen is legally and ethically regarded as valid in 
positioning the participant as able to consent in their own right to participating in 
research (British Psychological Society, 2010). However, given that the consensus on 
the age of majority and informed consent has been so widely debated (e.g. Waites, 
2005), for ethical purposes and for ease of recruitment, the more conservative age of 
eighteen was chosen as the age criterion for inclusion. Availability in the Greater 
London area was an inclusion criterion imposed by the limited time and scope of the 
research. English-speaking is an inclusion criterion that signals my discursive limits. 
For us to understand one another, without the complication of an interpreter, the 
interviews needed to be conducted in English. Already, some landscaping of the who 
in the study was visible: English-speaking adults in the Greater London area – a 
discursive context in which I share.  
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2.2.4.3. Recruitment  
I chose to use the internet as a site for recruitment because of its ubiquity and because 
it housed a multitude of pre-existing conversations between people who self-identified 
with ‘nervous breakdown’ on forums and social networking sites. I chose to target 
forums on ‘nervous breakdown’ first as they seemed the most publically accessible 
spaces. I contacted the hosts of forums I identified as UK-based and currently active. 
In total, I messaged seven forums asking the hosts for permission to advertise for 
participants. Three did not respond and the remaining four banned me from their 
forums. Two did not say why, but two of them cited “unwelcome invasion of privacy” 
and “breaking our safe space” as reasons for the exclusion. I have not provided the 
forums’ details out of respect for their insistence on privacy. I was struck by the 
construction of ‘nervous breakdown’ as private and its subject-agents as vulnerable.  
 
I turned to my own social networks, a seemingly more private space, for recruitment. I 
used opportunistic sampling, asking friends if they could advertise for volunteers who 
self-identified with ‘nervous breakdown,’ were eighteen or older and available for an 
interview in English in London. I supplied them with a letter of introduction to the 
study to distribute to their chosen social networks (Appendix B.1.). This letter invited 
volunteers to contact me directly, enabling them to approach me privately and 
protecting their anonymity.  
 
Such a localized and potentially homogenous site of recruitment is fitting for a 
qualitative study interested in the subjective discursive construction of ‘nervous 
breakdown,’ not in constructing a generalized demography of the construct. 
Moreover, it is particularly suitable for an exploratory study that relies on me and the 
participants being part of a shared discursive field. Greater commonality in the 
situations of participants has been observed to allow for in-depth analysis in small 
qualitative studies and to facilitate the coherence of the analysis and interpretation 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton 1990).  
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Eight participants volunteered for the study. All of them contacted me directly by 
email and we arranged for a follow-up phone call to discuss the interviews (Appendix 
B.2.). In this phone call I explained the research briefly (Appendix B.3.), clarified that 
the inclusion criteria were relevant to the participant and stressed the voluntary nature 
of participation. I also clarified that the interview was for research and not therapeutic 
purposes and that we would meet for a once-off encounter of about ninety minutes. 
This was to ensure that participants were informed about the limits of the encounter as 
the adjective psychological can foster confusion as to what type of encounter is being 
proffered. It also functioned to informally assess for risk and establish if the 
participants felt safe enough to talk about their experiences of ‘nervous breakdown’ in 
a once-off interview that offered no clinical support during or after.  
 
This was a deliberate step into a more clinical position which was deemed crucial in 
order to meet the ethical requirements for the study. Given that the literature reviewed 
in the introduction explicitly associates ‘nervous breakdown’ with psychological 
vulnerability and crisis, I had to put aside the critique of this literature and its 
epistemological foundations and warrant it with some credibility. It was necessary 
therefore to ascertain whether the potential participant felt safe enough to share his/her 
experience of ‘nervous breakdown’ with me at that time, particularly given that I 
could provide no support for the participant during or after the interview and given 
that participants were not recruited via an institution or group that did offer them 
support. None of the prospective participants who contacted me seemed to be likely to 
be overtly unsettled by an interview about their experience of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
and at the end of our telephone conversations, we arranged to meet for an interview. 
Had the conversations indicated that an interview might have been too unsettling or 
risky for the prospective participant, he/she would have been sensitively excluded 
from the study and emailed a debrief sheet (Appendix E) of supportive resources to 
consult if he/she so wished. I discuss the debrief space and resources later in this 
methods section.  
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This step into the territory of potential risk assessment was a reflection of the tensions 
between my position within the discipline of counselling psychology, its ethical 
regulations and practices and my position in this research as critical of this diagnostic 
expertise. However, I could not, in any good conscience forgo my professional 
responsibility to prioritize the safety of the research process and the participants. 
Haverkamp (2005) stresses that this ethical responsibility for the safety of the research 
participants needs to trump other methodological concerns in the research process. 
Risk assessments, both formal and informal, are a key competency developed during 
counselling psychology training and are seen as a core ethical obligation of the 
practitioner-researcher (Shillito-Clarke, 2010). For the purposes of this research, I 
aimed to ask about potential vulnerability as sensitively, incrementally and non-
invasively as possible, and to not use any overt psy-jargon, so as to limit its impact on 
shaping a subsequent interview space. Undoubtedly, it still did impact on the 
interview space and undoubtedly it positioned me as expert clinician, participant as 
vulnerable lay person and introduced some vestiges of a psy-discourse. However, 
again, this was trumped by the necessity of meeting the ethical requirements of the 
study. The tension inherent in the position of clinician-researcher is well documented 
in the literature, with many papers concluding that increased sensitivity to ethical 
obligations and participant safety is in fact a strength of this dual position (e.g. Bond, 
2004; Long & Eagle, 2009; Morrow, 2007).  
 
Although I had deliberately not pre-defined inclusion into the sample according to 
categories of person that I deemed significant (apart from those required by ethics), 
the sample was recognizable in its gendered homogeneity. I was struck that it was 
comprised only of women as my recruitment base was mixed in gender. As such, I 
wondered about the feminized position of shared self-reflection, and perhaps how my 
identity as a woman might have facilitated female participation and discouraged men. 
I wondered if gender would be significant in the interviews as part of a subjective 
construction of ‘nervous breakdown.’ 
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Guidance on sample size in discourse analysis relates to the ability of the sample to 
meaningfully respond to the research question (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Willig, 
2013). In this case, the aim is to explore subjective constructions of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ in the situated talk of people who self-identify with the construct. When 
facilitated by the quality of data derived from in-depth, semi-structured interviews, a 
localized sample ranging from five to twelve is deemed capable of providing for a rich 
and cohesive qualitative analysis (Tracy, 2013). 
 
2.2.4.4. Interviewing 
Participants were given a choice of location and time for the interviews. We met in 
mutually convenient spaces that allowed for privacy and for the recording of the 
interviews. I chose to avoid spaces directly linked with psycho-medical institutions 
and universities to mitigate the inevitable power differential between researcher and 
participant. For the most part, we met in private study rooms of local libraries. With 
two participants, we met in private conference rooms at their places of work.  
 
I had suggested to participants to allow for ninety minutes for the interviews. Many 
researchers believe this length is productive in allowing space for in-depth discussion 
and the emergence of the new, but also delimits the interview as an encounter that is 
manageable for both parties and which in its limits, provides focus to the discussion 
(e.g. Seidman, 2006). The interviews were based upon a loose interview schedule 
(Appendix C) which listed the main topics that I believed would facilitate the 
exploration of the participants’ choice of the construct of ‘nervous breakdown,’ allow 
for elaboration on its meaning to them and also examine the social consequences of 
drawing on this construct. Given its historical location in psy-discourses, I aimed to 
include some discussion of the personal and/or institutional resources the participant 
chose, was directed to or denied during ‘nervous breakdown.’ Given that ‘nervous 
breakdown’ is so intimately tied up with psy-diagnostic and treatment discourses and 
institutions, I felt this to be an important area to cover. I aimed to explore with 
participants who and where they sought help from during their ‘nervous breakdowns’ 
and whether psy-practitioners were relevant and/or accessible to them or not. If not, I 
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aimed to explore with the participants which other institutions and discourses were 
relevant to them in their constructions of their ‘nervous breakdowns.’   
 
2.2.4.5. Informed consent 
Before the interviews, I obtained informed consent from the participants in order to 
comply with the ethical requirements of participants being fully informed as to their 
undertaking and made aware of their rights within the research. I re-iterated the nature 
and aims of the research as explained during our phone conversation, their rights as a 
participant and the intentions for the data collected from them. I noted that 
participation was voluntary and that they had a right to withdraw at any time without 
reason or repercussion. I also clarified that participants were not obliged to answer all 
questions and could request for the discussion to move on. I indicated that the 
interviews would be recorded and transcripts used in the research. I stressed that 
participant identities would be anonymized and their data treated confidentially. 
Participants were asked to sign a consent form (Appendix D) acknowledging that they 
understood this and from this understanding, consented to participate in the study. I 
have kept these signed consent forms for my records.  
 
After obtaining informed consent, I began recording with a digital Dictaphone. 
Recording enabled me to be attentive to the participant in the interview and allowed 
for full-text analysis. I indicated the loose structure of the interview and that 
participants should feel free to introduce anything extra they felt relevant to their 
account of ‘nervous breakdown.’ Throughout, I aimed to maintain rapport, and 
balance an attitude of curiosity with a focus on the research objective. The schedule 
proved helpful in re-focusing the conversation on ‘nervous breakdown’ and its 
implications for the participant. I tried to limit my introduction of new content, rather 
focusing on restating the participants’ talk. Willig (2013) contends that this allows for 
the researcher to signal to the participant that he/she is present to their accounts and 
also allows the participant to correct any misunderstandings.  
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2.2.4.6. Debriefing 
At the end, I left time for participant questions and asked them how the interview had 
been for them. This allowed for a segue into debriefing. As indicated in the 
introduction of this thesis and the discussion about risk, the literature suggests that 
‘nervous breakdown’ has been associated with difficult emotional experiences and 
crisis. As such, ethics dictated that I acknowledge the possibility that difficult material 
might have been raised for the participants which a one-off research interview was 
unable to adequately contain and process and which might not have been apparent at 
the time of the informal risk assessment. I therefore provided all participants with an 
information sheet during the debrief which listed resources they could consult if they 
felt unsettled after the interview (Appendix E). I acknowledge that all the resources I 
provided are within the psy-disciplines, thereby constructing appropriate help for the 
feeling subject as psychological. However, these are the resources that I am mandated 
to refer to by the research’s position in the psy-domain and its ethical protocols. 
Moreover, from my position as a trainee counselling psychologist, however critical of 
the institution, I share an ethical position that deems these resources as helpful in 
ameliorating distress. In addition, in order to maintain the ethical boundary between 
research and therapeutic interview, it was important to delineate the debrief from a 
site of psychological support. The provision of the information sheet and its 
explanation served to demarcate them as separate spaces. The debrief included a re-
iteration of the aims of the study and what would happen next with participant 
contributions to the research. Participants were invited to ask any questions they had 
and to contact me at any point with further questions or if they wanted a copy of their 
transcript.  
 
2.2.4.7. Anonymity, confidentiality and storage of data 
Every effort was made to ensure that participant identity has remained anonymous. 
Informed consent assured participants that their data would be anonymized and stored 
confidentially. I have therefore allocated pseudonyms to all participants and kept the 
record of their correspondence in a locked filing cabinet accessible only to me. Other 
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identifying details such as place names, job descriptions, names of other people and 
particularly family, friends and partners were altered and the latter replaced with a 
label of relationship in square brackets e.g. [husband]. Participants were ensured that 
only me and my academic supervisor would see copies of their transcripts and that 
although direct quotations would be used in the research, identifying details would be 
anonymized such that a reader would be unable to recognize the participant.   
 
Interviews were recorded using a digital Dictaphone. Informed consent was obtained 
for this from participants. After each interview, I downloaded the recording to two 
different password secured files (the second for back-up) on a password secured 
computer accessible only by me. I then deleted the recording from the Dictaphone. 
Participants were advised, in keeping with City University’s research and data 
protection guidelines, that their data would be kept in the same secure storage 
facilities described above for ten years after publication of the research and thereafter 
confidentially destroyed by me.  
 
2.2.4.8. Additional ethical considerations: Complexities and tensions 
The study was granted ethical approval by City University’s Research Ethics 
Committee (Appendix F). I have attempted to weave key ethical considerations into 
the description of the research process. Thus far, they have included a reflexive 
consideration of the impact of my dual identities as therapist and researcher, as well as 
considerations of informed consent, voluntary participation at all stages, participant 
anonymity and confidentiality of data storage, and the potential impact of interviews 
on the participant. With regard to the latter, pertinent because a research relationship 
carries a power differential between researcher and participant, I have discussed the 
attempts made to foster a more collaborative interview space and to facilitate an 
encounter where participants had some agency over the conversational terrain, and felt 
listened to and able to ask questions.  
 
Many of the ethical considerations in this study were to mitigate risk to and 
exploitation of participants. However, some researchers contend that many 
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participants find the process of sharing a subjective account of experience within the 
constraints of a research interview to be beneficial (e.g. Frith & Kitzinger, 1998). It 
would be duplicitous to suggest that this research aims to give the participants voice in 
the stronghold of psy-discourses. The research is authored by me, situated as a psy-
study albeit a critical one, and chiselled by discourse analytic approaches which are 
deeply rooted in a Barthian death-of-the-author stance. This challenged my 
therapeutic position which is embedded in discourses prioritizing client agency. 
However, it chimed with my therapeutic concerns about systemic pressures on clients 
and services and the limits of an individualized gaze. As such, an ethical consideration 
can be extended out of the immediate study to its context within the discipline. By 
contributing to the growing body of research that argues for the psy-institutions to 
attend more to the ways in which clients choose to construct their experiences and to 
develop more dialogical client-psy relationships (e.g. Boughtwood & Halse, 2008; 
Burman, 2007; Harper, 2013; Gibson & Cartwright, 2013; Speed, 2006), this study 
can in some small way address these as ethical concerns in the discipline. This 
enterprise is dear to counselling psychology, which urges practitioners to apply its 
client-centred and reflexive values to research as well as practice (e.g. Bury & Strauss, 
2006; Kasket, 2012).  
 
2.2.5. Data transcription and analysis 
The final part of this chapter describes how the analysis itself was carried out and 
concludes the methodological discussion. The fusion between methodology and 
analysis is not as discrete as chaptered entries might suggest and where relevant I have 
included methodological considerations in the analysis. 
 
2.2.6. Transcription 
The articles in the media analysis study required transcription for ease of reading and 
analysis. Given that the content was already formatted as text, I copied the article text 
into word documents, standardized line length (highly variable in online media) and 
numbered the lines to facilitate analysis.  
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All eight of the interviews were transcribed in preparation for analysis. They were 
transcribed verbatim with basic transcription notions to give context to the analysis. 
Namely, I attended to vocal actions and attenuations which emphasized the function 
of the speaker’s discourse including pauses, emphases, interruptions, whispering, 
laughing, inaudibility, crying, clapping and so on. I drew on the adaptation of the 
Jefferson transcription notion system used by Potter & Wetherell (1987). A full 
transcription notation is generally used in those discourse analytic approaches 
attending only to the minutiae of conversation. This level of detail is neither necessary 
nor appropriate for a more synthetic analysis as used in this project and interrupts a 
more global reading of the text. I have included sample pages of media article and 
interview transcription in Appendices A.2 and G respectively.    
 
2.3. Analytic procedure 
Having already broadly outlined the analytic stance of this thesis, I will now describe 
the process in more detail. The same approach was applied in the media and the 
interview studies, but differed in emphasis given that the interviews demanded greater 
exploration of the intersubjective function of discourse whereas media texts demanded 
greater consideration of wider discursive terrain. Many discourse analysts contend that 
providing a neat definition of the analytic procedure is obstructed by its iterative 
nature and the fact that methodological tools are abstracted from variable 
philosophical readings of the position of the research (Billig, 1997; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). This was particularly pertinent given the synthetic approach to 
analysis adopted in this research. The analysis was thus guided by immersion in 
methodological texts, and the statement of the analytic position of the project. 
Analysis was then informed by the conceptual categories I sought in the texts, and not 
the linear progression of stages, and was in keeping with the approach to analysis 
taken by Wetherell & Edley (1998; 1999) and Edley & Wetherell (1997; 1999). In the 
interests of transparency, I have retrospectively produced a list of key criteria that 
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informed the analysis to assist other researchers should they wish to replicate this 
approach to discourse analysis.  
 
2.3.1. Familiarization and coding  
For both studies, I read the transcribed texts without any attempt at analysis. This was 
to get a sense of the texts as a data corpus and enable a topographical gaze that would 
allow me to link parts with the whole at later stages of analysis. I believed that 
immediate analysis would interrupt this more global first sense of the data. 
 
The next stage involved the start of a more active interpretation of the texts through a 
coding process. Re-reading each transcript or article, I made notes in the text’s 
margins when a part of it seemed to relate to ‘nervous breakdown.’ As indicated by 
Potter & Wetherell (1987), the process erred on the inclusive, allowing for anything 
that struck me as relevant to be noted. The process included descriptive interpretations 
and also some abstraction to inferred meanings. Over time I noticed patterns and 
repetitions in my basic interpretative codes. For example, I noticed a pattern in the 
media and participants’ descriptions of ‘nervous breakdown’ as a verge, an edge, and 
a dangerous place from which one can fall. This was denoted by a variety of 
descriptions which used mountaineering metaphors, descriptions of losing ground, 
horizons, and slipping and falling down, among others.  
 
2.3.2. Key analytic concepts 
Textual deconstruction then moved to an iterative process of identifying a discursive 
terrain that constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ and regulated its subjects; and also a 
process of examining how the discursive agents in the interviews and the media 
articles used the discourses this terrain made available to them to construct 
contextually-motivated accounts of ‘nervous breakdown.’ Analysis traversed these 
sites, looking to comment on the relationship between the two and the implications of 
this for the subject/agent of ‘nervous breakdown’ and the institutions that construct 
and are constructed by him/her. With regard to the latter, and given the genealogy of 
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‘nervous breakdown,’ I listened out for the implications for the subject-psy 
relationship.  
 
Constitutive discourse 
Firstly, the analysis addressed the constitutive nature of discourse through identifying 
interpretative repertoires. This allowed the research to examine the discursive 
currency made available for people to draw on in constructing ‘nervous breakdown’ 
and enabled a consideration of the subject positions that these repertoires make 
available for people in the discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ and their 
potential implications for subjectivity and social action.  
 
Constructive discourse 
Secondly, the analysis looked at the constructive nature of discourse, exploring the 
interface between the wider discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ and the 
individual discursive agent. Here it considered which repertoires were preferred or 
resisted and to what ends. It considered how people negotiated subject positions 
relative to ‘nervous breakdown’ and how they negotiated multiple, even contradictory 
positions and the social function of taking up or resisting a particular position. At this 
stage, the analysis attended to the localized deployment of discourse and the 
linguistic, rhetorical and symbolic devices that people used to construct their accounts 
and subject positions within the interviews, and as speakers in the media articles and 
interrogated the social function of these within the context of the account.  
 
Variable discourse 
Using the concept of ideological dilemmas identified by Billig et al. (1998) attention 
was paid to contradictions and variability within the texts. This was applied at all 
levels of analysis from interpretative repertoires identified in the discursive terrain of 
‘nervous breakdown,’ to those drawn on by participants in the interviews and also to 
the related subject positions. A consideration of this variability enabled analysis to 
offer some deconstruction of a singular notion of ‘nervous breakdown’ and to 
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comment on some of the varied and even competing social functions that ‘nervous 
breakdown’ can hold for those who use it.  
 
2.3.3. An integrated analysis 
An analysis that considers the relationship between a constitutive discursive terrain 
and a constructive discursive agent needs to travel between the fine-grained and more 
global levels of discourse analysis throughout the analytic process (Wetherell & 
Edley, 1999). As such, a two-stage analytical approach is outlined above for 
explanatory clarity. In reality, the process, typical of discourse analytic approaches, is 
far more iterative with each moment of analysis constantly re-informing the whole, 
and changing the immediate conceptual focus. Edley (2001, p. 168) describes the 
discourse analytic process as a “craft skill” of coming to recognize the patterns that 
denote a particular discursive terrain and its subject-agents. 
 
In the first instance, I used interpretative repertoires as defined by Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) as an exclusive analytic category. This was given its ability to 
facilitate an analysis that addressed both the wider discursive terrain and the agency of 
the people in it. However, during the process of analysis, I found that the more 
Foucauldian analytic category of discourse as defined by Parker (1992) fitted better 
when describing parts of the discursive terrain that were more hegemonic, and spoke 
of practices and legacies of power. I have therefore used both terms with interpretative 
repertoire denoting parts of the discourse of ‘nervous breakdown’ that are more 
partial, situated and malleable by discursive agents.  
 
2.3.4. Ending analysis 
Saturation or exhaustion is considered the point at which nothing new seems to 
emerge from analysis (Kelly, 1999). I stopped the analysis when I had gone over the 
texts such that the same patters re-emerged repeatedly. Many contend that ending 
analysis is also guided by an ability to address the research aim in its complexity with 
conceptual abstraction that is well-grounded in the data corpus, and also in the debates 
 79 
surrounding it (e.g. Antaki et al., 2003). I ended analysis when I sensed both 
saturation and a data-informed facility for discussing the meeting of the discursive 
terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ and its subject-agents. The following chapters address 
the findings of the analysis, starting with the analysis of the discursive terrain of 
‘nervous breakdown’ as mapped out by popular and contemporary online media.     
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3. Analysis 
3.1. Media Analysis 
Mapping the discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown:’ An analysis of popular 
media 
 
3.1.1. Revisiting the Research Aim 
The main aim of this study is to identify and explore the interpretative repertoires 
commonly used to construct ‘nervous breakdown’ in order to better understand what 
this construct might represent for people who invoke it and what the potential 
consequences are for the subjectivities of these people, and the institutions in which 
they are positioned and in which they choose to position themselves. A media analysis 
was conducted to map out the wider discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown.’ This 
was in order to see what interpretative repertoires are available for the construction of 
‘nervous breakdown,’ thus providing a discursive mise-en-scene for the analysis of 
participant constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ and grounding for a discussion of 
the relationship between the two discursive spaces that can construct ‘nervous 
breakdown.’  
  
3.1.2. Reviewing Newspaper Articles 
Following the analysis of twenty online newspaper and magazine articles using the 
search term ‘nervous breakdown,’ several predominant and even contradictory 
interpretative repertoires were identified. 
 
This search term revealed that many texts used the terms ‘breakdown’ and ‘mental 
breakdown’ interchangeably with ‘nervous breakdown’ in the same article. The 
Google search engine that I used to perform the search also did this. After some 
deliberation I chose to give up a purist position dictating that I attend only to the 
construction of ‘nervous breakdown’ in favour of a more exploratory position that 
would allow me to engage with the construct as it is used in the public domain. I 
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believed that this slipping and sliding around a core tenet of breakdown would allow 
for a richer analysis. Moreover, while different semantically, all three terms were used 
as part of similar interpretative repertoires, suggesting that their functions-in-text were 
similar.  
 
3.1.3. ‘Nervous breakdown’ constructed as a space on the edge 
Many of the articles reviewed positioned their readers as unknowingly moving 
towards the verge or edge of a ‘nervous breakdown.’ For example: 
 
On the verge of a nervous breakdown? 
(Title from The Mirror, 22 March, 2007, no author cited) 
 
And 
 
So how do you know if you’re having a particularly stressful day – or if 
you’re about to have a nervous breakdown? Look out for these warning 
signs that a breakdown is on the horizon: 
(Thapoung, 2013, Lines 12-14) 
 
Both excerpts use a rhetorical device often found in advertising of asking the reader 
directly to evaluate whether he or she is in a dangerous position (often coupled with 
the selling of a restorative or protective product). In so doing the articles imply that 
the reader may be unknowing of how close to this danger (in this case a ‘nervous 
breakdown’) he/she is. This allows for the text to be positioned as expert in relation to 
the reader as it is the text and its authors who “know,” akin to the product-solution 
setup. It also constructs the verge of a ‘nervous breakdown’ as a risky place to be: 
terrain that requires “warning signs” and this implies that to fall off the edge or 
“horizon” is dangerous. Together, these discourses appear to construct ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as a space of impending danger for the unknowing public and seem to 
facilitate subject positions that vary relative to this dangerous space. 
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However, there is an imperative in this interpretative repertoire. It is an imperative for 
the reader, now alerted to this impending danger, to evaluate his or her own proximity 
to “the verge” and also take action to prevent him or herself from falling off the edge 
and into a breakdown. This is well demonstrated in the following excerpt: 
 
Are you on the verge of a nervous breakdown? Here are a few signs you’re 
in the danger zone: 
You’re having trouble concentrating. 
You feel anxious, emotional or upset. 
You worry about how you’ll get your work done. 
You’re engaging with passive coping (drink, food, drugs). 
You’re taking longer than usual to finish routine work tasks. 
(Eurich, 2013, Lines 17-21) 
 
This text is again asking the reader to evaluate his or her proximity (space) to the 
danger of ‘nervous breakdown.’ Once positioning the reader as unknowing of his/her 
peril, it then offers its seemingly expert opinion on how to self-diagnose one’s peril. 
This implies that a responsible reader-citizen, now in knowledge of warning signs, 
will undergo a process of self-examination for his or her proximity to a ‘nervous 
breakdown’ by filtering it through what reads much like a psycho-medical symptom 
checklist. The presentation of a symptom checklist is deeply resonant of the expertise 
of a medical text book and is strikingly similar to many DSM-5 checklists for mood 
disorders
4
. Arguably, the text has co-opted this discourse to add to its legitimacy. 
 
This is further demonstrated in this excerpt from an article in Forbes (Casserly, 2011), 
the well-known financial newspaper, which includes advice from a “Robert Epstein, 
Ph.D, a research psychologist and former editor-in-chief of Psychology Today” (Lines 
17-18): 
 
                                                
4
 For example, the DSM-5’s list of diagnostic criteria for Generalised Anxiety Disorder (DSM-5: 222) 
offers an excellent referent for comparison of tone, content and format with this excerpt 
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Epstein also suggests taking advantage of online resources, like 
doyouneedtherapy.com, a site he's developed with a series of questions that 
can help you better understand your mental state. “It doesn't diagnose you, 
but it indicates whether or not you should consult a therapist or counselor 
and what to tell them. It gives you a language to use. 
(Casserly, 2011, Lines 70-74) 
  
This excerpt locates ‘nervous breakdown’ within the domain of mental illness and the 
expertise of its institutions and practitioners. However, it also suggests that the reader 
become his/her own expert on diagnosing and managing him/herself through 
imparting some of this psy-expertise to him/her. As such it still positions the reader 
and his/her experiences in the gaze of the psy domain – quite significantly giving the 
reader the (hegemonically constitutive) “language to use.” It also positions the reader 
within the evaluative criteria of the psy-institutions (for mental health or illness) by 
constructing a threshold (via self-diagnosis) at which one should or should not seek 
help from a “therapist.” 
 
However, the text implicitly locates responsibility for falling off the edge into 
‘nervous breakdown’ with the reader, not with the expert other or the socio-political 
institutions in which the individual is positioned. It is the reader who must notice that 
his/her behaviour is “off” and the reader who must seek out and use resources psy and 
otherwise to correct this offness or risk falling off the edge into ‘nervous breakdown.’ 
This again suggests a spatial aspect to the construction of ‘nervous breakdown:’ 
potential subject positions for the everyperson-reader are then ways in which he or she 
can locate or be located relative to the space of ‘nervous breakdown’ and negotiate 
and re-negotiate these discursive locales. 
 
3.1.4. Offness, stress or potential madness? 
The interpretative repertoire constructing ‘nervous breakdown’ as a space of 
impending danger near an edge chimes well with the common phrase ‘over the edge’ 
which can be understood as a discursive construct that is invoked to refer to the 
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boundary between constructs of sanity and madness. It also suggests that over the 
edge in ‘nervous breakdown’ is an irrevocable state, much resonant of popular 
constructions of a descent into madness. 
 
The image of edge and subjects’ spatial proximity to it appear extremely significant in 
the interplay between two seemingly competing discourses used to construct ‘nervous 
breakdown:’ discourses of stress and discourses of mental illness and madness. 
 
3.1.4.1. The individual breaking down under too much stress 
Almost all articles reviewed constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ using metaphors of a 
person breaking down, falling apart, collapsing, snapping, melting or being 
overwhelmed as a result of too much externally applied stress or pressure. This in turn 
constructs the edge associated with ‘nervous breakdown’ as a threshold space at 
which the individual succumbs to the stress and can no longer utilize inner resources 
to cope with it. This is well encapsulated in the following excerpt from The Daily 
Mail (Naish, 2013, Lines 41-47): 
 
The renewed popularity of nervous breakdown as a term may reflect the 
nature of our highly stressed times. Last month, even President Barack 
Obama was rumoured to have suffered one, thanks to the combined strains 
of dealing with the Syrian crisis, the UN and the U.S. budgetary problems. 
The internet buzzed with rumours that the President had suffered a mental 
collapse in Washington and had to be sedated. 
 
This excerpt constructs ‘nervous breakdown’ as a form of “collapse,” primarily owing 
to externally located “strains” and stressors becoming too much for President Obama. 
The use of the word “mental” situates ‘nervous breakdown’ in the domain of an inside 
mind. It implies that this inside mind has directly encountered the outside force of this 
stress. As such it positions ‘nervous breakdown’ at this encounter: where the outside 
world has breached an edge that separates it from the mind-inside-person and in so 
doing has caused the structure of the latter to “collapse.” The verb “collapse,” in 
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particular, suggests a force that is powerful enough to break down an existing 
structure in one foul swoop and draws on an engineering metaphor by invoking ideas 
of structure, force and collapse. 
 
By locating stress and strain as external to President Obama: “the Syrian crisis, the 
UN and the U.S. budgetary problems” this text seems to mitigate his accountability 
for his (rumoured) ‘nervous breakdown’ and implies that external demands of such 
force could “collapse” or break down even one of the most powerful men in the 
world. This constructs stress as a dangerous external agent whose attrition of the edge 
of the inside mind can cause ‘nervous breakdown.’ The phrase “thanks to the 
combined strains of” in the above excerpt seems to locate blame for ‘nervous 
breakdown’ with stress, not with the Obama and suggests a powerlessness of the 
mental structures that are purported to constitute a coping subject to remain structured 
when under stress. 
 
This discourse of mitigating blame for ‘nervous breakdown’ by attributing it to the 
inevitable force of external stress also serves to normalize the construct of a ‘nervous 
breakdown’ or at least move it into the terrain of discourses of laws of physics, work-
related performance and embodied health and away from discourses of a mad other 
who is positioned as irretrievably broken down over the edge or constructed as never 
‘normal’ in the first place. This is largely because stress constructs have become 
increasingly co-opted into discourses constructing normal daily life, and being 
stressed and managing stress can therefore be understood as routine discursive 
practices of a subject navigating his/her way through “our highly stressed times” 
(Brown, 1999; Doublet, 2000). This is well demonstrated in the following excerpt 
from Women’s Health (Thapoung, 2013, Lines 5-8 and 11-12): 
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But you don’t have to have an Oprah-level to-do list to be on the verge of a 
breakdown. It’s totally normal to feel overwhelmed and wonder if you’re 
two annoying texts from your mom away from completely losing control of 
your mental facilities[…]Dealing with constant, overwhelming stressors – 
like working crazy hours with no downtime – is the most common cause of 
a breakdown.” 
 
Once again, much like the Obama excerpt, it constructs a ‘nervous breakdown’ at the 
space of interface between “mental facilities” and “constant overwhelming stressors.” 
It suggests the power of these stressors to overwhelm the individual’s “control” and 
locates this control within the individual’s mind. This is resonant of the images used to 
construct Obama’s ‘nervous breakdown:’ a collapsing of his “mental” structures in the 
face of an onslaught of external stressors. 
  
These texts position anyone as vulnerable to stressors, from Obama and Oprah to 
those subject-citizens working “crazy hours.” These subject positions of president, 
celebrity and hard-worker are arguably valued positions in our post-industrial, 
commercially driven and celebrity worshipping societies. This suggests that even 
powerful, hegemonic identities are able to be near the edge of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
by virtue of the very things that make them powerful: hard work and participation in 
many endeavours deemed worthy. These pursuits are constructed as agents of stress 
and stress is construed as determining one’s proximity to being on the edge of 
‘nervous breakdown.’ Moreover since the individual is constructed as powerless in the 
face of the force of externalized and inevitable stress, blame for ‘nervous breakdown’ 
is attributed to stress, not the individual. In other words, (curiously, I think), this 
allows for and even normalizes a hegemonic subject position to be located close to the 
edge of ‘nervous breakdown’ and furthermore, allows it to act as a contemporary 
indication of success. 
 
The deployment of stress discourse as a causative agent for ‘nervous breakdown’ acts 
to position the subject away from the terrain of madness (over the edge) while 
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simultaneously allowing for features of mental illness to visible in the same position. 
This seems to be accomplished through the location of stress as external, an inevitable 
part of normal life and more powerful than the construct of a structured, internal mind 
which is positioned as the site of self-control and normative performance. Moreover, 
stress discourse has an embodied component which parallels the nervous in the term 
‘nervous breakdown.’ 
 
Theories and constructions of stress are varied and longstanding. However, the 
interpretative repertoire of ‘nervous breakdown’ which positions the individual as 
helplessly passive in the face of the pernicious onslaught of external stress draws most 
on Selye’s (1956) theory of the General Adaptation Syndrome of stress. This theory 
draws on an engineering metaphor to construct a cause and effect relationship 
between organic life and the environment. It suggests that external events (stressors) 
can have a direct and damaging impact on our bodies because prolonged exposure to 
these events causes prolonged arousal of stress hormones, which are posited to lead to 
illness (Viner, 1999). By drawing on this stress discourse in the construction of 
‘nervous breakdown,’ the media articles blur the lines between embodied illness and 
“mental collapse” and allow for the latter to be positioned more like the flu, and the 
subject more like a victim of exposure than an agent of contraction. Embodied illness 
that is caught rather than contracted by activity over which the subject is seen to have 
choice is rather more forgiving in the personal accountability stakes (Lupton 2012). In 
addition, subject positions in the realm of physical illness are generally more socially 
acceptable spaces than those in the terrain of mental illness (Pilgrim & Rogers, 2010). 
Thus, the use of discursive elements from Selye’s stress construct begins to 
accomplish a mitigation of personal responsibility for ‘nervous breakdown,’ and a 
mitigation of associations of mental illness when in ‘nervous breakdown’ – at least for 
Obama and Oprah and those occupying similar successful subject positions. In this 
interpretative repertoire of ‘nervous breakdown’ the subject becomes positioned as a 
victim of the stress of his/her success. 
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However, later theories of stress introduced the individual as the agent in his/her being 
stressed to a far greater extent. For example, the transactional model of stress suggests 
that a stress response is created through the individual’s internal appraisals of the 
external stressor and of his/her coping resources to deal with it (e.g. Lazarus & Cohen, 
1977; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). More recently, dominant stress theories have 
diminished the role of the external in becoming stressed and increased the role of the 
individual’s internal processes of self-management. These are believed to mediate the 
stress response, thereby rendering the individual wholly responsible for being 
positioned as stressed and if positioned as too stressed, as having failed in the 
enterprise of self-management (Brown, 1999; Ogden, 2002).  
 
The constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ as a spatial proximity to a dangerous edge 
which can and must be avoided by improved self-governance seem to draw more from 
these intra-subjective discourses of stress. The latter constructions are taken up by 
media articles asking the reader to self-diagnose and self-manage his/her proximity to 
‘nervous breakdown.’ These articles rely on expert psy-sources and occupy a very 
different subject position from he/she who has had a ‘nervous breakdown.’ It follows 
that these articles, which sell on a danger-prevention pitch, and which arguably have 
an implicit institutional interest in constructing and regulating the self-managing 
subject – all deploy voices of psy-expertise – would draw on discourses of stress that 
are consonant with this position. It also follows, that individuals positioned as having 
had a ‘nervous breakdown,’ such as Oprah, would actively seek to avoid a position of 
failed self-management by drawing on discursive resources that mitigate personal 
responsibility, such as those which construct stress as an external and inevitable agent 
of damage to the relatively helpless individual. The avoidance of a seemingly more 
dominant position that equates a position of too stressed with failed self-management 
is augmented through references to the import of the stressors or the stress inherent in 
the subject’s position of success. For example, one would have an uphill rhetorical 
battle to reposition the president of the USA who has been “dealing with the Syrian 
crisis, the UN and the U.S. budgetary problems” as a subject of failed self-
management. 
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Yet, while mitigating responsibility for ‘nervous breakdown’ in this way, it was 
Obama who had to be “sedated” and therefore managed as a result of ‘nervous 
breakdown,’ not the UN, the US Treasury or the multiple agencies presumably also 
“dealing with” Syria. By constructing the site of “collapse” within President Obama’s 
mind the article implies that “collapse” is an uncomfortable mental deviance from 
normal performance and it is this which requires sedation (or perhaps silencing), 
presumably until a state of normal mental structure can be performed again. 
 
3.1.4.2. Mad but not mad 
I believe that this touches on one of the key contradictions in the interpretative 
repertoires constructing ‘nervous breakdown’ in the popular press. Many of the 
articles and voices captured therein go to great discursive lengths to construct a 
position within discourses of madness and mental illness while also avidly disavowing 
this position through the deployment of stress discourses. As Brown (2005) contends, 
the use of stress discourses can act to reposition the subject away from the sharp edges 
of distress, complexity or difficulty into seemingly more banal spaces of health and 
personal resource management. However, as is emerging, this is not accomplished 
completely in the construction of ‘nervous breakdown’ and allusions to mental illness 
and madness remain throughout. I believe this contradiction is also reflected in the 
slipping and sliding between ‘nervous breakdown’ which locates the site of 
breakdown in the body, ‘mental breakdown’ which locates the site of breakdown in 
the mind and ‘breakdown’ which seems to touch on both.  
 
This interplay of contradictions is well encapsulated by Oprah Winfrey in constructing 
her experience of ‘nervous breakdown’ as cited in an article in The Independent 
(Walker, 2013, Lines 19-20): 
 
“I mean, I wasn't ready to go run naked in the streets. Let's make that clear,” 
Ms Winfrey went on. “But I had reached a point where I couldn't take in any 
more stimulation. OK?” 
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Oprah seems to imply that some might regard the way in which she constructed her 
‘nervous breakdown’ as the signs of someone who is going mad (moving to the space 
over the edge). The phrase “running naked in the streets” seems resonant with an 
interpretative repertoire of madness that pre-dates its co-option into the discourses and 
walled institutions of mental health and mental illness. It invokes a construction of 
over the edge as a space where individuals who disrupted consensual norms of 
Victorian Christian morality such as by “running naked in the streets” were construed 
as mad, unsafe and unmanageable (Appignanesi, 2008). The subject constructed as 
mad in this way is one that is positioned as othered, marginalized and at risk of losing 
liberties behind the restraints of the asylum or behind the ridicule and rejection of 
those positioned as sane (Sadler, 2004). This undoubtedly carries over into the 
interpretative repertoire of madness that Oprah touches on and understandably wishes 
to move away from. 
 
As such, Oprah appears very resolute in telling the reader that this was not the case for 
her. This is not a subject position she chooses to take up or one that is consistent with 
her rags to riches story of success and self-empowerment. The phrases “let's make that 
clear” and the suffix of “OK?” act as rhetorical devices that emphasize her position 
and do not enable the reader to easily interrogate it. Moreover, temporally, she admits 
to ‘nervous breakdown’ after the fact: situating her experience of it with a past subject 
position by using the past tense throughout. This implies that she is presently 
positioned back at a safe distance from the edge of ‘nervous breakdown.’ The article 
that refers to Obama's purported ‘nervous breakdown’ also uses the past tense and 
thus also discursively accomplishes a present subject position that is no longer 
collapsed but repaired to a safer space away from the edge. 
 
3.1.5. ‘Nervous breakdown’ constructing a liminal space: An edge 
The discursive space of ‘nervous breakdown’ as constructed in the articles reviewed 
seems riddled with ambiguities. It is constructed largely as potential: an approach to a 
dangerous edge, and the everyreader-subject as proximal to but not quite in it. It is a 
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position on “the horizon” or “two annoying texts from your mom away” (Thapoung, 
2013, Lines 14 and 7). It is a “verge” that is at least a “danger zone” away (Eurich, 
2013, Line 16). Positions taken up in this approach to an edge might be said to be in 
the space of ‘not nervous breakdown,’ the more normal, even socially lauded space of 
stressed wherein one might still have a chance to maintain one’s position or navigate 
away from the edge through practices of self-management. Even for subjects who 
have been in ‘nervous breakdown’ and fallen off the edge, such as Oprah or Obama, 
the space of ‘nervous breakdown’ is constructed in the past, and the now-subject as 
repaired to the normality of before the edge. This too constructs ‘nervous breakdown’ 
as a space not-here-now: ambiguous and slippery.  
 
By implication, ‘nervous breakdown’ is both the edge and the space over the edge. 
This is a problematic space structurally: how can it be both an edge and after the 
edge? It is also problematic because it is unclear whether or not a subject in ‘nervous 
breakdown’ can return to normal given the overlap with positions of madness which 
carry a heavy discourse of permanence and loss (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999). Yet, some 
subjects like Oprah and Obama do return. They do so via discursive strategies that 
reject positions of madness, either actively, like Oprah who was “wasn’t ready to go 
run naked in the streets” or through the invocation of those stress discourses that 
allude to the more palatable landscape of an embodied breakdown of the helpless 
victim. They also accomplish a returned position via grammatical time, situating the 
subject in ‘nervous breakdown’ as not-now and the subject now as ‘not in nervous 
breakdown.’  
 
‘Nervous breakdown’ is therefore constructed as a problematic space. It seems to 
position its subjects both as victims of the stress of success and as failures of the self-
management of stress. It positions its subjects as stressed, not mad and as mad, not 
(just) stressed. It positions them as almost-there and having-been-there but not-there-
now. ‘Nervous breakdown’ appears to problematise binaries on either side of the 
edge, referring to them and then tripping them up in the very same sentence.  
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 As such, ‘nervous breakdown’ offers a liminal space: one that is not in the realm of 
sanity or madness, physical or mental illness, victimhood or agency, now or then, but 
one that allows for subject positions somewhere in between. This space is also one in 
which the hegemony of psycho-medical institutions is both represented but also can 
be resisted and re-appropriated. For example, while the texts locate expertise on 
defining this construct and the best way to manage it with psy-professionals, by their 
very nature as texts for the public’s self-diagnosis and as confessional spaces, they 
also suggest facility for the reader-subject to use and re-use the construct in 
negotiating his/her proximity to the edge of ‘nervous breakdown.’ To better 
understand this interplay, I turned to interviews with participants who self-identified 
as having had a ‘nervous breakdown,’ curious to see which interpretative repertoires 
they chose to construct ‘nervous breakdown’ and what this might accomplish for 
them.  
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3.2. Interview Analysis 
Exploring subjective constructions of having a ‘nervous breakdown’ 
 
3.2.1. ‘Nervous breakdown,’ breakdown and break 
Most participants used the terms ‘nervous breakdown’ and ‘breakdown’ 
interchangeably during the interviews. The interpretative repertoires they drew on to 
construct ‘nervous breakdown’ all used the verb stem ‘break’ in some way, and 
played on its multiple meanings to accomplish different positions relative to ‘nervous 
breakdown’ and within the interview space. These are discussed in the following 
analysis, as is the discursive function of including ‘nervous’ as an adjectival precursor 
to position the ‘breakdown’ as an embodied experience.  
 
3.2.1.1. Breaking 
The media analysis had identified that ‘nervous breakdown’ is often constructed as a 
space relative to a verge or edge. Similarly, in the interviews, many participants 
prefaced their constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ with an approach to a dangerous 
edge. For example: 
 
There seems to be this quality of lurching around – really just desperately 
looking for ground  
(Jackie, Line 98) 
 
Later in the interview, Jackie described the time immediately preceding her ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as: 
 
I felt on this edge and I felt y’know like I was gonna fall over the edge 
y’know? 
(Jackie, Lines 366-367) 
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Maria used a similar description: 
 
It wasn’t a sudden breakdown. I think things slowly started sliding and 
slipping and I started losing touch with myself – losing purchase 
(Maria, Lines 62-63) 
 
Both Jackie and Maria drew on metaphors of losing footing on firm ground: the usual 
preface to a fall. For both, this loss of a stable place on an edge was positioned as out 
of their control. Being “ungrounded” and “slipping...losing purchase” suggested that 
they started to fall owing to unstable terrain and not owing to a decision to fall. Jackie 
added that despite “desperately looking for ground” she felt as if she was going to fall. 
For many participants, the moment of ‘nervous breakdown’ was constructed as 
uncontrollable falling into a deep and frightening place: 
 
It was like sinking down – you know a very very slippery slope – landing in 
a horrible dark place at the bottom 
(Maria, Lines 250-251) 
 
I was just falling down this hole. Just going down down down and it was 
getting darker and it was getting heavier 
(Chantal, Lines 110-111) 
 
A downwards movement uses an interpretative repertoire that constructs ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as falling over an edge and the subject as fallen down. Falling indicates a 
position of helplessness: a person who falls on unsteady terrain is not to blame, rather 
it is the fault of the terrain and the inevitable force of gravity. Moreover, a person who 
falls from a great height (over an edge), if not fatal, sustains serious injury and needs 
to be rescued by others. A fall also implies that the person is now in a space where 
others with firm footing are not: alone in a space no-one desires to be in. As such, by 
drawing on an interpretative repertoire of falling from an edge, indicating a 
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metaphorical breaking with the boundary of the edge, the subject positions him/herself 
in ‘nervous breakdown’ as victim (not to blame), injured, helpless, alone and in need 
of external rescue. Moreover, he/she is positioned as a victim of the (external) force of 
gravity. This resonated with the interpretative repertoires that emerged from the media 
analysis that constructed the subject in ‘nervous breakdown’ as a victim, felled or 
collapsed (as in Obama’s case) by external forces. 
 
Some participants accomplished this position in a slightly different way. For example: 
 
All of that started to come out, y’know? He [ex-husband] was very 
abusive...and I hadn’t really dealt with all of that and it was only in that 
moment at the end of August that it all literally came out. ‘Cause I just kept 
holding it, holding it 
(Chantal, Lines 76-79) 
 
That’s the beginning of everything I was always everything keeping in 
myself holding everything in[…]I think it started at the same time and 
happened after… it’s just like when you, when you can’t hold it anymore 
(Ella, Lines 93-94 and 100-101) 
 
This too, resonated with an interpretative repertoire that constructed ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as the result of powerful and inevitable forces. In this case the edge that is 
broken with is not constructed as a mountainous one but drawn from an engineering 
metaphor: 
 
What happened over those two weeks [of nervous breakdown] was such that 
I couldn’t keep it in 
(Rachel, Lines 203-204) 
 
Later in the interview, Rachel referred to the moment of ‘nervous breakdown’ and 
noted that: 
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I saw a quote the other day saying it’s about being too strong for too long 
and at some stage the dam walls have to break 
(Rachel, Lines 332-333) 
 
Rachel also drew on an interpretative repertoire that constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ 
as the surpassing of an edge: the breaking of a dam wall. Such walls usually break 
apart from an overload of water pressure suggesting that Rachel was constructing her 
‘nervous breakdown’ as a breaking apart of her wall, her edge between inside and 
outside, owing to there being too much on the inside, much like Chantal saying that 
“all came out” after “holding it, holding it” and Ella saying ‘nervous breakdown for 
her was “when you can’t hold it” in anymore. These constructions are resonant of the 
force of gravity used in the interpretative repertoire that constructs ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as a fall from an edge and is similar to the interpretative repertoire that 
was used to construct the ‘nervous breakdown’ of Obama, as “mental collapse” 
(Naish, 2013, Line 46) directly because of forces of external stress. They do, however, 
differ in the site and direction of the force that causes the edge to break. The force in 
this instance is located within the individual and its pressure felt in the direction of 
inside to outside, not outside to inside as for Obama and for the subject pulled down 
by gravity. The break with the edge occurs when internal pressure is construed to be 
too much for the individual to keep “holding,” which results in it all “literally 
[coming] out.”  
 
Rachel’s metaphor which likens the moment of breaking apart to the bursting of a 
dam wall suggests that the moment of breaking apart was fairly cataclysmic. A burst 
dam wall is considered akin to natural disaster and can devastate surrounding areas. In 
addition, this metaphor suggests that in breaking apart Rachel was no longer 
functional as a holder in some way, for a burst wall renders a dam no longer 
functional. By invoking a position of having one’s edges no longer hold, the subject is 
constructed as broken apart and therefore is rendered not functional. Moreover, the 
subject is also positioned as not particularly accountable for this inability to function. 
 97 
The breaking of the edge is constructed as a force majeure and as happening to the 
subject by forces which put pressure on an edge and which cannot be resisted by the 
subject. For example, Chantal noted that “it all came out” not that she let it out.  
 
This is deeply resonant of Freud’s intra-subjective hydraulic metaphor which 
constructed the individual in terms of a build-up of inside psychological pressures, 
which had to find release in an expressive way. In the original model, the amount of 
libidinal build-up was correlated with the force of release and the process generally 
considered to be out of conscious control (Freud 1923/1961). As Parker (1997) 
contends, the contemporary discursive pool is saturated with Freudian idiom and 
metaphor and it has become a culturally dominant way of constructing relationships, 
individuals, groups and even perhaps largely constitutive of the self-reflexive subject. 
It is therefore unsurprising that the language of participants holds the discursive 
residue of Freud’s marriage of hydraulic engineering with the individual. Particularly, 
given that an interview space is implicitly set up for the discursive practices of self-
reflection: I had asked participants to tell me about their experiences of ‘nervous 
breakdown.’  
 
Chantal, Rachel and Ella all prefaced their breaking apart with descriptions of external 
events that were constructed as both difficult and ongoing. For Chantal, these were 
years of abuse by her ex-husband. Rachel prefaced her account of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ with an account of emotional abuse by her partner, while Ella prefaced 
hers with childhood abuse and neglect. All three of them constructed these events as 
external but as having had some effect on them internally: a pressurised effect that 
they had had to keep holding in or manage over a length of time. Thus, they situated 
the cause of their breaking apart both with these external forces and with a failure in 
their internal ability to hold in the pressure evoked by these external forces.  
 
The latter makes reference to an internal process of stress or distress management: a 
process that requires the individual to hold in, and/or deal with the effects of outside 
forces. This seems to borrow from discourses of stress, distress and pain that position 
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these constructs as within the control of the individual’s internal processes of self-
management (Brown, 1999; Ogden, 2002). This differs from a Freudian hydraulic 
model wherein an overwhelming cathartic expression is constructed as largely 
unconscious. However, they do overlap in constructing an individual as holder of 
internal forces of pressure that have the potential to overwhelm him/her – breaking 
things apart – if not worked-through or dealt-with by internal resources. The common 
phrase of ‘holding oneself together’ is immediately brought to mind. 
 
However, while acknowledging failure of this internal holding in as a possible subject 
position, Chantal, Rachel and Ella, along with most other participants, moved the site 
of failure to hold from one in their control to one out of their control. They 
accomplished this through the minutiae of the grammar and metaphors describing 
their breaking apart. For example, through Rachel’s invocation of the burst dam wall 
metaphor and Ella’s use of a passive “you can’t hold it anymore” not an active “you 
don’t hold it anymore.”  
 
They also accomplished a mitigation of personal responsibility for holding in through 
their accounts of the external events that caused the build-up of internal pressure and 
thus precipitated the breaking apart. These events, such as prolonged abuse or neglect 
invoke a socio-discursive position of victim. For example, Chantal described ongoing 
abuse from her ex-husband as the external force she had to hold in or deal with. The 
battered wife is a discursive position that often invokes a position of helpless victim. 
This is a similar discursive manoeuvre to that used in the media description of 
Obama’s ‘nervous breakdown’ where the severity of the “Syrian crisis, the UN and 
the U.S. budgetary problems” were constructed as acceptably severe enough to allow 
for Obama to “collapse” as a victim of success, not a failure of self-management 
(Naish, 2013, Lines 44 and 46). For Chantal, Rachel and Ella, their descriptions of the 
difficulty and complexity of the external forces causing the build-up of overwhelming 
internal pressure allowed them, mostly, to break apart as victims of uncontrollable 
force. These forces, both external and internal, are constructed as severe enough to 
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mitigate the subject’s responsibility to hold it in and position the subject as helpless 
victim.  
 
Other participants accomplished a position of helpless victim by drawing on slightly 
different interpretative repertoires to construct the surpassing of an edge in ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ For example: 
 
It [nervous breakdown] happened incrementally...and then just – it almost 
like hit a wall. Like if you run a long distance and your body hits a wall 
when you stop but my brain, my emotions, my life just hit this wall and 
suddenly went oh my god how does this work? 
(Sophie, Lines 202-206) 
 
Instead of drawing on falling or engineering metaphors, Sophie drew on the discourse 
of runner’s wall. This is a construct borrowed from marathon runners and is used to 
refer to a sudden loss of energy while running. It is attributed to the toll that long-
distance running takes on the body’s glycogen reserves and denotes an embodied edge 
of ability to continue moving forward (Noakes, 2001). Sophie constructed her moment 
of ‘nervous breakdown’ as one of hitting this “wall” implying that the edge of her 
ability to continue had been surpassed. Similarly hitting a wall also implies a crash 
after which the subject-object that has crashed is unlikely to continue functioning, 
much like a car that crashes into a wall, or the body of a runner who hits runner’s 
wall. Sophie did not use the pronoun ‘I.’ Instead she constructed a system of brain, 
emotions and life which crashed into the edge of the wall. This functioned to mitigate 
personal choice in and responsibility for the crash. Anna used a similar discursive 
strategy, noting: 
 
It kind of felt like my head just popped one day. It just, it just stopped. I 
kind of felt like – if I remember rightly – I was rapidly getting to the point 
where I felt like my head was going to explode but instead of my head 
exploding it just kinda stopped 
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(Anna, Lines 93- 96) 
 
Anna continued this description, noting: 
 
I was floored. I mean it was like literally being broken down. Like not 
having the energy or capacity to do much physically or mentally 
(Anna, Lines 102-103) 
 
Anna constructed the moment of ‘nervous breakdown’ as her head “just stopping” 
after reaching a “point” where she was “floored.” This too implied that an edge of 
embodied ability to keep functioning had been surpassed, much like Sophie’s runner’s 
wall.  The embodiment of the stopping of functioning, as discussed in the media 
analysis, is a discursive strategy that mitigates agency or choice. Anna’s head stopped, 
not her. Anna takes the embodied metaphor further, drawing on a boxer’s discourse of 
being “floored” which suggests that she was rendered unable to move and to continue 
the fight – the fight of staying on the edge of ability perhaps? A head that stops could 
be akin to being in a coma, where the subject is unable to do but is not dead. Anna 
also drew on the mechanical discourse of engines breaking down to augment this 
position, noting that being “broken down,” she could not move or function as 
expected. “Broken down” invokes the metaphor of an engine, particularly that of a 
car, that suddenly stops working and renders the driver or operator unable to use it.  
 
Being “broken down” denotes that a mechanical system has surpassed the edge of its 
ability to keep functioning. Drawing on this interpretative repertoire accomplishes two 
key functions. Firstly, for Sophie and Anna, constructing themselves as embodied 
mechanical systems mitigates their agency in the ‘breakdown’ and shifts an attribution 
of blame. An embodied malfunction falls under the realms of physical illness, 
commonly constructed as happening to a subject and not his/her fault. It also 
constructs illness as system malfunction and thus suggests it may be fixable, like parts 
of a machine. Similarly, a car that is broken down is something happens to the car and 
the driver. Neither is to blame. A broken down car can also be fixed. As Jackie noted: 
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It almost feels like if you have a breakdown you can be fixed or, like, or and 
that sounds like you need to be fixed by another but y’know like if a car 
breaks down, the AA come and they, y’know put jump leads on and y’know 
off you go 
(Jackie, Lines 273-276) 
 
All participants drew on one of three interpretative repertoires that constructed 
‘nervous breakdown’ as the breaking with or of an edge. Namely, interpretative 
repertoires that rendered the subject as broken after a fall, broken apart by pressure, or 
broken down after running out of embodied reserves. In all cases, accountability for 
‘nervous breakdown’ was somewhat mitigated and the subject positioned as victim in 
an uncontrollable experience or force and subsequently rendered unable, injured or 
helpless. This also implies that the subject is unable to restore him/herself to a position 
of ‘not nervous breakdown’ on his/her own and requires the assistance of external 
agents such as “the AA.” However, these three interpretative repertoires that construct 
‘nervous breakdown’ as the breaking with or of an edge all leave some suggestion of 
the possibility of the repair of the position of the broken subject. In all cases the 
subject is rendered unable but alive, akin to the coma-like state invoked by Anna’s 
construction of her head stopping.  
 
3.2.1.2. Taking a break 
Being positioned in ‘nervous breakdown’ rendered participants as helpless victims 
and also as unaccountable for this inability to exercise the agency that they might 
otherwise be expected to demonstrate. For example: 
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I literally spent two or three months in bed and my mum nursed me back to 
health. I know it sounds silly but I remember... I don’t remember a great 
deal because it was really like my head just switched off and went on 
holiday but I remember my mum coming and feeding me like warm 
Weetabix like mashed up with it was the only thing I could eat... I... 
physically, physically I was absolutely battered and broken and mentally as 
well 
(Anna, Lines 113-119) 
 
Anna continued this description noting: 
 
It was literally like my body and head went on holiday...just kind of 
physically I was there in bed but my mind was taking a break like it needed 
to 
(Anna, Lines 122-126) 
 
Anna, like most of the other participants, constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ as a time 
spent in a passive position and in bed. This drew on an interpretative repertoire of 
recovery from physical illness to construct ‘nervous breakdown.’ Anna constructed it 
as a time when she was “nursed” back to health from a position of “battered and 
broken.” What is striking is that she explicitly constructed this time as one of 
“holiday,” particularly for her head which was “taking a break like it needed to.” She 
began to draw on a different interpretative repertoire to construct ‘nervous 
breakdown’ in this instance: one that used the noun ‘breakdown’ in the sense of break 
and holiday as opposed to broken. 
 
Chantal drew on a similar interpretative repertoire: 
 
[The GP was] saying ‘you just need to stop’ y’know and explaining to me 
what I had been through and that I needed some time out for me 
 (Chantal, Lines 178-179) 
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She continued talking about that interaction with the GP later in the interview, saying: 
 
I went to the doctor [GP] and he gave me the sick note and then I rang work 
and then I knew I had closed that bit so I thought right I don’t need to deal 
with that 
(Chantal, Lines 357-358) 
  
She then described what she did after receiving the sick-note:  
 
I literally I was like ok I have to just take one day at a time and just do what 
I need to feel – rather than, to get into that and y’know and to fall 
apart...I...y’know I’ve now got this opportunity to rest because that’s what 
my body was asking 
(Chantal, Lines 360-363) 
 
Chantal, like Anna, drew on an interpretative repertoire of recovery from physical 
illness to construct ‘nervous breakdown:’ she consulted a GP and got a “sick-note” in 
order to take “time out” and to “rest.” This also began to draw on an interpretative 
repertoire that constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ as a break, time-out from work and 
an opportunity to rest. Both Anna and Chantal justified their respective breaks by 
constructing them as types of enforced (not chosen) holiday and rest. For example, 
Anna said she was unable not to take a break because her head went on holiday and 
her body was unable to get out of bed. She qualified this as “needed.” Chantal 
justified hers by drawing on the power of a medical diagnostic discourse which 
effectively prevented her from working via a sick-note. Moreover, she qualified this 
by constructing her break as a response to what her “body was asking.” This 
positioned her as responsible caretaker to her vulnerable body. This touches on 
discourses which speaks to the value of self-care in our society and which positions 
the responsible subject as custodian-regulator of the body (e.g. Rimke, 2000). In both 
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cases, the break in ‘nervous breakdown’ is not constructed as a choice made by either 
party and is constructed as necessary, responsible and restorative. 
 
Anna continued to construct her break in ‘nervous breakdown’ as restorative: 
 
I feel there was something in me that was kind of put into a bubble with the 
nervous breakdown: a very safe, nourishing bubble and just kind of 
suspended out of my physical and mental being for a while. And I feel like 
that is what needed to happen at that time. And then certainly...kind 
of...when...and then when I’d got well again it was kind of when the bubble 
had done what it needed to 
(Anna, Lines 286-290) 
 
In so doing, Anna drew on the connotations of break that construct it as a “safe” and 
protective space of stopping, not unlike a fuse effect or circuit breaker which function 
to stop the flow of electricity in a circuit if there is danger of the circuit being 
overloaded and causing harm. A fuse can be replaced and a circuit reset once the fault 
is repaired. Again, this harkens to constructions of mechanical failure, and acts to 
invoke a position of enforced (not actively chosen), protective stopping from which 
one can be restored when fixed. 
 
Anna also constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ as a “suspended” time of recovery. She 
noted that “when I’d got well again it was kind of when the bubble had done what it 
needed to” which constructed 'nervous breakdown' as temporary, not permanent and 
also reinforced her position of passive recuperation: the “bubble had done,” not her. 
All the participants positioned their 'nervous breakdowns' as a temporary episode 
outside of the context of normal functioning. For example: 
 
 I came to what I would call say maybe a three to six month full stop 
because  the following year I arrived back and did what I had to do  
(Naomi, Lines 119-121) 
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It was like ok, you've had some time out now- it's time to take charge and 
responsibility and give yourself the life you deserve and y’know really make 
things happen for yourself and I remember that...I remember that moment so 
clearly ‘cause that’s when I got out of bed and I thought enough's enough 
now. I've had my break or breakdown but more of a break and it was like ok 
now things are going to change  
(Anna, Lines 253-258)  
 
Naomi constructed her 'nervous breakdown' as a time-limited episode from which she 
“arrived back.” This, again, drew upon the interpretative repertoire of break to 
construct 'nervous breakdown' as a time-away from doing what one “has to do” that 
serves to restore one to doing what one “has to do” – to normal functioning. Anna did 
this too, indicating ‘nervous breakdown’ was “some time out” which ended when she 
had had “enough” of it. She demarcated the end of the passive position of patient that 
she had taken up when “suspended” in her “safe, nourishing bubble” with the 
introduction of a voice of personal choice and agency, saying “it’s time to take charge 
and responsibility” This agency is positioned as internal to Anna as she referred to 
herself as “you” when speaking, as if speaking to herself.  
 
This resonates with discourses of self-management that construct the functional 
subject as able to relate internally to him/herself and thereby exercise agency over 
life-events (e.g. Ogden, 2002). This discursive space constructs the subject as 
caretaker of him/herself, and one who needs to act to optimise his/her functioning 
(Rimke, 2000). It links with those discourses identified in the media analysis that 
suggest that the responsible citizen-subject can avoid falling off the edge of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ through the practices of self-management. This suggests that by drawing 
on an interpretative repertoire that constructs ‘nervous breakdown’ as a restorative but 
discrete break, participants can be positioned/position themselves as passive patient-
tourist-victims on an enforced break and then have the potential to be restored/restore 
themselves to positions of agents of self-care and self-management at the end of the 
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break. In other words, avoiding those constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ in the 
wider discursive terrain that suggest a potential for being irretrievably lost after 
parting with the edge of so-called normal, sane or functional.  
 
3.2.1.3. Breaking through 
This ultimate restoration to agency at the end of ‘nervous breakdown’ was reflected in 
the accounts of all the participants. For example:  
 
I’m much more content, much more wholehearted in the way I’m living 
now[...]I mean I wouldn’t recommend anyone go through a nervous 
breakdown of course but if you’re like me and you’re so incredibly stubborn 
that you don’t want to change anything then to have something like this 
[nervous breakdown] that gives you a clean slate to rebuild something that’s 
more honest is a good thing  
(Rachel, Lines 471-480) 
 
Rachel’s account of ‘nervous breakdown’ earlier in the interview had drawn upon 
interpretative repertoires that positioned her as passive and unable to exercise usual 
agency for a discrete period of time. For example, when describing the start of her 
‘nervous breakdown,’ she said: 
 
It was this big black void. I didn’t know how deep it went. I didn’t know 
how high it was. I didn’t know how wide it was. It was just dark. It left me 
questioning everything and that was a situation I just didn’t have the tools to 
cope with 
(Rachel, Lines 134-138) 
 
In this construction of ‘nervous breakdown,’ Rachel positioned herself as a victim and 
without control who was falling into a deep and unknown “void.” Like many of the 
other participants, she used the interpretative repertoire to construct ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as an uncontrollable falling off an edge into a dangerous and unknown 
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space to accomplish this position. Rachel also indicated that she did not have the 
“tools to cope” and thus augmented her position as helpless. This contrasts with her 
later accounts of ‘nervous breakdown,’ as referenced above, where she moved into an 
active position. She was able to “rebuild” herself while in ‘nervous breakdown’ and 
positioned this as part of the process leading out of ‘nervous breakdown,’ and leading 
to a (current) subject position that is “more content” and “more honest” than before 
‘nervous breakdown.’ The reference to a then-and-a-now constructs ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as a discrete break. Moreover, Rachel drew on an interpretative repertoire 
that constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ not only as a restorative break, but one which 
repositioned her-as-subject into an improved space than that she had been in before 
the ‘nervous breakdown.’ This move from passive to active and then improved was 
echoed by Sophie: 
 
I look on it [nervous breakdown] now as a blessing and I didn’t when I was 
going through it. It’s taught me a lot about myself and how I can keep going 
and how I did keep going and how much inner strength I have 
 (Sophie, Lines 320-322) 
 
She also described her ‘nervous breakdown’ in retrospect as: 
 
So I really feel I’ve gone into the depths of Hades and now I can come out 
and shine even more light 
(Sophie, Lines 341-343). 
  
Sophie also drew upon an interpretative repertoire that constructed the start of 
‘nervous breakdown’ as a low, lonely experience in a depth: “Hades.” She also 
juxtaposed it, like Rachel, with an interpretative repertoire that constructed ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as a process that had repositioned to an improved subject position than 
that which she had occupied before ‘nervous breakdown.’ She was able after ‘nervous 
breakdown’ to “shine even more light,” presumably when compared with before 
‘nervous breakdown.’ Sophie positioned herself as a now-agent actively able to 
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“shine” and “keep going” and as having “inner strength.” The latter is often used to 
describe the individual who is held together, not breaking or broken apart and also 
arguably a key construct in the discursive terrain of successful self-management. 
Moreover, Sophie suggested that ‘nervous breakdown’ functioned to teach her about 
herself and thereby positioned ‘nervous breakdown’ in the discourse of learning 
experiences. This is a term that litters the self-help discursive terrain and it is used as a 
preferred label to reframe aversive or distressing life events. It links with the 
discourses, already discussed, that position stress, distress and pain as well as health, 
ease and happiness largely as the result of processes of intra-subjective appraisal and 
control (Ogden, 2002).  
 
In situating herself in this discursive domain, Sophie was drawing on an interpretative 
repertoire that constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ as a breaking down of the individual 
for purposes of rebuilding an improved version, with renewed an perhaps even better 
internal processes of self-management. This speaks to discourses of breakdown to 
breakthrough often used in contexts of self-development or spiritual enlightenment, 
where an individual who is constructed as somehow inauthentic or flawed goes 
through a period of change or breakdown in order to be reconstructed as more 
authentic, capable or spiritually advanced. These are seen to be positions of internal 
improvement and greater agency (e.g. Caprino, 2008; Druck, 2012; Sutcliffe, 1993). It 
was only from this discursive vantage point, where she had not only returned from 
Hades but was “now” shining more light than before, that Sophie could acknowledge 
any features of agency while in the “depths.” Being in the position of having “come 
out” from ‘nervous breakdown’ as repaired and even better, enabled Sophie or even 
required her by virtue of its reconstitutive quality, to say that she “did keep going” in 
‘nervous breakdown’ and to imply that her “inner strength” remained throughout. This 
contrasted with her earlier position of being rendered a passive, helpless victim after 
hitting an embodied “wall” (Sophie, Line 204).  
 
Most participants drew on the interpretative repertoire of breakdown to breakthrough 
in order to construct their current relationship to ‘nervous breakdown’ in the interview 
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space. Having manoeuvred through positions of unable victim and patient-tourist on a 
restorative break, all participants arrived at a position of triumphant survivor, re-built 
for the better by their respective ‘nervous breakdowns.’ Rachel (Line 101) positioned 
herself as a veritable “Phoenix rising from the ashes.” Yet, as discussed, the latter 
position can only be accomplished when juxtaposed with the helpless victim-subject 
who is rendered broken, broken apart or broken down after breaking with an edge that 
acts as a border between not ‘nervous breakdown’ and ‘nervous breakdown’ – 
between able and unable, stable and unstable, or held together and fallen apart. This 
begins to suggest that ‘nervous breakdown’ acts as a disruption to these binaries and 
that participants are actively positioning themselves as disrupted, not as permanently 
in an-other discursive space to the norm who sit in variable locations to the edge.  
 
3.2.2. Not mad or bad, just nerves 
In each of the interpretative repertoires discussed above, participants accomplish a 
relationship to ‘nervous breakdown’ that avoids positions within the interpretative 
repertoires identified in the media analysis that construct ‘nervous breakdown’ as a 
potential failure of self-management or as madness, and its subjects as not coping or 
mentally-ill.  
 
3.2.2.1. Not my fault 
Being positioned as having failed to avoid succumbing to ‘nervous breakdown’ relies 
largely on discourses that premise ‘nervous breakdown’ on the build-up of external 
stressors and/or internal pressure that could have or should have been mitigated by 
internal processes of self-management at some point. While participants can and do 
construct their ‘nervous breakdowns’ as the result of too much external or internal 
force, consonant with the interpretative repertoires of breaking with firm ground and 
being pulled down by gravity, breaking apart under too much pressure, or surpassing 
an edge of internal reserves (depleted by external demands) participants deny personal 
responsibility for reaching breaking point. They achieve this, as discussed above, 
through discursive strategies that position them as helpless victim on treacherous 
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ground, or that construct ‘nervous breakdown’ as a cause and effect relationship of the 
physics of engineering or mechanics applied to an embodied system whose edge of 
capability is surpassed by uncontrollable forces. In this way, ‘nervous breakdown’ is 
constructed as happening to participants, not as happening because of their failure to 
act in prevention – their not coping.  
 
This position also relies on the construction of the causative forces trumping any 
internal attempts at prevention. Implying, that what participants construct as the 
reason for their breaking with the edges of their stability, holding together or 
continued functioning, is positioned as more powerful than those precipitators of 
‘nervous breakdown’ that the media constructs as warranting prevention. In the media 
analysis, articles that drew on constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ as a verge whose 
sharp edge must be avoided tended to draw on discourses that constructed stress as the 
precipitator of ‘nervous breakdown.’ They constructed stress largely as the result of 
difficulties of not coping well with competing work and personal demands and were 
thus located in a more transactional and intra-subjective discourse of stress
5
. These 
discourses contend that a responsible subject would know when the edge was being 
neared and take preventative measures or help them cope.  
 
For example: 
 
Bring some balance and routine into your life – take days off, make time for 
relaxation, try to eat regular meals, and get to bed early. Avoid alcohol, 
caffeine and sugary junk foods.  
(The Mirror, 22 March 2007, Lines 94-96, no author cited) 
 
Participants in the interview study constructed the precursors to their ‘nervous 
breakdowns,’ or the forces pushing them off and through dangerous edges, as other 
than work-life stressors. For example, as discussed, Ella prefaced her ‘nervous 
breakdown’ with a long history of family difficulties and Chantal with an abusive 
                                                
5
 See Ogden (2012) for a comprehensive overview of the discursive terrain of stress  
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relationship. Similarly, Maria prefaced hers with the loss of a long-term partner, 
immigration and a miscarriage: 
 
The start of it all was leaving [country] and the life I had with [ex-partner] 
(Maria, Lines, 13-14) 
 
Later, again describing the build-up to her ‘nervous breakdown,’ Maria noted:  
 
Then there was the pregnancy and the miscarriage that happened, oh that 
was a...that was a massive sort’ve...started the real degeneration  
(Maria, 49-51) 
 
No participants constructed failure to cope with work-life balance as precursors to 
‘nervous breakdown.’ The forces they constructed as pushing them towards the edge, 
such as abuse, neglect or loss, position pre-emptive treatments of “daily relaxation” or 
the avoidance of “sugary junk foods” as facile and inappropriate. This would suggest 
that participants avoided being positioned as having failed to spot and prevent 
‘nervous breakdown’ by constructing their ‘nervous breakdowns’ in a different 
discursive terrain from the media articles that would position them as having failed to 
cope with or manage their stress. Rather they drew on discursive terrains which 
constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ as other than work-life stress, and as the result of 
greater forces whose propulsion towards or attrition of an edge of embodied capability 
or stability could not be have been preventatively managed.  
 
Nonetheless, despite circumventing unwanted positions of having failed to prevent 
‘nervous breakdown,’ all participants suggested that they had been reluctant to use the 
construct in the public domain. For example: 
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There’s people, people that I work with [who] have no idea I had a nervous 
breakdown because partially it’s none of their business but there is still a 
stigma about mental illness 
(Sophie, Lines 190-192)  
 
Sophie constructed public disclosure of ‘nervous breakdown’ as having great potential 
for others to position her as “mentally ill” which she calls a position of “stigma” and 
therefore as unwanted. She also constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ as located in the 
private domain – it being “none of their business.” One might infer that this is because 
of the fear of being positioned as mentally ill in the public discursive space whereas in 
a more private space, such as in the interviews, participants could construct a version 
of ‘nervous breakdown’ that could evade this position. This resonated with my 
experience of the internet web forums, which had constructed my accessing their 
conversations on ‘nervous breakdown’ as an “unwelcome invasion of privacy” and as 
“breaking our safe space.” Perhaps, they too feared the discursive positions they might 
have been placed in by me (positioned as public domain), such as mentally ill, 
whereas in the privacy of an ongoing insider conversation, they would have been able 
to construct alternative positions in ‘nervous breakdown’ by drawing on other 
interpretative repertoires – as did the participants in this study.  
 
3.2.2.2. Not mad 
In the interviews, participants actively avoided being positioned in a discursive terrain 
of mental illness or madness. For example Anna noted: 
 
I think that had psychological professionals been involved, my path from 
that point would have been very different. I think I woulda been section-
able. I think I probably woulda got all sorts of diagnoses and be put on 
different medication and I feel I had a lucky escape from that but the way 
my parents approached the doctor was that I was ill physically  
(Anna, Lines 150-155) 
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Anna was using her own knowledge of psy-discourses to construct her position in 
‘nervous breakdown’ as relevant to its diagnostic gaze and treatment. She constructed 
her avoidance of the psy-institution as a “lucky escape” indicating if she had been co-
opted within in it, she might have been positioned as prisoner – not only of a section, 
but also of the permanent markers of diagnoses and the material effects of medication. 
Anna said, shortly after this excerpt, that the presentation of a physical illness to her 
family doctor, a medical professional, was “safer” (Line 164) as if to imply that a non-
physical, or mental construction would be dangerous. This, in turn, begins to position 
psy-institutions and practices as potentially dangerous for the subject who is rendered 
helplessly passive.  
 
Even though Anna acknowledged the potential for her experience of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ to be constructed as mental illness and her to be positioned as 
“diagnosed” by psy-discourses, Anna deferred to a different construction that relied 
on ‘nervous’ as preface to ‘breakdown:’ 
 
I called it a nervous breakdown at the time because there’s no other words 
for it. I mean literally as a literal translation y’know I broke down 
nervously...I was a nervous wreck prior to that point. It was the utter extent 
of anxiety, living on nerves that just got to the point where it was just kind 
of enough’s enough and the shutters came down...literally just broke down 
(Anna, Lines 304-308) 
 
Anna seemed to be connecting the psy-construct of “anxiety” with an embodied effect 
on her nerves. She indicated that she “broke down nervously” and situated the 
breaking down within her nerves, within her body. This again, relies on an 
interpretative repertoire that constructs ‘nervous breakdown’ as the trespass of an edge 
of embodied reserves, in this case located in the nerves, by a forceful agent, such as 
continuous “anxiety.” This draws on stress discourses, as discussed in the media 
analysis, which feature anxiety as part of stress and which link ongoing stress with 
physical attrition, collapse and illness (Abbott, 1990; Selye, 1956; Viner, 1999). It 
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also draws on the sediment of psy-discourses originating from the mid 1700s, which 
had began to deploy constructs of nervous disease to explain an unable, restless or 
apprehensive subject (Shorter, 2013). Anna’s amalgamation of these discursive 
terrains allowed her to draw on psy-discourses to construct herself as “anxious,” but 
also to avoid a follow through positioning within the realm of psy-practices. It is 
unclear whether Anna was locating anxiety as external, internal or somewhere in 
between, but regardless of this, she was able to navigate into the terrain of physical 
malfunction, which as discussed, implies less accountability in onset or repair, greater 
possibility of audience sympathy and also suggests a temporary disruption to normal 
functioning. Most poignantly, as Anna suggested, she “escaped” a dangerous position 
as mentally ill.  
 
It is at this point that participants’ use of ‘nervous’ as qualifier for ‘breakdown’ 
becomes increasingly salient. Participants used ‘nervous breakdown’ and ‘breakdown’ 
interchangeably in their accounts, even erring towards a preference for the latter. 
However, when asked about why this descriptor for their experience and not another, 
participants re-invoked ‘nervous’ as explanation: 
 
It’s funny ‘cause if you actually think about it a nervous breakdown is not 
quite correct. It’s a mental breakdown but at the same time it’s the nervous 
system that is going to buggery and is not functioning properly 
(Sophie, Lines 372-374) 
 
Sophie was quite explicit in capturing the potential for her to be positioned in the 
realm of “mental” not only in this excerpt but also in her talk about not why she chose 
not to use the construct of ‘nervous breakdown’ in the public domain. This alluded to 
a position within the realm of discourses of mental health and illness. Sophie also 
pointed to a contradiction in the premise that the construct of ‘nervous breakdown’ is 
either physical or mental, suggesting a disruption of this binary. Yet, she was keen to 
ultimately locate the breakdown within an embodied “nervous system” and render 
“going to buggery” as its malfunction, not hers. This resonates with other participants’ 
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attempts to manoeuvre out of the realm of discourses that construct ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as a descent over the edge into madness. Rachel touched on this more 
explicitly when asked why she called her experience a ‘nervous breakdown:’  
 
It’s purely because I think it [nervous breakdown] encompasses the entire 
experience[...]I think I hadn’t had enough exposure to mental health terms 
to call it anything else. It certainly wasn’t a psychotic break or anything 
(Rachel, Lines 282-292) 
 
Like Sophie, Rachel began positioning ‘nervous breakdown’ within the terrain of 
“mental health” thereby suggesting that for her, it was legitimately part of these 
discursive practices and she, a subject of them. She also brought the construct of 
“psychotic break” to the fore. This is a psy-construct used to denote a moment when 
the subject breaks with reality in some way. Leader (2011) contends that this is one of 
the most powerful constructions of madness in the contemporary discursive terrain. It 
is a break with an edge that results in a repositioning in the realm of mental illness, 
and carries with it the stigma of life-long psy-diagnoses, treatments and a position of 
exclusion from those who function normally. Rachel’s need to explicitly disavow her 
construction of ‘nervous breakdown’ as “psychotic break” confirmed the discursive 
connection between the two, consistent with the findings in the media analysis. It was 
as if she was telling me very clearly that while she had been rendered broken apart, 
unable to function and “everything [she’d] known had gone up in a puff of smoke” 
(Lines 133-134) – not unlike a break with an edge functioning as the border to a 
familiar reality – this was not to be construed as a “psychotic break.” This resonates 
with Oprah’s disavowal of madness in her media interview about her ‘nervous 
breakdown,’ where she had said: ‘ “I mean, I wasn't ready to go run naked in the 
streets. Let's make that clear” ’ right after she had positioned herself as having been 
unable to function as normal (Oprah Winfrey cited in Walker, 2013, Line 19).    
 
Most of the participants constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ as a position in which they 
were unable to respond to external demands as they normally would for a period of 
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time. I have discussed their preferred interpretative repertoires to construct, explain 
and justify this position. The need to achieve an embodied breakdown for which they 
have limited responsibility can begin to be understood in terms of the fear of being 
positioned as mentally ill. The use of the interpretative repertoire of ‘breakthrough’ is 
particularly powerful in this regard as not only does it run counter to a position as 
mentally ill, it repositions the subject as even more able than before, discouraging any 
questioning or doubt of their current position in the discursive terrain of sanity. There 
appears to be a link emerging between demonstrating ability through practices 
constructed as coping or functioning and being positioned as sane. For example Anna 
noted: 
 
Y’know you just get on with things and you don’t...you just cope and you 
just deal with things and I got to that point where I couldn’t cope and I 
couldn’t deal with things anymore so I remember feeling like that’s not ok 
(Anna, Lines 324-326) 
 
Anna continued reflecting on not coping not being “ok,” noting: 
 
I think we do generally kind of y’know have a culture of kind of you just 
suck it up and get on with things. Perhaps that y’know not being able to do 
that is seen as a kind of weakness or some kind of psychological flaw 
(Anna, Lines 357-359) 
 
Anna constructed herself as unable to “to cope” when in ‘nervous breakdown’ and 
suggested that this was antithetical to a hegemonic cultural discourse of a coping 
subject who “just cope[s].” Moreover, she was implying that if positioned within this 
discourse, she would be constructed as having a “weakness” or a “psychological 
flaw.” To be part of a culture where you “just cope” and you “just deal” positions the 
subject as actively choosing to cope and deal. This in turn positions the subject who 
“couldn’t cope” as potentially accountable for this. As Rachel noted: 
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A little voice in my head went “you’re not coping” and I thought well 
you’re gonna have to find some way of coping because this is your life. You 
can’t book out of your own life 
(Rachel, Lines 228-230)  
 
 In this excerpt Rachel was constructing her “not coping” as a choice both by 
suggesting that she “find” a way to cope and also by constructing her not coping as 
her actively “book[ing] out” of her life. This implies that there is a powerful 
discursive position in the wider terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ that constructs not 
doing and not coping as the subject’s choice and therefore the subject’s fault. This 
implies that an inability to perform a coping self, as evident in all participant accounts 
of ‘nervous breakdown,’ needs to be justified for it to not be rendered as mentally ill, 
a failure of self-management or, crucially, as the choice and fault of the subject. 
Participants achieved this justification by constructing their not coping as a feature of 
temporary, embodied inability caused by uncontrollable forces that would overwhelm 
almost any individual. In addition, they emphasized that ‘nervous breakdown’ was not 
of their choosing or doing, but happened to them. Most importantly, participants 
constructed their not coping as repaired to even better coping as a result of ‘nervous 
breakdown.’  
 
These discursive justifications for ‘nervous breakdown’ are a double-edged sword. 
They both avoid a position of accountability and blame for ‘nervous breakdown’ but 
also act to reinforce the power of this potential position by illuminating the extensive 
discursive measures one has to take to mitigate against this position. What begins to 
emerge is that participants are not only evading the stigma of mental illness but also 
the stigma of a person who does not cope. There seems to be a significant discursive 
overlap between the two positions in that to invoke one seems to require commentary 
on the other. The deployment of ‘nervous breakdown’ seems to function to mitigate 
against the stigma of both positions.   
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Permutations of ‘breakdown’ seem to allow access to interpretative repertoires and 
discourses that allow for more palatable positions of inability, particularly when 
prefixed with ‘nervous.’ The latter seems to allow for some constructions of a 
distressed subject to be borrowed from psy-discourses and then repurposed as an 
embodied malfunction. For example, in referring to “losing your reality” and “you’re 
crazy” (Jackie, Lines 523-524), “depression” (Sophie, Line 64) and “section-able” 
(Anna, Line 152) these participants allowed sediments of these psy-constructs and 
their connotations of madness, stigma and distress to enter their constructions of 
‘nervous breakdown.’ Yet, they lingered here but briefly, sidestepping and even 
disavowing these constructs, like Rachel saying “it certainly wasn’t a psychotic 
break” (Line 292) and Sophie emphasizing that while “it’s a mental breakdown” it is 
simultaneously “the nervous system going to buggery” (Lines 373 and 374). 
Participants showed a preference instead for those constructions of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ that emphasized its embodied location, its temporary nature and its 
largely external and unsolicited cause.   
 
All participants claimed to have chosen the term ‘nervous breakdown’ themselves. 
For example: 
 
Nervous breakdown is the only label I knew 
(Naomi, Line 469) 
 
Naomi went on to contrast her choice of label with that of her psychiatrist: 
 
My perception would be that they would have a terribly high falutin jargon 
term of a more academic or whatever you would call it...they would have a 
very specific rather long word that was a bit complicated that the normal 
layman wouldn’t understand 
 (Naomi, Lines 532-535) 
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Sophie said: 
 
The doctor didn’t call it a nervous breakdown, it was me 
(Sophie, Line 9) 
 
Sophie described her choice of label at a later point in the interview, saying: 
 
At the time we [Sophie and family] needed a label to describe what I was 
going through so that it legitimised it rather than this is some kind of 
wobbly “poor Sophie can’t stop crying.” It gave it a legitimacy and a 
seriousness that helped us all cope because there is the opportunity for a 
person to think they’re going completely mad 
(Sophie, Lines 376- 380) 
 
For Naomi and Sophie, even though they had both consulted psycho-medical 
professionals, they chose to name their experiences themselves and call them ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ Naomi explicitly indicated that her construction of her experience 
differed from the psychiatrist she had consulted. She appeared to show some disdain 
for his diagnostic terms by disparaging them as “high falutin,’” or perhaps as not 
relevant or accessible to her. Implicit in Naomi’s construction of her account of self-
diagnosis is a sense of distance between her and the psychiatrist and of an inability as 
a “layman” to participate in the diagnosis he might have used to construct her 
experience. Anna’s “escape” (Line 154) from psy-diagnosis also places a distance 
between her and a psy-diagnosis. Similarly, for Sophie, she and her family chose 
‘nervous breakdown,’ not her doctor. For them, this label accomplished a reassuring 
gravity by not dismissing it as a “wobbly,” arguably a more facile construct, albeit one 
that draws on metaphors of being insecurely positioned and close to falling. However, 
the gravity bestowed by ‘nervous breakdown’ also served to mitigate a position of 
“going completely mad.” For Sophie, it functioned to move her to a different 
discursive terrain: a legitimate break but not a mad break. Jackie, too, reflected on this 
discursive function of choosing the label of ‘nervous breakdown:’   
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I don’t want to be labelled as being ill, y’know, and in a way perhaps the 
idea of having a breakdown ‘cause it almost feels like if you have a 
breakdown you can be fixed[...] If I’ve got depression it’s kind of like this 
perpetual ongoing thing that I have or I am. Whereas a breakdown almost 
feels like a disruption 
 (Jackie, Lines 271-280)  
 
Jackie reflected on the possibility of her experience being constructed as depression 
and situated in the psy-diagnostic terrain. She explicitly stated that she believed this 
position carried with it permanence and constructed the diagnostic label as intrinsic to 
personhood. She explicitly rejected this position, saying that she did not want to “be 
labelled as ill” within the psy-terrain. She indicated that for her, ‘nervous breakdown,’ 
constructed using the interpretative repertoire of mechanical breakdown, was 
preferable to a psy-diagnosis for it implied temporary “disruption,” the possibility of 
being fixed by an-other and less accountability and blame for not coping. 
 
What must be noted at this point is despite their use of ‘nervous breakdown’ as a self-
owned label to construct their experience and going to great lengths to construct it as 
an embodied experience and re-purpose it out of discourses of mental illness, some 
participants chose to consult psy-resources, particularly talking therapies, while in 
‘nervous breakdown.’ This appeared to be because they were unsure of where else to 
turn for an external agent of repair. As Naomi put it: 
 
Where else would I have gone? I tried the health farm[...]If you’re feeling 
disconnected and you’re feeling disorientated and you’re feeling out of 
yourself and not yourself and you don’t have a temperature or physical 
things[...]I knew enough about psychological help because my aunt when 
she got divorced had been to see a psychologist , so I knew enough about it 
(Naomi, Lines 434-446) 
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Naomi suggested she was faced with few external resources for help. The 
juxtaposition of “health farm” and “psychological help” is interesting for a spa alludes 
to the interpretative repertoire of ‘taking a break’ for purposes of restoration and 
alludes to treatments of the body. However, psychological therapy alludes to 
treatments for the mind and suggests that Naomi while having constructed ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as not her fault, embodied, and even transformative, also situated it within 
the wider socio-historical discourses that render a “feeling” subject appropriate for the 
hegemonic technologies of the mind. It also suggests a contradiction in her 
construction of an embodied experience. Nonetheless, it was Naomi, not the 
psychiatrist she saw, who chose the construct of ‘nervous breakdown.’ It was Naomi 
who chose to leave the psychiatrist’s diagnosis to his “high falutin jargon” (Line 533). 
This appeared to reflect an ambivalence in the relationship to psy-therapies for the 
subject of ‘nervous breakdown’ and an uncertainty of where to turn to for help during 
‘nervous breakdown.’ 
 
Similarly, Ella saw psychologists while in ‘nervous breakdown.’ She noted that she 
was taken there by a concerned aunt who did not know where else to turn to for help: 
 
She [aunt] said she can’t hold this anymore[...]they took me to the hospital 
and then there was some people – psychologists – coming to me and talking 
to me and stuff but I didn’t listen to them they didn’t help me at all 
(Ella, Lines 771-778) 
 
She compared the psychologists with the care she received from her aunt: 
 
You [psychologists] don’t even know what’s going on in my mind and my 
aunt she let me take me out all these things: what was going actually in my 
mind, what I was thinking about  
(Ella, Lines 835-837)  
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For Ella, like for Naomi, there was a turn to psy-institutions for help during ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ She positioned her aunt, like her, as helpless victim who could no longer 
“hold.” Interestingly, this might imply that Ella’s practices of not coping during 
‘nervous breakdown’ were so difficult for her aunt to manage that she too could not 
“hold” and turned to the hospital for support in managing Ella. This emphasizes the 
extent of the deviance associated with a not-coping-as-usual subject position in the 
wider discursive terrain, so disruptive to normal that it could affect another almost as 
if by contagion. 
 
However, Ella constructed psychological intervention as unhelpful. Ella, like Naomi, 
repositioned ‘nervous breakdown’ as out of the body and “in my mind.” Having also 
gone to great discursive lengths to construct an embodied experience and one which 
led to personal breakthrough, Ella blurred this position with one located in the mind. 
She thus positioned ‘nervous breakdown’ as both within the discursive terrain of psy 
but also outside of its reach. What begins to emerge is a sense that ‘nervous 
breakdown’ allowed participants to play with the discursive borders of psy: to 
navigate in and out of its territory and to dictate what parts of it they used as opposed 
to being constructed as its mad subject. Also emergent, is that ‘nervous breakdown’ 
functions to disrupt a binary of mind and body. Although participants went to great 
lengths to construct an embodied breakdown, they all alluded to features of mind, to 
the possibility of being positioned in psy-discourses and some even consulted psy-
practitioners to help their minds.  
 
3.2.3. A liminal space 
It would seem therefore, that participants chose ‘nervous breakdown,’ even when 
faced with other discursive possibilities – even when positioned, like Naomi or Ella, 
within the purview of psy-practitioners. Participants appeared to choose the term to 
allow themselves a discursive space that could draw on some psy-constructs to make 
sense of their experience and themselves, such depression, anxiety or even speculating 
that they were losing a reality or going crazy but which allowed them to avoid the 
stigma and permanence of psy-diagnosis and circumvent positions in the space of 
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mental illness. It allowed some participants to use psy-therapies for support but, like 
Naomi and Ella, to take ownership of diagnosis and entry and exit from these 
therapeutic technologies.  
 
The use of ‘nervous breakdown’ appeared to allow participants to construct an 
experience featuring both the body and mind at different discursive junctures thereby 
disrupting this binary. It allowed them to embody the mind at moments of not doing to 
avoid the dual stigmas of being positioned as not coping or mad. This suggests that 
the normal or valued subject needs to choose to perform practices of coping, which 
are intrinsically related to socially endorsed practices of a stable and held together 
subject who can continue doing-as-normal. The subject of ‘nervous breakdown’ is one 
who falls from unstable ground, who breaks apart and is not held together and who is 
“not functioning.” As Jackie puts it:  
 
Breakdown seems to be characterised by not functioning and by that I don’t 
mean dysfunctional but I mean not functioning, y’know? Maybe there is a 
kind of, yeah going to bed or a, or a y’know, a not...not working 
(Jackie, Lines 499-501) 
 
Jackie was suggesting that the performance of a coping self is demonstrated through 
practices of functioning such as going to work and getting up in the morning. She was 
also constructing a self who in ‘nervous breakdown’ is “not functioning” but was clear 
in delineating it from a subject position of “dysfunctional.” This seems to indicate the 
difference between a not-coping subject rendered as such through acts and language 
of being unable or not doing – particularly work – and the mad subject. It would seem 
that the construction of ‘nervous breakdown’ allowed participants to carve out a 
discursive distinction between the two subject positions, again, alluding to the 
construct’s facility in its interplay with the boundaries of discourses of madness. The 
position of unable and not-doing and the position of mad seem nonetheless related: 
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People sort of think you’re crazy [if you have nervous breakdown] that 
y’know that yeah I think it’s just sort of this perception that people kinda 
think, well people kinda think well there’s something wrong with you or 
something not right with you or...and...you know if can’t hold yourself up 
high and walk, y’know get through the day then there’s y’know, what’s 
wrong with you? And actually it’s ok to fall apart 
(Chantal, Lines 487-491)  
 
Here Chantal was referring to others’ constructions of one not being able to “get 
through the day.” Much like Rachel’s construction of coping, Chantal suggested that 
the norm is to be actively holding oneself “up” and able to “walk.” This active 
position implies agency and choice over “holding yourself up” and therefore, by 
implication, choice in not doing so. Chantal denies that this was a choice in ‘nervous 
breakdown’ by using the verb “can’t.” She indicated that this would cause others to 
position the unable subject who can’t (or won’t) as “crazy” or having “something 
wrong” with them and thus indicates a link between the not-coping subject and the 
crazy subject. Yet, she also ended by saying “it’s ok to fall apart.” This touches on 
what ‘nervous breakdown’ seemed to be able to accomplish for the participants: a way 
to be in a position of unable, even deploying constructions of mental illness, but for it 
to be constructed instead as an “ok” way “to fall apart.”  
 
The embodiment of falling apart in participants’ constructions of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ seems crucial in this regard for it finds through the adjective of ‘nervous’ 
a legitimate way of rendering the body unable because of external forces of attrition, 
pressure or destabilisation that can also be positioned as acting on the mind (such as 
feelings of loss or anxiety). It allowed participants to deploy psy-discourses to 
construct these external forces and to construct their experiences of them but then to 
neatly manoeuvre into the realm of physical illness, which functions as a far more 
forgiving discursive space of inability (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999). However, 
participants’ blurring of the boundaries between physical and mental in their use of 
‘nervous breakdown’ also allowed them to remain silent about the body when 
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deploying the interpretative repertoire of ‘breakdown to breakthrough.’ They situated 
constructs of personal breakthrough within spaces of feeling and thinking self: spaces 
of the mind. ‘Nervous breakdown’ therefore appeared to allow participants facility in 
disrupting the binary of body and mind in the interviews in order to achieve discursive 
positions that legitimised their ‘nervous breakdowns’ through forging positions 
relative to inability that were justified and positions relative to new-found ability that 
were within discourses of the accomplished subject.     
 
However, by extension, this discursive freedom was not without limits. While 
allowing participants greater facility over how and when they engaged with psy-
discourses and discourses of not coping in the construction of their ‘nervous 
breakdowns’ all participants had to engage with these discourses, even through 
discursive acts of disavowal, justification or silence. The wider discursive field that 
constructs ‘nervous breakdown’ is largely constituted by discourses of mental illness 
and concomitant psy-interventions. In addition, a not-coping subject is constructed in 
the wider discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ as a subject who has failed to 
manage and in this, a choice in managing and not managing is implied – for example, 
the choice implied in the media discourses instructing the responsible citizen-subject 
to recognise and prevent him/herself from reaching the edge of ‘nervous breakdown.’ 
This brings to the fore the interplay between the subject of ‘nervous breakdown’ and 
the discursive agent who constructs ‘nervous breakdown.’ For example, the facility to 
re-construct ‘nervous breakdown’ as an “ok” way to “fall apart” seemed more limited 
to private conversations, implying that in the public domain it was harder to escape 
positions of mental illness or chosen deviance. The ensuing discussion will expand on 
this contextual interplay. 
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4. Discussion 
On accomplishing an ok way to fall apart 
 
What emerged from both the media and the interview analyses was that subject 
positions within discourses of madness and discourses of self-management were the 
most readily available in constructing the subjects of ‘nervous breakdown.’ 
Constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ seemed to invoke the possibilities of mental 
illness and/or of having failed to manage to hold oneself together. Subjects who self-
identified with ‘nervous breakdown’ were therefore faced with a discursive terrain 
that foreclosed on their options to explain their experiences in language other than that 
of mental illness or failed self-management – replete with their associated stigmas. 
‘Nervous breakdown’ seems to be an explanatory exercise in accounting for passivity, 
helplessness and distress: one that seeks to evade fixed positions within the discursive 
terrains of madness and failed self-management, albeit forced to refer to them, and to 
carve out another less stigmatising space for its subjects in their moments of not-
managing.  
 
4.1. Finding a place between not coping and mad 
4.1.1. Failed self-management 
The media analysis mapped out a discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ that was 
predominated by interpretative repertoires that constructed it as a dangerous position 
to be avoided by the alert, responsible and self-effective subject. He/she is called by 
this interpretative repertoire to diagnose his/her position relative to the danger of 
‘nervous breakdown’ and then adopt prescribed practices of self-management such as 
eating “regular meals” or getting “to bed early” (The Mirror, 22 March 2007, Line 
95). This implies that those who reach a position of ‘nervous breakdown’ have failed 
to self-diagnose and failed to self-manage appropriately and thus, ‘nervous 
breakdown’ is their fault. This is premised on the assumption that individuals hold 
internal processes and resources which are constitutive of their ability to cope or 
 127 
manage and furthermore, that the individual holds him/herself together via these 
processes.   
 
The self-managing subject who holds him/herself together in this way, constantly 
policing and preventing risk of falling apart is a hegemonic construction of the 
individual in the contemporary discursive terrain (Ogden, 2002; Rose, 1998). It is 
premised on psy’s constructions of the individual as constituted by malleable, internal 
cognitive processes held in his/her mind that can create and moderate experiences of 
distress (e.g. Bandura, 1993; Beck, 1979; Gilbert, 2009). Thus, the mind of the 
individual is constructed as the seat of self-management. Hybrids of this discourse that 
have begun addressing the embodiment of the mind still attribute these same 
properties of agency and self-management to the mind-body and thus situate them 
within the control of the individual (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Given that within 
this discourse, processes of self-management and control are ascribed as constituting 
this individual mind, or mind-body, they can be said to also constitute the individual. 
As such, this discourse very clearly circumscribes the normative and successful 
individual as consistently agentic and responsible for creating his/her experiences. It 
locates contextual experience within the individual thereby stripping the social of its 
responsibilities for impacting upon the individual. Therefore, via this discourse, the 
self-managing subject becomes almost totally defined by attributions of responsibility 
for his/her state and fate that are internal to and even constitutive of him/herself.   
 
This construction of the self-managing individual has infused almost all institutional 
spaces that constitute and regulate the individual, from the workplace where the 
employee’s fitness is assessed through his/her internal ability to manage stress as far 
as domains of medicine where self-management, particularly of the constructs of 
external stress and health behaviour, is seen as causing or preventing illness (e.g. 
Bandura, 2004; Iwata, Ota & Duman, 2013; Lovelace, Manz & Alves, 2007; Oginska-
Pulik, 2005). What is central to these constructions are the polarities of coping and not 
coping. They are construed as the polarities of a self-managing individual who is 
doing this self-managing well enough not to disrupt the systems of workplace, health, 
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family etc. and he/she who is not doing it well enough and causes disruption to these 
systems through visible indications of illness, passivity or distress (Snyder & Pulvers, 
2001)
6
. These systems rely on and therefore continuously reconstruct and regulate the 
self-managing, agentic individual who is positioned by them as successful.  
 
What ‘nervous breakdown’ seems to indicate is a moment where the subject has not 
managed to demonstrate adequate self-management or to cope. The discursive terrain 
of ‘nervous breakdown’ as mapped out in the media study is quite explicit in this 
regard: offering up an interpretative repertoire asking the subject to appraise and if 
need be upgrade his/her coping so as to not fall into ‘nervous breakdown.’ The 
participants in the interviews were not as explicit but they used positions of passivity, 
distress and helplessness to construct themselves in ‘nervous breakdown.’ These 
positions run counter to the hegemony of the self-managing agent. The interpretative 
repertoire of breaking that participants deployed to construct a start of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ in the interviews is a construction of the breaking with their positions on 
the edge, which is a space where self-management and coping are situated.  
 
Moreover, participants deployed this interpretative repertoire of breaking to account 
for the moment when passivity, helplessness or distress became impossible to hide or 
contain: when Ella, for example, could no longer “hold it,” (Line, 101) when Chantal 
could not get out of bed (Lines 66-67) or when for Rachel, the “dam wall” burst (Line 
333). In this way, the participants constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ as a disruption to 
what is/should be managed on the inside and implied a disruption to processes of self-
management. It would seem then that ‘nervous breakdown’ not only denotes a failure 
of the subject to self-manage or cope but also a failure of the subject to hide this on 
the inside, away from the gaze of others. As such, subjects who are/have been in 
‘nervous breakdown,’ are almost immediately positioned as not coping, replete with 
its associations of failed self-management and personal responsibility for this failure.  
 
                                                
6
 Snyder & Pulvers (2001) provide a comprehensive overview of the coping theory-construct and its 
link to processes of self-management  
 129 
4.1.1.1. Not to blame: Using ‘nervous breakdown’ to avoid accountability for not 
coping 
 
In breaking 
Understandably, this was a position that the participants who self-identified with 
‘nervous breakdown’ worked very hard to avoid. However, it was not a position of not 
coping that they attempted to avoid but rather a position of being held accountable for 
it. Participants attempted to avoid being positioned as to blame for passivity, 
helplessness and distress and the disruption these positions posed to normal agency, 
such as going to work, getting out of bed or holding and managing distress. Running 
like a red thread through all the interpretative repertoires that participants used to 
construct ‘nervous breakdown’ was the mitigation of personal responsibility. This was 
also evident in the constructions of Obama and Oprah’s ‘nervous breakdowns’ in the 
media analysis. For example, Oprah and all of the interview participants positioned 
themselves as helpless victims of ‘nervous breakdown’ not as agents who chose it. 
They accomplished this by constructing ‘nervous breakdown’ as a breaking whereby 
they were pushed into positions of helplessness and passivity by powerful forces that 
were positioned as external to them and out of their control. When these forces were 
positioned as internal to the individual, they were constructed as out of conscious 
control and still related to the pressures of external events.  
 
These powerful forces were constructed as having the capacity to overwhelm the 
individual, much like a natural disaster, accident or attack. For example, participants 
drew on metaphors of falling from a high edge into a deep void. This positioned them 
as the victims of the force of gravity and victims of dangerous terrain, akin to being 
the victim of a dangerous mountaineering accident. They also drew on metaphors of 
hydraulic pressure bursting through and pouring out, thus breaking the inside-outside 
binary. This positioned them as victims of this uncontrollable internal pressure, akin 
to being the victim of the disaster of a “dam wall” bursting and also akin to being 
overwhelmed by a cataclysmic Freudian catharsis. Finally, participants drew on 
metaphors of mechanical breakdown, likening the body to a machine. In this 
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metaphor, the individual is rendered helpless because a part of the machine-body that 
is constructed as driving him/her has failed, much like a broken down car leaves the 
driver helplessly stranded or a broken circuit renders a building and its occupants as 
victims of the shutdown. In Obama’s case, possibly because he is such an iconic 
example of the successful subject, it was the media (not him) who positioned him as 
helpless victim of the stressful forces of the current socio-political landscape. He was, 
in their construction of his purported ‘nervous breakdown,’ forced into a position of 
“collapse” by the corrosive effect of ongoing external stressors, akin to a building 
being collapsed by an overpowering attack or a surface structure being worn down by 
abrasive forces.  
 
One is hard pressed to attribute personal responsibility to a helpless victim of 
overwhelming forces, natural disaster, or the breakdown of the machinery on which 
he/she is reliant. In constructing ‘nervous breakdown’ as a breaking of the subject’s 
ability to cope by powerful agents that are out of his/her control, participants rendered 
themselves as not to blame for their not coping. They allowed themselves to display 
features of a position of not coping or failed self-management, visible and even 
ongoing passivity, helplessness and distress, but evaded the stigma of the subject who 
has failed to hold it together. Interestingly, throughout their accounts of ‘nervous 
breakdown,’ as participants traversed from breaking to break and then breakthrough, 
the evasion of personal accountability for positions of passivity, helplessness and 
distress remained a key accomplishment of the term ‘nervous breakdown.’ While 
positions of agency within ‘nervous breakdown’ varied, from the total helplessness in 
breaking to the agency that subjects took up in breakthrough, agency for causing 
‘nervous breakdown’ was constantly and consistently mitigated.  
 
In break 
In the interpretative repertoire of break, participants accomplished the mitigation of 
personal accountability through the use of physical illness discourses, positioning 
themselves as passive and helpless patients on the enforced break of recuperation. As 
discussed in the analysis, dominant discourses of physical illness, when prefaced with 
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the metaphors of being struck down, position subjects as victim-patients and not to 
blame for their bodies being overwhelmed by the virus or germ that comes in from 
outside spaces (Lupton, 2012; Ogden, 2002). The taking up of this position of patient-
victim is deeply resonant of the sociological discourse of the sick role, originally 
theorised by Talcott Parsons (1951/2001). It posits that in the sick role, the subject is 
exempt from the normal obligations of social roles, particularly work. Parsons added 
that this position is socially endorsed because the subject is seen as not accountable 
for taking it up. Becoming ill and recovering are construed as being completely out of 
the subject’s control and thus the subject is obliged to seek medical assistance. Indeed, 
many of the participants consulted a GP while in ‘nervous breakdown,’ particularly to 
procure sick-notes for work and thus to lend credibility to their positions within a sick 
role discourse. Participants who consulted both a GP and a psy-professional, such as 
Chantal, still deferred to the GP’s sick-note when accounting for their absence from 
work. Another key obligation of the sick role as constructed by Parsons is to take a 
period of recuperation. All of the participants did this during what they constructed as 
the break in ‘nervous breakdown.’ One might contend that Obama did this too, while 
“sedated” after “collapse” and furthermore that this period of recuperation is what 
participants constructed as time spent in ‘nervous breakdown.’  
 
This concept of sick role has infused medical discourse and informed doctor-patient 
positions, positions relative to illness and particularly positions relative to 
accountability, passivity and agency (Fahy & Smith, 1999). While it has been 
critiqued in many ways, largely for disempowering patients and rendering doctors as 
all-powerful and in this regard for even being out-dated, it remains a dominant 
discourse in constructing the patient and what he/she is allowed to do (Young, 2004). 
By drawing on this discourse of physical illness to construct ‘nervous breakdown’ as 
an enforced, recuperative break, participants evaded personal responsibility for their 
positions of helplessness and passivity, and even found legitimacy for their bed-rest 
and not working.  
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The sick role discourse ties in well with participant constructions of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as time-limited, for a further obligation of the role is to recover and for 
illness and recuperation to be discrete and short-lived. A slight tension in the 
construction of both the sick role and ‘nervous breakdown’ arises here: the absolution 
of responsibility for becoming ill and for the means of recovery and yet a 
simultaneous responsibility to recover quickly. Given its time-limited nature, the sick 
role discourse is therefore less applicable to chronic conditions and to diagnoses of 
mental illness, for both invoke a greater permanence of positions that are seen as 
deviant from normal social roles (Crossley, 1998; Karp & Tanarugsachock, 2000). As 
such, it seemed crucial for participants to deploy constructions of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as a time-limited, physical illness which happened to them and to avoid 
positions of permanent passivity or mental illness. These were positions that the media 
analysis indicated as readily available in the wider discursive terrain for the subject of 
‘nervous breakdown.’  
 
This is also deeply resonant of the Victorian constructions of nervous illness, which 
were positioned as counter to diagnoses of mental illness and madness (Shorter, 
2013). It also speaks to the female nervous subject of that era, for whom the 
conservation of nervous energy through rest was seen as vital (Appignanesi, 2008). 
What is interesting in this study, is that ‘nervous breakdown’ is being deployed by 
female participants not only to counter to positions of mental illness, but also to 
counter positions of failed self-management. It would seem that positions of failed 
self-management and passivity in the contemporary discursive space are deemed as 
pejorative as those of madness. This suggests that the construction of the nervous as a 
largely physical complaint and thus a legitimate reason to forgo positions of normal 
coping is still being used in contemporary discursive terrain but to slightly different 
ends than in the Victorian era and early twentieth century. The bed-rest and passivity 
were deemed a necessary cure for women’s nervous complaints are no longer 
endorsed.     
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In breakthrough 
Even in the interpretative repertoire of breakthrough, participants constructed 
‘nervous breakdown’ as having happened to them, and not as their choice. This was 
striking because this interpretative repertoire featured the participants in positions of 
agency and empowerment, not positions of passivity and helplessness. Participants 
deployed the interpretative repertoire of breakthrough to construct the end of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ and to indicate a current position that was better than before ‘nervous 
breakdown,’ and one that was improved because of ‘nervous breakdown.’ Yet, even in 
this space, even when co-opting discourses of self-development and self-management 
to construct themselves and their renewed and improved agency, participants 
continued to take up positions of passivity with regard to the cause of ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ For example, Sophie constructed it as a “blessing” (Line 320) within this 
interpretative repertoire. While this is a positive construct when positioned as counter 
to a curse, it still designates a passive position. A “blessing” is constructed as given by 
a divine entity to an individual. In this interchange, the divine is agent and the 
individual is a passive recipient. Thus while having reconstructed ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as a positive experience, which allowed her to now deploy an active tense 
and to “shine even more light” than before it, Sophie still mitigated her personal 
responsibility for causing it.  
 
This was echoed by most other participants and was also echoed in Oprah’s 
confessional of her ‘nervous breakdown.’ This discursive manoeuvre of positive 
reconstruction of agency after an enforced position of victimhood borrows from 
survivor discourses and some discourses of personal transformation. Victim-survivor 
discourse is contemporarily pervasive in the construction of the subjects of abuse, 
gross human rights violations and some illnesses such as cancer (Thompson, 2004). 
Key to all subjects constructed by this discourse is their having been violated, struck 
down or attacked by a dangerous external agent, such as abuser, terrorist, Nazi or 
deadly virus, and positioned as innocent victim of this agent. The subject is then 
positioned as having survived this attack or violation and is thus accorded agency, and 
the positive attributes of courage, strength, will-to-live etc. He/she is often also 
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positioned as having greater knowledge, empathy or strength as a result of having 
survived (Leisenring, 2006). The position of survivor can be deemed as one of 
personal choice and runs counter to the position of victim who does not recover from 
attack and whose continued passivity and distress is often maligned (Dunn, 2005; 
Orgad, 2009).  
 
As such the survivor discourse can be positioned within the discursive terrain of the 
self-managing individual. The use of ‘nervous breakdown’ seemed to allow 
participants to accomplish the same discursive feat as survivors. It allowed them to 
take up the position of victim of uncontrollable force or attack, who after a discrete 
period of passive recovery, could take up a position of renewed and improved agency 
within the discursive space of the self-managing individual. Most significantly, it 
allowed them to mitigate personal responsibility for being positioned as helpless, 
passive or distressed in the first place, while allowing them to take responsibility for 
the valued positions of recovery, restoration and renewal. However, this position 
could only be successfully accomplished after ‘nervous breakdown’ when the subject 
was no longer passive, helpless and distressed and when he/she was back on the right 
side of the edge. 
 
Personal transformation discourses function in a similar fashion, but are found more in 
spiritual and self-help literature. They act to position the subject as victim of intrinsic 
flaws, particularly that of inauthenticity. These flaws are then positioned as causing 
personal suffering and/or preventing the realisation of personal potential (Caprino, 
2008; Zweifel & Raskin, 2008). Breakdown is constructed as a period of being 
rendered the helpless victim of these flaws and/or helpless victim of the driving force 
of transformation. Breakdown is constructed as the process whereby the individual 
sheds these flaws through a destructive catharsis and is transformed into an improved 
subject imbued with greater agency, self-management and personal power (Abrams, 
2007; Sharma, 1997). One could contend that this is quite assuredly part of a self-
management discourse but only by virtue of the fact that passivity is re-appropriated 
after the fact as a necessary evil in the goal of improving one’s position in the terrain 
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of self-management and agency. If the latter subject position were not to be taken up, 
and passivity not reconstructed as a temporary and transformative position of 
victimhood, the subject would be at risk of being positioned as somehow failed or 
permanently lost to a much stigmatised passivity. 
 
Survivor discourse and personal transformation discourse parallel the demand for 
recovery inherent in the sick role discourse. Together, these discourses seem to 
indicate that positions of helplessness, passivity and distress are socially acceptable 
under some circumstances: when the subject is victim of embodied illness, severe and 
uncontrollable forces or a process of personal transformation, and as long as these 
positions of passivity are temporary, and not chosen by the subject. By drawing on 
these discourses in the construction of ‘nervous breakdown,’ participants were able to 
avoid the curse of taking accountability for their positions of not coping. As Rachel 
said, perplexedly reflecting on finding herself in a position of helplessness, “you can’t 
just book out of your own life” (Line 230). One could summarise the disclaimer that 
her account of ‘nervous breakdown’ issues to this, by adding, ‘except if it’s not your 
fault, lasts for a short time and you use it to transform yourself into a better, more self-
contained agent.’ This disclaimer was manufactured in all participant accounts of 
‘nervous breakdown’ and evident in Oprah’s account of hers. As such ‘nervous 
breakdown’ seems to function to explain positions of not coping in a more palatable, 
less stigmatised manner than as a failure in self-management and thus the fault, or 
choice, of the subject.      
 
4.1.2. Mad 
So what then of madness? This is the other discursive space that the wider discursive 
terrain makes so immediately available to the subjects of ‘nervous breakdown’ and 
which the Victorian construction of nervous illness attempted to counter. The articles 
reviewed in the media analysis are laden with terms referring to a potential madness 
of the subject who falls off the edge into ‘nervous breakdown.’ For example, they 
construct understanding one’s “mental state” as a particular site of interest in 
preventing ‘nervous breakdown’ (Casserly, 2011, Line 2). They also suggest that this 
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understanding be constructed through the lens of psy-diagnostic criteria by using 
symptom checklists that are deeply resonant of those found in the DSM and which, for 
example, refer to psy-constructs of feeling “anxious, emotional or upset” and “passive 
coping” (Eurich, 2013, Lines 18 and 20). In addition, these articles tend to cite psy-
professionals as expert-authors of ‘nervous breakdown,’ and how to diagnose 
(construct) one’s position relative to it. By constructing ‘nervous breakdown’ within 
the domain of psy-expertise and its language, the media articles situate it within the 
terrain of mental health and mental illness.  
 
Some of the media articles adopted the language of madness more explicitly in 
constructing ‘nervous breakdown,’ eschewing the more sanitised constructions of 
mental health. For example, deploying constructs such as “mental collapse” and 
“sedated” to describe Obama as the subject of ‘nervous breakdown’ (Naish 2013, 
Lines 46-47). These speak to constructs of the uncontrollable mad subject who needs 
restraint. They dig up the construct of the lunatic who is straight-jacketed or 
lobotomised in the asylum. Other articles speak of “completely losing control of your 
mental facilities” as indicative of being over the edge and in ‘nervous breakdown’ 
(Thapoung, 2013, Lines 7-8). Oprah attempted to position her ‘nervous breakdown’ as 
not being ‘ “ready to go run naked in the streets” ’ (Walker, 2013, Line 19). This also 
speaks of the construct of the mad subject running riot, visibly ridiculed and excluded, 
and disruptive to social norms. These constructions of the mad or deviant subject 
speak of an irretrievable position and have been feared, excluded and ridiculed 
throughout western history (Parker et al., 1995). As Micale (2008) notes, before they 
were the object of a psycho-medical gaze, these subjects were constructed as lost to 
demonic or supernatural possession and were feared by all who were positioned as not 
possessed as contagious vehicles of harm. Arguably, some of the residue of this 
demonic possession still seems to cling to the construction of the mad subject. This is 
evident in the stigma attached to the subjects constructed as mentally ill who are still 
feared, shunned and even blamed (Couture & Penn, 2003; Yang, Cho & Kleinman, 
2010).  
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The spatial metaphor that the media constructs of ‘nervous breakdown’ as being over 
an edge is resonant of metaphors that construct madness as a movement of descent, 
much like a movement into hell (e.g. Donner, 2014). It also speaks to the permanence 
attached to the mad subject wherein he/she is seen as irretrievably lost to madness. 
This symptom of permanence is still attached to the discourse of mental illness and is 
one of the main critiques of diagnosis (Kvaternic & Grebenc, 2009). Thus the wider 
discursive terrain positions the mad subject and the subject in ‘nervous breakdown’ as 
very closely related, and even as synonymous.  
 
Furthermore, as Yang et al., (2010, p. 492) note, public attitude surveys show that 
people associate the construct of mental illness with the adjectives of “dependent and 
helpless on the one hand and dangerous, different and unpredictable, on the other.” 
These words are virtually synonymous with those used for ‘nervous breakdown’ by 
both participants and the media alike. For example, the media constructed ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as a dangerous space and synonymous with a loss of control and 
participants spoke of being the helpless victim of ‘nervous breakdown,’ and of the 
concomitant positions of passivity and distress which they could not contain or 
control. These speak of the adjectives of helplessness and also of dangerous 
unpredictability. Participants also constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ as a moment 
when they were no longer able to meet normative social obligations in a consistent 
and predictable manner. This speaks particularly of the words of “dangerous, different 
and unpredictable.” In addition, participant constructions of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
alluded to a disruption of the binaries of inside-outside and private-public, wherein 
what should be managed within or kept in the private domain, such as distress, bursts 
out and becomes visible in the public domain. This can be associated with a disruptive 
difference or outburst which is dangerous and unpredictable. Moreover, constructs of 
madness or mental illness tend to feature a similar disruption to private-public and 
inside-outside as the moment of becoming mad (Leader, 2011).        
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4.1.3. Not mad, just ‘nervous breakdown’ 
As such, the wider discursive terrain is not only at the ready to position the subjects of 
‘nervous breakdown’ as having failed at self-management but is also pressing to 
construct them as mad or mentally ill. Participants seemed to walk a tightrope by 
using some of the lexicon of psy and of madness to construct ‘nervous breakdown’ 
while simultaneously avoiding the permanence and stigma of being positioned as 
mad. The use of ‘nervous breakdown’ seemed to allow for this interplay. 
 
For example, Anna was quite clear in saying that she might have been “section-able” 
(Line 152) in ‘nervous breakdown.’ She noted that her description of being in 
‘nervous breakdown’ overlapped with descriptors of psy-diagnoses. A section is a 
psy-intervention of restraint and speaks of the danger that the subject might pose to 
him/herself or to others (Donat, 2005). Similarly, Jackie spoke of “you’re crazy” and 
of “losing your reality” (Lines 523-524), Sophie engaged with the discourse of 
depression (Line 64) and Rachel, albeit in referential disavowal, spoke of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as not being a “psychotic break” (Line 292). As discussed, Rachel, Ella 
and Chantal deployed a Freudian hydraulic metaphor to construct the moment of 
‘nervous breakdown,’ which they likened to a sort of bursting through of internal 
pressure into external and public space. Naomi consulted a psychiatrist for help while 
in ‘nervous breakdown’ while Ella, Rachel, Chantal and Sophie consulted counsellors 
and psychologists also for help – thereby indicating that at least in part, they 
constructed ‘nervous breakdown’ as relevant to the language, technologies and 
practices of psy.   
 
In their consultation of psy-practitioners, participants showed a great deal more 
agency than one would expect of the rather put-upon Foucauldian subject of psy: 
entering and exiting psy-services when they chose, and taking up or resisting 
diagnoses. Naomi, for instance, rejected the “high falutin” (Line 533) diagnostic 
language of the psychiatrist she saw, preferring to call her experience ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ Ella engaged with psy-services and then left, preferring the care of her 
aunt. Chantal and Sophie consulted a counsellor and psychologist respectively, but 
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also consulted alternative therapies, such as angel healing and yoga (Lines 229 and 
152 respectively), and they did this without the endorsement of their requisite psy-
professionals. This indicated that they were not fully signed up to only being the 
subject of psy while in ‘nervous breakdown’ and that the term gave them some facility 
to engage with and co-opt other constructions of their experience. It would seem that 
‘nervous breakdown’ allowed participants to use the constructions of madness, mental 
illness and in some cases, the psy-resources made available by these constructions, but 
on their own terms.   
 
Why then use this language if it has the potential to position one as mad and 
stigmatised for being so? Well, firstly, it seems that the wider discursive terrain does 
not offer much alternative in the construction of passivity, aberrance from norms and 
distress. Moreover, as discussed in the analysis of the interviews, the contemporary 
individual is largely constructed by psy-discourse, and thus it follows that any 
individual’s account of his/her experience would be saturated with this language 
(Parker; 1997; Rose, 1998). Yet, participants were not passive subjects of this 
discourse, and it would seem that they were actively using the language of madness, 
mental illness and psy to construct a certain quality of experience in ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ In so doing they were able to imbue ‘nervous breakdown’ with the 
distress, danger and unpredictability of madness, and even access the socially 
sanctioned support of psy-therapies, while also eschewing a fixed position as mad.  
 
4.1.4. Nervous: Mitigating blame and individualising distress 
In this regard, the adjective of ‘nervous’ as a preface to ‘breakdown’ performed a 
crucial discursive function. As indicated in the introduction, the use of nervous as an 
adjectival precursor to describe individual affliction, discomfort or deviance can be 
traced back in western psycho-medical discourse to 1684, but gaining most 
momentum in the Victorian era. At that time, the mind and the flesh were all under the 
purview of a medical gaze, and many so-called deviances of normal expression were 
being reconstructed by medical science as having an embodied, as opposed to a 
supernatural, origin (Micale, 2008). The introduction of the nervous marked a major 
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discursive shift in reconstructing many positions of distress, particularly those 
hallmarked by worry, as different from madness by virtue of the fact that they were 
seen as embodied by the nerves and were thus deemed curable, much like any other 
organ.  
 
The introduction of nervous indicated and seems to still indicate a crucial bifurcation 
in psy-discourse. The subject of nervous disease was originally constructed as distinct 
from the mad subject. Nervous disease was constructed as embodied, and therefore 
curable and time-limited. It was signified by the attributes of “dependent and 
helpless,” whereas madness was murkier and was signified by “dangerous, different 
and unpredictable” (to quote the distinction made by Yang et al., 2010, p. 492). In 
addition, one could contend that the mad subject still held/holds the discursive 
sediment of the terror of demonic or supernatural possession, whereas the nervous 
subject is the construct of the reasoned and sanitised clinics of medical science. 
Nervous diseases, signified more by worry, are arguably positioned as closer to the 
norm of the self-contained agent than the visible deviances, outbursts and psychoses 
that have been used to construct madness (Gove, 2004; Shorter, 2013). The former is 
seen as recoverable, and the latter as not. As discussed in the introduction, ‘nervous 
breakdown’ while a colloquialism, is imbued with this legacy of nervous disease – 
constructed as relevant to psy-discourse but positioned as distinct in its transience and 
as distinct from madness. This seems reflected in participants’ use of the term to 
construct a time-limited experience that is not mad per se, but that can use the 
language and resources of the mad.  
 
‘Nervous breakdown’ by virtue of this legacy of embodied worry overlaps with some 
aspects of contemporary stress discourse which all posit, regardless of the agency 
accorded to the individual, that high levels of uncontrolled stress have a corrosive 
physiological impact. Stress and worry are often used if not interchangeably, then as 
very close constructs (e.g. Brosschot, Gerin & Thayer, 2006). Furthermore, stress, not 
unlike ‘nervous breakdown’ is located within the psy-domain but positioned as 
distinct from madness. It is a dominant construct of health psychology (e.g. Ogden, 
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2012) and thus sits quite a world away from the wards and waiting rooms of 
discourses of psychopathology. In fact, as Brown (2005) contends, stress discourse 
can function to mute distress, surrendering it up to the alternative blandness of the 
hold-all of stress and constructing it as an all together different thing – a more 
palatable form of madness, perhaps. It is no wonder, therefore, that the media analysis 
featured ‘nervous breakdown’ and stress as overlapping constructs. Many of the 
articles constructed unmanaged/unmanageable stress as the precursor to ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ They situated stress as pertinent to every reader, constructing it as an 
inevitability of living, and particularly, an inevitability of “our highly stressed times” 
(Naish, 2013, Line 42) . This resonates with the Industrial Revolution’s inscription of 
its clamour, speed and engine breakdown onto the nerves and bodies of its subjects.  
  
I was therefore surprised that participants did not overtly deploy stress discourse to 
construct their ‘nervous breakdowns.’ The media analysis had indicated that it was a 
readily available discursive alternative to madness. I was, however, perhaps mistaken 
in thinking that a position of failed self-management was preferable to that of 
madness. While participants used similar engineering metaphors to those in stress 
discourse – of pressure, strain on edges, collapse etc. – they did not construct ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as caused by the stress of everyday living. As discussed, it would seem 
that they wanted to avoid the position of failed self-management incumbent in a 
position of breakdown from stress and perhaps regarded this as equally, if not more 
pejorative than a position in discourses of mental illness. Herein, as already touched 
upon, seems the biggest difference in the use of ‘nervous breakdown’ and the nervous 
from its Victorian roots where it was explicitly positioned as not mad (Shorter, 2013). 
The few pieces of academic literature that do suggest that it performs a discursive 
function, suggest that this is only to counter positions of madness and psychiatric 
diagnosis (Barke et al., 2000; Gove, 2004; Wolfe, 1933). They do not suggests that it 
simultaneously functions to counter positions of failed self-management. This 
indicates, perhaps, that the self-management of stress might be a newly dominant 
discourse, or one particularly pertinent to the participants and articles in this study.    
 
 142 
For example, not unlike in the article constructing Obama’s ‘nervous breakdown,’ 
participants went to great lengths to contextualise ‘nervous breakdown’ in their 
constructions of it. They all attempted to set the scene for it by speaking of a build-up 
which was constructed as the movement towards the edge of ‘nervous breakdown.’ 
However, they did not refer to a build-up of work-life stress as the media analysis 
might have suggested they would. Rather, they spoke of spousal abuse, childhood 
neglect and abuse, miscarriage, immigration, spousal infidelity, divorce, and loss of 
work and significant relationships, among others. For most participants, these build-up 
events were not constructed as once-offs and immediately preceding ‘nervous 
breakdown.’ Rather, they were constructed as multiple and cumulative and as 
extending back in time. For example, Ella constructed the abuse and neglect she 
experienced as a child as part of the build-up to ‘nervous breakdown’ in early 
adulthood.  
 
Participants used these histories to construct the forces that rendered them helpless 
victims of ‘nervous breakdown’ and to imbue these forces with a social severity that 
would warrant them as other than everyday stress (that should be managed) and as 
other than mad. For example, Chantal spoke of years of spousal abuse as the 
precursor-force to her ‘nervous breakdown.’ This allowed her to take up a position of 
battered wife which carries with it a socially acceptable helplessness that engenders 
sympathy and care. This position also carries with it the legal and moral obligations 
that others have with regard to the subject (Leisenring, 2006). Chantal used this 
position of battered wife to explain ‘nervous breakdown’ as an appropriate and 
therefore not a mad response to her circumstances and thereby to mitigate personal 
responsibility for causing it. Surely such abuse, much like “the Syrian crisis, the UN 
and the U.S. budgetary problems” were for Obama, is severe enough to legitimately 
“collapse” the self-managing, self-contained individual? Yet, Chantal side-stepped a 
discussion of the social nature of abuse. It may have functioned, in part, to legitimate 
her ‘nervous breakdown,’ yet Chantal constructed the effects of her ex-husband’s 
abuse as something she “hadn’t really dealt with” (Lines 78-79). She went on to 
construct it as something that “just literally came out. ‘Cause I just kept holding it” 
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(Line 80). This acts to position the abuse as something Chantal had to hold inside her 
and also something that she had to deal with. This strips the abuse of its social, moral 
and legal obligations, colluding with the individualisation of distress inherent in the 
self-managing, self-contained agent who must manage stress, distress and pain on the 
inside. It suggests that while Chantal was using the construct of abuse and the severity 
of corrosive force it implies to absolve herself from having failed to deal with it, she 
was still positioning the abuse as something that had to be dealt with by her and inside 
her at some point.  
 
This was the case for all the participants. The severity of the social forces they used in 
constructing the build-up of ‘nervous breakdown’ served to legitimate its occurrence 
and to absolve the individual from the stigmas of madness and failed self-
management. In addition, it would seem that this absolution was granted only for a 
brief and discrete period of time, much like the absolution granted to the individual in 
the sick role and survivor discourses. Should Chantal and the other participants not 
have dealt with or found resolution for the passivity and distress that ‘nervous 
breakdown’ denoted, they would have been likely to be held accountable for this and 
be pushed by the wider discursive terrain into positions of failed at self-management 
or madness.  
 
Thus, while participants’ introduction of the social nature of their distress began to 
open up a space for some critique of the oppressive individualisation of distress that 
the construct of the self-managing, self-contained agent enforces, participants 
exploited this only briefly and only to explain that ‘nervous breakdown’ was the fault 
of these very powerful and corrosive external agents. It would seem that the 
imperative of the self-managing, self-contained agent was so compelling that it 
trumped any further discussion of the social attribution of responsibility and symptom. 
It was the participants who had ‘nervous breakdowns,’ not their spouses, families, 
legal teams or psy-practitioners. It was the participants who had to justify and 
manufacture socially sanctioned explanations for their ‘nervous breakdowns.’ This 
signals that the break with successful self-management and successful sanity that 
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‘nervous breakdown’ affords its subjects does not afford them an extended facility to 
critique these constructs, only a brief liberation from them. The onus is on the 
individual to return to a place well away from the edge as soon as they can and not go 
back.     
  
This at once liberating and at once oppressive function of ‘nervous breakdown’ is very 
much an artefact of nervous discourse. Nervous functions to situate breakdown within 
the nerves of the individual thereby locating it as a disruption of the individual but one 
that is contained within the individual. Although acknowledging a relationship 
between the social and the individual’s nerves, nervous functions to locate the nerves 
inside as the point of interest in nervous disease and thus deflects the gaze of 
treatment and cure away from the social. It is thereby available for the same critique 
as is often levelled most other psy-diagnoses: that they serve to relocate social 
injustices and inequalities in the holder of the individual (Crowe, 2000). For example, 
hysteria and its contemporary label of borderline personality disorder, have been 
critiqued for pathologizing the woman who is subjugated or abused in a patriarchal 
world and who through her inevitable showing of distress, is deemed by the gaze of 
this world to be mad (Shaw & Procter, 2005; Wirth-Cauchon, 2001). The psychiatric 
act of locating disruption/madness within the tissue of the individual exacerbates the 
manufacture of the madness in the individual and obscures examination of the 
potential social madness that construct the individual (Parker, 1999c). The same 
critique, unsurprisingly, can be levelled at discourses of stress, particularly those that 
err on the intra-subjective side. As I have touched upon already, these discourses 
function to locate the site of the stress-problem as within the individual and the site of 
solution as also within in the individual. This shifts scrutiny away from unreasonable 
management practices in the workplace, for example, and onto the success (or lack 
thereof) of the self-managing subject (Hepburn & Brown, 2001). 
 
In the same vein, a gendered critique of nervous disease and its discursive progeny 
can also be made. As Appignanesi (2008, p. 7) contends in her comprehensive history 
of women’s relationship to mental health, “contemporary statistics always emphasize 
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women’s greater propensity to suffer from the ‘sadness’ end of madness”. This 
touches on the bifurcation between psy-constructs that signify a helplessness and 
those that signify a danger, co-opting women into the former category and thus also 
co-opting them into ‘nervous.’ Moreover, the Victorian history of nervous disease is 
rife with references to women and to the dangers that deviation from the norms of the 
feminine, especially independence and an intellectual career, posed to nervous 
regulation (Russett, 1989). In addition to this, the diagnosis of hysteria in the 
Victorian west constructed a propensity for women to suffer from “nervousness” and 
“mental instability” simply by virtue of their organic reproductive processes, such as 
menstruation (Cayleff, 1988, p. 1200). As such, the nervous subject has a history of 
being constructed as synonymous with the inside-body of the female subject, and 
particularly, the female subject who disrupted patriarchal norms. This, again, locates 
the problem inside, and inside the woman, and hushes a questioning of patriarchal 
norms.  
 
Interestingly, all of the participants who volunteered for this study, self-identifying 
with ‘nervous breakdown’ were women. Many of the subjects of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
in the media analysis were women, like Oprah, but not exclusively. They also 
included the likes of Obama, albeit positioning him as passive and collapsed which 
are historically the beta feminine counterpoints to the resolute strength of the 
masculine alpha. One can imagine, therefore, that it might be easier for women to find 
a position within ‘nervous breakdown’ than for men. Not only because of its 
discursive sediment as endogenous to the female body (be it nerves or womb) but also 
because it is associated with the more feminine positions of helplessness, passivity 
and visible distress. That is not to say that it is easy for women to occupy these 
positions. It is undoubtedly more difficult than it was in Victorian times when the 
woman was necessarily positioned as acquiescent and dependent (but preferably not 
distressed and totally helpless). In the contemporary west, at least, the feminine ideal-
norm has become infused with the do-it-all agency and self-reliance put forward by 
second wave feminism (Sorisio, 1997; Wolf, 1991). As a result, it seems that the 
socio-cultural imperative of the strong self-managing agent still trumps a positions of 
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the battered wife, for example, for she must still breakthrough triumphantly as more 
agentic and more self-managing than before ‘nervous breakdown.’ Nonetheless, it 
does beg the question of why the gaze is shifted away from abuse of women and onto 
the battered wife’s self-management and her nerves. The same question, with some 
permutations of abuse into miscarriage or loss, for example, can be asked of all the 
participants. It can even be asked of Obama.  
  
4.1.5. ‘Nervous breakdown:’ Discursive flexibility and constraint 
Nonetheless, ‘nervous breakdown’ does rupture the seamless logic of the self-
managing and self-contained ideal-subject who can and must alchemize distress or 
helplessness into an acceptable performance of coping and sanity. ‘Nervous 
breakdown’ seems to accomplish for its subjects a (somewhat) socially sanctioned 
period of passivity, helplessness and distress that manages to evade the stigmas of 
being positioned as mad or as having failed at self-management. As much as its 
discursive terrain consigns its subjects to account for their passivity and distress by 
referring to and dismissing these positions, this act of explaining also allows them a 
space to construct alternative readings of these positions. It allows them to use 
discourses of madness and mental illness to convey a certain quality of experience and 
to make visible in the public space what they were seemingly supposed to hold or hide 
such as abuse, loss or in Obama’s case, a feminized position of being collapsed. This 
offers an opportunity to ask what it is the self-managing subject is meant to manage 
and why and to begin to poke a few holes in this construct and the individualisation of 
distress it endorses.  
 
Participants closed down this critical window by simultaneously constructing ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as an embodied collapse or malfunction in them and for which they were 
forced to take a recuperative break. One could contend that their reconstruction of 
‘nervous breakdown’ as a breakdown to breakthrough is the ultimate closing of this 
critical window, for it constructs the whole experience as an superlative act of self-
development. It constructs ‘nervous breakdown’ as creating a capacity for self-
management and agency that surpasses what was there before falling off the edge and 
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even surpasses those others who have not yet fallen off the edge. It is also, I think, 
quite a brilliant triumph to co-opt the very same discourse that could potentially 
exclude and stigmatise one and use it to reposition one into a space that was better 
than before and even trumps most other self-managing subjects. This allowed the 
participants to seemingly fall apart not only with impunity, but also to benefit from the 
experience. In the case of celebrity confessionals of ‘nervous breakdown,’ such as 
Oprah’s, one might add that this benefit extends to their public relations and positions 
them as simultaneously more accessible to the public and even more successful than 
they were before
7
. I believe this constitutes something of a challenge to of the 
rigorously policed hegemony of normal sanity and self-management for it places some 
power in the hands of the subject to repurpose these discourses. It liberates them not 
only from the subjugation by these discourses, but also from being the passive subject 
who has no recourse from institutional regulation.  
 
At the same time, one could ask what choice did they have? Could they have really 
found a permanent alternative for passivity, helplessness and distress that did not 
become mad or failed self-management? What would this have accomplished? Would 
they even have wanted to? I believe these are questions for future work and also as 
part of a continuous critical enquiry both in the therapeutic encounter and beyond. In 
this instance, ‘nervous breakdown’ offers a temporary alternative, albeit one that must 
be defended, explained and shored up at every corner. Its reprieve is not indefatigable 
as the discursive terrain’s foreclosures of madness and failed self-management are 
always near. For example, many participants were quite careful to whom they used the 
label of ‘nervous breakdown.’ Sophie was explicit in not using the term with work 
colleagues for fear of being positioned as mentally ill. The internet forums I attempted 
to contact in the first instance of recruitment were quite clear in policing the insider 
status of their conversations, positioning my contact as an unsafe intrusion. It would 
seem that ‘nervous breakdown’ might not hold up in all spaces as a more palatable 
explanation for not coping and distress. In this regard, I believe that my insider status 
                                                
7
 See Cohen (2013) for an excellent discussion on the discursive function of the publication of the 
private for the celebrity subject.   
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with participants from my own social networks, our shared identities as women, as 
middle class and professional, and perhaps my identity as a trainee counselling 
psychologist in a one-on-one interview space might have facilitated participants’ use 
of the label to describe their experiences. It comments on a shared access to and 
interest in the term and highlights my role as researcher-author of this piece.       
 
4.2. A personal grapple: Researching and authoring this 
construction of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
Quite clearly this research is my own authorship. This extends as far as my very 
choice of ‘nervous breakdown’ as the subject of study for my professional 
qualification as a counselling psychologist. This in itself positions ‘nervous 
breakdown’ as a site of legitimate interest for a psychological gaze. The project 
occupies a very different space from Skinner’s legacy of objective psychological 
science. This is purposeful, for the very epistemology that allows for me to map and 
question the socio-discursive functions of ‘nervous breakdown’ demands that the 
answer be confined to the articles and participants I consulted, their relationship with 
me and my relationship with the material. It also meant that I have had to openly 
grapple with questions that I might have avoided had I chosen to rather address the 
more realist question of ‘what defines a nervous breakdown?’  
 
I could not be in any but the former camp of discursive enquiry for this piece of work. 
I believe that adopting any other approach would have been to neglect the shifting 
sands of ‘nervous breakdown’ over time and space and a deliberate act of blindness. I 
enjoyed the creativity, curiosity and opportunity for critical thinking that working in a 
social constructionist paradigm afforded me. However, I found it difficult at times to 
reconcile the theory with a day-to-day life. My daily performance of myself relies on 
many assumptions of as-if-true. For example, while I accept in theory that my identity 
and experience are probably shaped by language, I identify with having an interiority. 
So did many of the clients I saw as a trainee. In the same vein, I found it difficult to 
explain to curious enquirers, in the grips of a modern realism, that the purpose of my 
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project was not to find out what ‘nervous breakdown’ was, but rather the opposite, 
that I didn’t think it was some-thing at all. Their looks of bafflement and slight 
disappointment tempted me to find a position within the reification of mainstream 
science that was about discovering the truth of a thing. I began to query the use of a 
non-generalizable and emic piece of work in a world where reified scientific truths 
hold such sway, including in my own worldview. Even my chosen profession of 
counselling psychology often operates on the assumptions of as-if-true diagnoses and 
interventions: at least when accounting to the HCPC, multidisciplinary teams and 
even to our clients themselves.  
 
This project has asked me to evaluate where I stand with regard to the real, the critical 
and the socially constructed and moreover, how I navigate between them in different 
spaces. I am indisputably the product of hegemonic discourse: finding it difficult to 
consistently occupy positions that are alternative to it, such as the constructionist 
epistemology of this project. Discourse analysis is not even so controversial these 
days and has arguably become co-opted into mainstream psychology’s research 
repertoire (Parker, 2011). In this regard, I must make the point that it has not been 
difficult to apply a social constructionist approach from a purely academic position. 
No, that has been endorsed, even made quite cool by its Foucauldian, postmodern 
associations. It has been hard to apply this approach in other spaces. For example, in 
engaging with the participants in this project who believed that ‘nervous breakdown’ 
was a thing and a thing that happened to them. Even though I explained to them that I 
was looking at it as a label that served to shape experience, I felt a fraud in knowing 
that I was applying a lens to their words that might make them unrecognisable in 
hindsight. I consoled myself by saying that this was true of all attempts at meaning-
making and that at least I was acknowledging it. I am not the first qualitative 
researcher to question the ethics of interpretation and the literature documents this 
debates (e.g. Willig, 2012). My engagement with these debates in this piece of 
research indicated to me that I am more inculcated in person-centred politics than I 
had thought: still believing, that the representation of others can function as 
interpretative “violence” (Teo, 2010, p. 296). I believe this not also reflects the 
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person-centred ethos of my counselling psychology training, but also reflects my 
background as a white South African whose formative years were spent negotiating a 
post-Apartheid society where having authority to co-author the truth` of another was 
constructed as a violation (e.g. Coombes, 2003; Lykes, Terre Blanche & Hamber, 
2003). 
 
The ethics of social constructionism in psychological research are also tricky. My 
following of the university’s ethical guidelines for working with people meant 
repositioning as real the very same things the study was critiquing as constructed. It 
also meant explicitly constructing the participants as psy-subjects. Yet, to have 
dispensed with these protocols, especially the concept of risk, was unthinkable for me. 
My firm foot-hold in the discipline of counselling psychology, my belief in a human 
rights discourse, my sensitivity to the harms that psychology’s authoritarian legacy 
has caused and also my fear of being held accountable for any harm to participants all 
came into play. I wondered how Margaret Wetherell or Ian Parker addressed concepts 
of risk in their research. I wondered if there could be an alternative conceptualisation 
of ethics that was more compatible with an enterprise that is both critical and 
psychological.   
 
It is this same bric-a-brac background that drew me to considering social 
constructionism and discourse analysis in my research in the first place. My academic 
career was shaped by left-wing South Africans urgently rewriting the injustices of a 
post-Apartheid nation. Critical theory was introduced to me at high school through the 
medium of post-colonial literature and this continued in my studies at university 
where I supplemented psychology with modules in gender studies, sociology and 
sociolinguistics. As a woman, I have always been primed to issues of oppression and 
marginalization and it was not a far leap to extend this thinking to language. In this 
regard, constructions of the mad woman have always been in my peripheral vision: 
more so as my studies in psychology progressed and my work with clients began. The 
personal started to become political for me as I worked in an inpatient facility for 
young women diagnosed with eating disorders and other so-called disorders of 
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emotional regulation. I could see that really, the key difference between them and me 
was their visibility to a discourse of pathology, and my relative invisibility. I 
wondered what psychiatrists might have made of me at various junctures in my life.  
 
‘Nervous breakdown’ always seemed quite nearby. One of its cultural permutations is 
the image of middle-class housewife replete with her mid-morning gin, valium and 
dressing gown. This is an image of a woman that I heard summoned by others 
throughout my life. Female friends and relatives would even joke about becoming her. 
I would even joke about becoming her. ‘Nervous breakdown’ is intriguing to me 
because I can identify with it. There have often been times in my life that I have been 
tempted to use the label. Times when my performance of coping was barely up to 
scratch, and I was afraid I was going mad. Times when the physical and mental 
became blurred but I preferred to keep this to myself and tell work that I had come 
down with a bad cold. Fortunately, these were of brief duration and I was able 
somehow, perhaps through the comforts of a middle-class position, to fake it ‘til I 
made it back to that haloed space called normal. I never actually used the label but I 
am sure I could have.  
 
4.2.1.  Considering the constraints that I placed on the work 
Undoubtedly, my history has contributed to my interest in the term and shaped my 
authoring of the research. An-other researcher positioned differently in the social field 
would have without doubt interpreted the research differently. For example, a 
sociologist might have decided to look at race, culture, socio-economics and 
geography more deeply, being academically primed to those conceptual categories. A 
demographic construction of ‘nervous breakdown,’ was not only beyond the scope of 
this study but was also inconsistent with its epistemological premise. However, I think 
that asking the question of ‘who has/can have ‘nervous breakdowns?’’ is relevant, and 
one that this study does not address apart from a brief discussion of gender. It is also 
not incompatible with a critical approach for it speaks to who has access to this 
discursive reprieve from agency and self-management and who does not.  This might 
be interesting to address in future work. A related examination specific to the 
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gendered nature of constructions of helplessness, passivity or distress would also be 
interesting. For although I have touched on the possible feminization of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ and the positions it invokes, it would be interesting to see if men use it, if 
they can use it, and what they might use instead. It would also be interesting to see 
which kinds of women and men use it: would it only be relevant to a middle-class 
position as reflected in this study?  
 
In fact there are many aspects of ‘nervous breakdown’ and its subjects that this work 
could not address – partly because I as interpretative-researcher did not have 
discursive access to them and partly because of the study’s limited scope. One of the 
criticisms levelled at discourse analysis is its discourse determinism which can 
prevent a consideration of extra-discursive ways of constructing identity and 
experience (Brown, 2001). It is also criticised for its neglect of individual histories 
(Avdi, 2012). Arguably, this is the point of social constructionism but in so doing, it 
can become as dogmatic as those epistemologies it was set up to critique. As such, this 
study might have looked at ‘nervous breakdown’ as a more personal phenomenon and 
perhaps one that considered the extra-discursive. After all, participants went to great 
lengths to offer personal histories to their ‘nervous breakdowns.’ In addition, a crucial 
hallmark of ‘nervous breakdown’ is an embodiment. A psychosocial approach such as 
that espoused by Hollway and Jefferson (2000), would have allowed for more of a 
consideration of the relationship between the personal and the social. A critical realist 
discursive approach (e.g. Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007) might have allowed 
the research to consider the embodied aspects of ‘nervous breakdown’ and to look at 
the material consequences of an embodied shutdown.  
 
Another aspect of the discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ raised in this study 
but not addressed by it is the vast expanse of quasi-psy literature that seems to 
construct it as a legitimate diagnosis. These are largely internet-based and came up 
during my search for media articles. I excluded them from the study as I was unsure of 
their popular reach, believing that endorsed media sources were more likely to have 
permeated popular discourse more readily given that they are not only reliant on the 
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explicit search term of ‘nervous breakdown.’ However, an exploration of them would 
no doubt enrich a discussion on the space(s) of ‘nervous breakdown’ and offer some 
comment not only on its discursive function for subjects who identify with it but also 
offer comment on its function for those subjects who use it while positioning 
themselves as experts. By this I mean experts who exist in the self-help hinterland 
between the psy-clinic and the lay healer: a liminal space, not dissimilar to that 
occupied by Loosmore (1921) and his contemporaries in the early twentieth century. 
Exploring this was beyond the scope of this study and would have required a 
dedicated study of its own but my interest was piqued and I would like to follow it up.  
 
In a similar vein, I chose to focus this study on the interaction between the wider 
discursive terrain of ‘nervous breakdown’ and the subjects of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
who identified with the term. I chose this in order to focus on what the term may 
accomplish for those who use it to describe their experiences. This related to my 
interest in the construction of the client-patient, my own position as a therapist and my 
understanding of ‘nervous breakdown,’ as a popular re-working of a psy-legacy: as an 
interesting disruption to the directives of the psy-subject. However, this can be 
critiqued for failing to turn the gaze back on the centre. This is a critique often 
levelled at critical studies that look only to how the other-subject is constructed by 
hegemonic discourse, and which neglect to observe the simultaneous construction of 
the hegemonic subject. Studies on the construction of masculinity, heterosexuality and 
whiteness are responses to this critique (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; Steyn, 
2001; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1994). Similarly, this study might have turned the gaze 
onto psycho-medical practitioners and interrogated their constructions of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ and its subjects. In this context the discursive function of the term might 
have been very different and perhaps offered a more heterogeneous comment on the 
psy-institution which this study has tended to construct in a homogenously post-
Foucauldian manner. There are a variety of approaches housed under the psy-umbrella 
and it would be a disservice to them to not acknowledge this and the different 
conversations they all have with ideas of diagnosis, social change and the language of 
norms, among others. For example, Harper, Cromby, Reavey, Cooke and Anderson 
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(2007) go to great lengths to spell out the diversity of approaches to mental health care 
that can be used in practice. They also attempt to foreground those that attempt to 
reconcile meaningful ways of working and a more critical enterprise, arguing that 
while there remains a psychiatric diagnostic hegemony, assumptions of a homogenous 
psy-institution are false.  
 
The social constructionist stance that this research adopts can also be critiqued for the 
paralysis of its relativism, even if it aims to be critical (Burr, 1998). For if all is a 
discursive construction and nothing is truthful, real or better than something else, then 
how can one hope to effect change (e.g. Burman, 1990; Gill, 1995; Willig, 1998)? 
How can a social constructionist piece of research be of use except to a niche of like-
minded intellectuals? An extreme relativism is only useful in shaking loose rigid 
reifications. Psy-practitioners, in particular, as gatekeeper-creators of deviance and 
normality, as Harper et al. (2007) contend have an obligation to do a bit more. We 
have to stick our necks out a bit and contribute to making these constructs more 
tolerant and this tolerance more visible.  
 
4.3. In conclusion: What can this study of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
contribute? 
What has emerged from the application of a social constructionist approach to the 
study of ‘nervous breakdown’ is a sense of the construct as a discursive 
accomplishment whose power lies in its liminal position. Its position in both psy and 
popular spaces gives it the facility to be used to talk about psy-constructs but also to 
play with them and resist them. Similarly its blurring of the mental and physical 
allows it to use both discursive spaces but avoid becoming fixed in either. It is only 
through its position in-between that ‘nervous breakdown’ can allow those who use it 
to have a brief reprieve from the constraints of must-have agency, self-management 
and sanity without permanent reprisal. It has never been an official psy-term and if it 
did become a psy-diagnosis, co-opted into the mainstream, it would lose this ability to 
flirt with psy-discourse with impunity. It would also lose the opportunity it makes 
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available for critical comment on the ideal-norms of self-management and self-
contained sanity. In a parallel process, to steal a phrase from psychoanalysis, this 
piece of work reflects the liminal status of ‘nervous breakdown.’ It is at once part of a 
psy-institution as a mandatory act of my qualification for membership but is also 
critical of the institution and its realist assumptions. By treating ‘nervous breakdown’ 
as a discursive accomplishment and not as a diagnosis, this piece of work accords the 
subject an agency in the construction of experience that a purely scientific approach 
cannot. Through its use of a methodological approach that combines both Foucauldian 
discourse analysis and discursive psychology, this project is able to look at the 
discursive construction and constraint of the subject of ‘nervous breakdown’ and also 
the ways in which an agentic subject can re-fashion these constructions and resist 
these constraints.  
 
In this sense, the project is a dialogical one. It does not pretend to regard the truth 
from the soapbox of science but neither does it pretend to be a virtuous radical 
picketing the institution from outside its gates. I do not believe that a critical exercise 
has much effect if it is not dialogical exercise. A psychologist is also a member of the 
public in many spaces: I would not have had access to the term of ‘nervous 
breakdown’ if had not straddled these two discursive terrains. Psy-discourse and its 
services, such as those provided by counselling psychologists, are by their very nature 
dialogical. They are positioned both as regulators of the self-contained agent and also 
as one of few social spaces that can tolerate people who are helpless and distressed, 
who are dangerous or deviant and not held together. Participants like Naomi had little 
idea of where else to turn in ‘nervous breakdown.’ I believe that this positions psy-
services and its practitioners as able to play a significant role in redressing the 
oppressive imperatives of the norms of self-management and the individualisation of 
distress.  
 
The subject of ‘nervous breakdown’ is so readily constructed as mad or having failed 
at self-management and has to work terribly hard to carve out an alternative. He/she is 
also held solely responsible for metabolising distress and helplessness. The gaze is 
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easily shifted by psy-practices away from the social nature of this distress, refocused 
as a failure or disruption of the individual. The subject can accomplish an alternative 
position by using ‘nervous breakdown’ as has emerged in this study, but it also offers 
psychologists an alternative. It offers us an opportunity to really think about what we 
are telling clients when our language locates the problem inside them and the 
consequences of this. To my mind, we need to find other ways of talking about coping 
and not coping that are less asphyxiating for the individual – that do not require a 
GP’s sick note to save face or save a job. We need to be more vocal in acknowledging 
the massive fictions of self-management and self-containment and point a finger back 
at the social. Or, at the very least, we could be more flexible with the binaries of 
coping and not coping or mad and sane. What the third space carved out by ‘nervous 
breakdown’ in this study seems to suggest is that these binaries are illusionary. Things 
are less clear cut. People wander in and out of them, even people like Obama and 
Oprah. Yet, even so, people are forced to hide their experiences of travelling over the 
edge or tie themselves up in knots justifying them for fear of being fired, ridiculed or 
diagnosed.  
 
I believe that counselling psychology, the institution within which this piece of work 
is located, is particularly well-positioned to endorse multiple, even contradictory 
constructions of what is coping or sane and to co-construct these with its client-
subjects. Counselling psychology’s core values include that of dialogical and reflexive 
practice which can play with and also critique essentialist truths (Kasket, 2012; 
McLeod, 2001). A therapeutic encounter informed by these values and which 
foregrounds the relational is therefore well situated for the co-construction of 
alternative subject positions relative to these constructs (Anderson, 1997; Avdi, 2012). 
This is made all the more relevant because it would seem that these encounters are 
some of very few socially sanctioned spaces that are accessible to people who are 
positioned as deviant from hegemonic norms – people like the participants in this 
study. In addition, the relational and reflexive nature of counselling psychology’s 
practice allows it to explicitly notice and even welcome being impacted upon by its 
clients. It allows, to some extent, for popular discourse to have an impact on 
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institutional discourse. The situation of this piece of work, therefore, does not 
necessarily close-down the challenges that the liminality of ‘nervous breakdown’ 
poses for psy-practices, rather it can be seen as a consideration of them.  
 
Psy’s brushing off of ‘nervous breakdown’ as a popular colloquialism is what allows 
its subjects to accomplish something other than a psy-diagnosis, including a diagnosis 
of failed self-management, in the first place. However, by maintaining this boundary 
between psy and popular discourse, the subjects of ‘nervous breakdown’ as well as the 
psy-institution all collude in keeping the pervasive individualism perpetuated by the 
psy-complex intact. This contributes to the maintenance of the oppressive fictions of 
coping, self-management and self-contained sanity. As such, it is not such a violence 
for a piece of work in counselling psychology to look at what a popular term like 
‘nervous breakdown’ might accomplish for its subjects and to ask why they might 
need or want to accomplish these things. Instead, I hope, with this non-generalizable, 
emic piece of work to have added, albeit modestly, to a critical interrogation of the 
ideal-norms that psy so readily peddles and which its subjects readily reconstruct. This 
is so that we might reconsider them, and use our influence not only in the therapy 
room but in the wider discursive terrain to offer alternatives to the one-size-fits-all 
expert opinions on how we as individuals can and must hold ourselves together. In the 
meantime, there is the alternative offered by ‘nervous breakdown’ – seemingly one of 
few ok ways to fall apart currently available on the market (and not only for sale to 
middle-class housewives in dressing gowns).  
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Appendix A2 – Sample transcription of media article 
 
Note: transcriptions have been reformatted for ease of reading. The line numbering is 
consistent with that used in the thesis, but may differ from the original sources. 
 
 
Kenny, U. (2000, September 10). Nervous breakdown. The Guardian. 
According to Mental Health Foundation figures, one in 20 of us is likely to suffer from 1 
'clinical' depression - that is, serious depression, a disabling disorder including breakdown. At 2 
one level, 'breakdown' is one of those words that operates as shorthand; many of us routinely 3 
refer to being on the verge of a breakdown when we want to convey just how put upon, 4 
stressed and pressurised we are, without really meaning it at all. 5 
At a deeper level, though, a nervous breakdown is generally understood to describe a crisis 6 
situation; when someone has reached rock bottom and 'broken', in as much as they have 7 
ceased to function in a normal way. The details are more difficult - how a breakdown 8 
happens, why, and who it is likely to happen to are harder to pin down. 9 
There is no textbook experience, as Dr David Bell, consultant psychiatrist and psychotherapist 10 
at the Tavistock Centre, confirms. 'Breakdown is a general term that people use to describe a 11 
very, very wide variety of experiences.' Still, he feels it is an 'appropriate' word. 'It captures 12 
something of the experience,' he says. Despite the fact that, as Dr Massimo Riccio, consultant 13 
psychiatrist and medical director of The Priory in Roehampton, points out: 'There isn't really 14 
any such thing in medical terms - saying someone has had a breakdown means everything and 15 
nothing, and we need a lot more information to fine-tune a diagnosis and make it manageable.' 16 
Nevertheless, it is a helpful description for the layman. According to a study earlier this year, 17 
more than a quarter of Americans (26 per cent) say they have felt on the verge of a mental 18 
breakdown (relationship problems and being a single parent were most often cited as the 19 
cause). The study, by a psychologist at Indiana University, represents an increase of 7 per cent 20 
since the last similar study 40 years ago, which may not mean that any more of us are 21 
suffering from major depressive episodes, just that more of us are willing to admit it's a 22 
possibility. Whatever 'it' is. 23 
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Appendix B – Recruitment 
 
1. Email of introduction to the study for prospective participants 
 
Have you experienced a nervous breakdown in the past?  
If so, would you willing to talk about it as part of a psychological research project? 
 
If you are 18 years or older, live in/are able to easily access the London area, and feel 
comfortable talking about your experience in a short interview please contact Natalie 
Le Clézio <emailaddress>.  
 
2. Initial email of response to participants 
 
Dear <name> 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research project. So that we can 
discuss the details of the project, please could you email me your telephone number 
and a time and day that would be suitable for me to phone you. 
Warm wishes 
Natalie 
 
3. Information to be shared with participants on telephone call and re-iterated at 
start of interview 
 
I am conducting research looking at the experiences of people who have had nervous 
breakdowns. There hasn’t been a great deal of research done that looks at this and 
particularly from the perspective of those people who have experienced a nervous 
breakdown, yet it seems that more and more people are identifying with this 
experience. A better understanding of how people make sense of their own 
experiences of nervous breakdowns would be really helpful in informing not only the 
work of those in the mental health professions, but also the public understanding of 
the experience.  
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Appendix C – Interview schedule 
 
 Introduction, informed consent, review confidentiality, and begin recording. 
Explain parameters: ninety minute interview about their experience of nervous 
breakdown for research aimed to understand this better.  
 
 Probe why the participant chose to speak about this in this space? “What made 
you decide to participate in this research?” (Aimed to ease the participant in to 
the interview and also explore motives for the telling of the experience). 
 
 “Can you tell me a bit about when you had your nervous breakdown? When 
did it happen?” Follow up with questions of how it unfolded, what happened, 
key actors, institutions, motives etc. (Expect this to form a large part of the 
interview).  
 
 “What made you decide that what happened to you was a nervous breakdown 
down?” (Exploring choice of term, use of term).  
 
 “Do you know where you first heard the term?” Follow up with prompts as to 
what he/she associates with the term, and possibly linking it to cultural 
texts/institutions.  
 
 “What do you think of the term nervous breakdown? Does it explain what you 
went through?” Follow up with other prompts to see if the participant has 
alternative explanations. (Again to explore choice of discourse and possible 
alternatives). 
 
 “How do you think your nervous breakdown was perceived by the medical or 
psychological community?” (Probing the gap in the use and credibility of the 
term). 
 
 “How do/does your community understand or react to the fact you have had a 
nervous breakdown?” (Exploring the participant’s relationships and 
positioning(s) in discourse by other actors or institutions in his/her life).  
 
 “How do you feel about telling this story of nervous breakdown now? How 
has it been for you?” (Exploring the process of the telling, the interview and 
our interaction. This will provide rich material for reflexive interpretation and 
also begins to draw the interview to a close). 
 
 Thank you, debrief and ending.  
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Appendix D – Informed consent form 
 
I understand the content and procedure of this study as explained to me by the 
researcher. I also understand that I am free to leave this study at any time, should I 
wish to. I agree for this interview to be recorded and for the transcript to be used as 
part of the research. I understand that my data will be treated as confidential and 
anonymous.  
 
I hereby agree to participate in this study. 
 
Name:      Signature: 
Date: 
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Appendix E – Debrief resource 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. Sometimes, issues that get raised in such 
research can be difficult, or arouse one’s curiosity to explore further. This is a 
broad list of resources that might be helpful to you if you feel you require further 
support. These are resources that can be accessed at all times, not only at times of 
crisis. 
 
 Your GP. He/she acts as a care co-ordinator for both health and mental health 
needs. 
 
 MIND – a UK based organisation that provides support for people who have 
mental health concerns or difficulties for no or minimal cost 
http://www.mind.org.uk (website); 0300 123 3393 (Info line) 
 
 SANEline - a national out-of-hours telephone helpline offering emotional support 
and information for people affected by mental health problems 
http://www.sane.org.uk/what_we_do/support/helpline/ (website); 0845 767 8000 
(phone line open from 6pm to 11pm) 
 
 Samaritans – a 24 hour source of support via phone, email, letter or face-to-face 
http://www.samaritans.org/ (website); 08457 90 90 90 
 
 If you’re interested in longer term therapy, the best place to begin to look is at the 
British Psychological Society’s register of chartered psychologists: 
http://www.bps.org.uk/psychology-public/find-psychologist/find-psychologist 
(website) 
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Appendix F – Ethical approval 
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Appendix G – Sample interview transcription 
 
Transcription formatting  
 
(.)  micro pause 
((pause)) longer pause 
(inaudible)  
(other vocal actions) 
[]  overlapping.interruption speech from other speaker 
—  interrupted speech 
(?)  unsure if correct word 
underline emphasized word 
[…]  Omitted speech 
N:  Natalie 
P(number): participant 
 
 
P5: Mmm. Er I think yeah, I think that would’ve been (.) y’know once I’d physically 222 
healed from the abortion that I had (.) and:: (.) y’know once (.) y’know I suppose I just 223 
after that I just really struggled to pull things back together again [mmm] and I felt 224 
different. I felt like terminally wounded.  225 
 226 
N: Mmm [and (inaudible)] like something wasn’t quite the same 227 
 228 
P5: Yeah yeah this kind of fear that would be (.) keeping me from (.) yeah from 229 
engaging I think (.) that really kicked in then. 230 
 231 
N: Mmm. When do you think you stopped and thought actually there’s something going 232 
on here? 233 
 234 
P5: Round about yeah round about then round about May last year. 235 
 236 
N: And and did you think at the time that it might be a nervous breakdown or did you 237 
have other ways of understanding it? 238 
 239 
 196 
P5: I just, I think, y’know it felt like I kind of, like my paradigm had shifted and that (.) 240 
y’know the fight or y’know the (.) the gusto that I used to have in me the y’know the 241 
audacity(?) that used to that I used to have or the force of (inaudible) had just 242 
disappeared completely, and it’s just that (inaudible) this is the longest I think I’ve 243 
known I’ve (inaudible) cold(?) about something (inaudible) or sad about something 244 
‘cause the sadness pervaded everything and it didn’t really (.) lift it kind of stuck with 245 
me [mm] all that time.246 
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Part B – Critical literature review 
The immigrant, immigration and mental health care: A critical 
literature review 
1. Introduction 
This paper will attempt to explore the challenges that counselling psychology and 
psychologists face when working with clients who come from immigrant populations. 
More specifically, it will explore, firstly, why this is a salient question for us to be 
addressing at this time. Secondly, it will explore the difficulties in defining terms and 
experiences of immigration. Particularly, it will examine whether immigration is a 
subject that can be collapsed under the rubric of cross-cultural work or not, whether 
immigration is an experience that warrants scrutiny in and of itself, or whether it 
simply serves as a predisposing factor to categorically defined mental illness. The 
latter seems to be an assumption that runs throughout the current research and which 
warrants critical appraisal.  
 
In exploring these debates, the tensions between theory and research that support 
context-bound pluralities and those that support universal human truths will be 
addressed. Finally, this paper will attempt to suggest that for counselling 
psychologists, it is a critical awareness of one’s way of working, both in the room, and 
in the broader contextual framework of therapeutic intervention that might best 
address the complexities of working with immigrants, as opposed to either/or models 
or sets of assumptions.  
2. Immigration: The current contexts 
Immigration was a hot topic in the UK election of 2010. So much so, that apart from 
the recession and fiscal crisis, it was seen as one of the main problems that a majority 
of the populace wanted the new government to deal with (Carey & Geddes, 2010). In 
addition to this, the escalation of the complexities of the international discourse of 
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terror and terrorism since 9/11 has unquestionably impacted on the subject of the 
immigrant and his/her association with ideas of threat and safety (Huysmans & 
Buonofino, 2008). The UK has experienced an exponential spike in immigration over 
the last thirty years, particularly since the early 1990s (Manacorda, Manning & 
Wadsworth, 2012). This can be attributed largely to the expansion of multi-national 
corporations, the creation of the EU and other cross-national identities and 
agreements, and an increased political consciousness of and stake in a global human 
rights culture (Hansen, 2000; 2003). Augmented by the increasing polarities between 
developed and developing worlds, immigrants to the UK vary greatly in their 
provenance. They come from former colonies, the wider EU, and from war-torn 
regimes seeking refuge and asylum, among others (Castles & Miller, 2003; Morris, 
1997; Panayi, 2010).  
 
As such, working with immigrants is crucial for counselling psychologists to consider. 
Firstly, because immigrants and people who have experienced immigration are 
becoming increasingly prevalent in the client groups with whom we work and will 
work. Secondly, as will be explored later in this review, the current research suggests 
a higher prevalence of mental illness in immigrant populations than the norm. And 
thirdly, the same literature suggests that working with immigrant populations might be 
more challenging to mental health professionals and psychologists than working with 
a so-called native population as they are seen to foreground issues of difference in the 
counselling context and process (Conwill, 2010; O’Mahony & Donnelly, 2007). 
Moreover, counselling psychology is defined by the fluidity with which it moves 
between the rigorously clinical, the critical, the social and the individual. The 
hallmark of the discipline is its scope and flexibility in applied practice (Strawbridge 
& Woolfe, 2010). As such, its practitioners are likely to encounter the immigrant-
client-subject in all manner of domains of practice and ideology, and are likely to face 
the reflexive discomfort of conflicting understandings of the immigrant and his/her 
mental health while still finding a way to work (Eleftheriadou, 2010).    
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Recently, owing in part to the recession and in part to the prevailing discourse of 
international terrorism, the British public have become more vocal in wanting to keep 
Britain for Britons and the government has taken stringent measures to cap 
immigration (Blinder, 2012). This is a tricky balancing act, in the wake of the policies 
and politics of multiculturalism that have been prevalent following the Brixton race 
riots of 1981 and on the back of global black consciousness, feminist, and human 
rights movements that gained voice and momentum from the late 1960s onwards, 
along with the disenfranchised voices of former colonies (Gilroy, 2004; Samson, 
2001).  
 
The current British literature on mental health care and immigrants reflects this 
tension in the socio-political context. It seeks largely epidemiological evidence of 
psychopathology: the counting of which immigrants suffer from which types of 
mental illness. The research suggests that immigrant populations in the UK, by DSM 
taxonomy, suffer from more mental health problems than the norm. Claassen, Ascoli, 
Berhe and Priebe (2005) provide an excellent meta-analysis of trends in recent 
research on immigrants and mental health in the UK and their results confirm these 
trends in the literature.  
 
Other trends in the research on immigration and mental health reflect the aim to come 
to some sort of universal understanding of mental illness by attempting to subsume 
immigrant or more emic descriptions of difficulties under DSM diagnoses (e.g. Fearon 
et al., 2006; Jarvis, 2001; Kirov & Murray, 1999) . Some literature, however, seeks to 
address how we (positioned as psychologists within a westernised developed world 
framework) might work with people positioned as different (e.g. Hassiotis, 1996; 
Laungani, 2002). This reflects at least some critical awareness of differences in power 
and identity within a counselling and care context, but speaks very much from a 
stance of us and them. Indeed, the NHS’s current stance towards treating mental 
illness reflects this conflict between overt embracing of a more inclusive, 
collaborative approach with service-users, while at the very same time, attempting to 
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standardise care and situate itself within evidence-based practice medical practice 
(Hewitt-Taylor, 2006). 
 
The landscape of Australian, American and Canadian literature on mental healthcare 
and immigrants is quite different in tone. This reinforces the idea that research and 
mental health practice which it informs cannot be distinct from the socio-political 
climate in which it operates (Dineen, 2004; Foucault, 1965; Rose, 1985). For example, 
a great deal of literature from Canada and the USA focuses on the difficulties 
immigrant populations might face in a new country and how best these populations 
might be assisted to access appropriate care. A great deal of the work is qualitative 
and delves into the experiences of specific immigrant populations, largely those that 
are perceived to be very different from native populations.  
 
Indeed, while the respective American, Australian and Canadian governments have 
fairly stringent immigration laws, the political climate seems to welcome immigrants 
as potential workers and revenue streams. Moreover, perhaps it is these countries’ 
new world legacies that might lend themselves better to these different discourses of 
immigration or perhaps, in the case of the USA, it was the hotbed of 1970s black 
consciousness movements and perhaps ideas of advocacy for the marginalised are still 
very prevalent. This is not to suggest that the lived experience of immigrants in these 
countries is free from discrimination and alienation: quite the opposite as the detail of 
the research would suggest.   
 
This paper will discuss a saturated sample of the most recent literature on 
immigration, mental health care and psychological practice. The broad trends in the 
literature will be outlined, but most attention will be paid to key debates, tensions and 
assumptions arising from the epistemologies and contexts in which the relevant papers 
are grounded as opposed to micro-analyses of the research process of each paper 
itself. This is more useful in informing a critical perspective and for thinking about 
areas for new research, and tensions and assumptions that we may bring to evidence-
based counselling practice and the institutions in which this practice operates.   
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3. Immigration and mental health 
All the research in the sample reviewed for this study indicates that immigrants are 
more at risk for mental illness than the norms for native populations. The research 
seems to explore this link in several different ways.  
 
3.1. Diagnosing immigrants 
The bulk of peer-reviewed research aims to quantitatively assess specific immigrant 
populations for psychopathology using specific DSM-IV taxonomy. It compares this 
assessment statistically to the normal distribution of specific diagnoses within the 
home or native population, generally with a purpose of describing epidemiology of 
mental illness among immigrants and in some cases, recommending suitable pathways 
to care and types of care. This is especially prevalent for diagnoses of depression, 
psychosis and incidences of suicide (e.g. Harrison, Glazebrook, Brewin, Canbrell & 
Dalkin, 1997; Hassen & Sardashti, 2000; Neeleman & Wessely, 1999).  
 
This type of research is useful in informing policy (for how can one make decisions 
without having a topographical sense of what might be going on), in allowing for care 
to be consistent across client-groups which is a corner-stone of current NHS best-
practice policy, and in informing practice that might best facilitate access to care for 
marginalised groups of immigrants who seem to be at higher risk for certain mental 
health difficulties. It might even inform preventative measures for these migrant 
groups. The language of hard science in which this research is grounded constitutes 
the hegemonic psycho-medical discourse at present. It is the language and 
epistemology currently most persuasive to governments, funding bodies, and arguably 
the general public as it offers an idea of scientific proof and truth which seems to 
prevail as the most persuasive type of communication in our current context (Kuhn, 
1962). 
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 As such, this trusted and shared language and epistemology of science is useful in 
achieving several things. Firstly, in allowing for comparisons across studies and 
populations, the possibility of generalizability and replicability of studies, and of 
facilitating communication between researchers and clinicians. Secondly, it offers the 
idea that by finding factors which seem to definitively contribute to increased 
immigrant psychopathology, one might find definitive treatments or solutions for 
these. For a profession that has moved to a premise of evidence-based practice, it 
offers such evidence for counselling practice constructed as best. Furthermore, from a 
political point of view it makes a convincing case not only for psychologists, but for 
government and other political bodies to pay attention to the difficulties immigrants 
seem to be facing by sheer weight of sample numbers and the extrapolations made 
from these. 
 
However, the work rests on some problematic assumptions. Firstly, almost all 
research in this category fails to address who counts as an immigrant for the purposes 
of study and when it does, there is little consistency across studies. For example, 
Harrison et al. (1997) do not unpack the very obvious confounding variable of 
generational differences in the Caribbean migrants in their sample. There is arguably a 
great difference in the experiences of first and second generation immigrants, for 
example. This lack of consistent definition in who is an immigrant makes for murky 
water when comparing across studies, and when using the evidence in an applied 
sense. Especially, as when one scrutinises the idea of a native population, it is far from 
a homogenous group. In many cases, it is full of the descendents of immigrants and 
marginalised groups, groups positioned as other, and socially and politically 
disadvantaged groups (Bhatia & Ram, 2001). Indeed, as Silveira & Ebrahim (1998) 
found in their study of social determinants of psychopathology, it was the variable of 
social disadvantage as opposed to other person-bound categories of difference, such as 
being an immigrant, that most strongly correlated with increased incidences of mental 
illness.  
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This research draws upon assumptions of universality: that both immigration and 
mental illness are definitive things that have common features true for all people and 
which can be accurately measured with standardised instruments. Silveira & Ebrahim 
(1998) employed measures created by and validated against DSM-based diagnostic 
categories, for example by using the Symptoms of Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(SAD) to find anxiety and depression. Haasen & Sardashti (2000) and Harrison et al. 
(1997) employ similar data collection strategies.   
 
In so doing, this research imposes a westernised developed world’s understanding of 
immigration and mental health onto the immigrant populations it studies. As such, it 
does not allow for nuances between immigrants to emerge, for immigrants’ own 
understandings of their difficulties or mental health and illness to be heard. In many 
cases, fails to pay adequate attention to the socio-political factors that may trigger, 
exacerbate and maintain higher rates of mental illness among immigrants. This is 
problematic in an applied sense: for example, what happens in therapy when the 
therapy and the problem as understood by the therapist (informed by all this evidence-
based, DSM imbued practice) does not gel at all with the client? Or perhaps when a 
stable home and a job might alleviate depressive symptoms better than any NICE 
recommended CBT? This is the crux of the emic-etic debate that has run through 
mental health discourse and particularly cross-cultural psychology for several 
decades. Do we prefer an etic westernized system that we can all apply, share and 
discuss? Or do we opt for an emic approach which offers situated understanding, 
acknowledges context and plurality and which is negotiated between researcher and 
participant or therapist and client (Bhatia & Ram, 2001; Flaskerud, 2007; Littlewood, 
1990)? 
 
For example, as psychiatrist Derek Summerfield (1995) quite convincingly argues, it 
seems appropriate, not pathological that refugees who have experience the atrocities 
of war in their home countries appear more distressed than the norm! Indeed, this 
suggests value in turning the gaze of the research question away from the 
psychopathology in the immigrant and towards the experience of immigration itself. 
 204 
 
3.2. Mapping the psychological process of immigration 
The next subset of research reviewed aims to do just this, to map out, in the main 
qualitatively and from the point of view of the immigrant-participants, the experiences 
of immigrants. It generally indicates a high proportion of adverse experiences and life-
events during and after immigration (Conwill, 2010; Djuretik, Crawford & Weaver, 
2007). Within this subset, is research that aims to map out psychological processes of 
immigration. In many cases this is discussed within the ambit of acculturation theories 
(Berry, 1980; 1997; 1998). Some research likens the immigration process to a 
bereavement model (Hani, Stiles & Biran, 2010). In others, it is described as a 
distinctive process, which involves elements of mourning but which is unique to 
immigration (Khan & Watson, 2005; Shin & Shin, 1999). In all cases, however, a 
difficult and painful process is described, which has adverse effects on immigrant 
mental health and psychological and emotional development. 
 
This research is useful in many senses. Firstly, it addresses some of the gaps in the 
more quantitative diagnostic type of research. In many cases it allows for more emic 
understandings of psychological distress and immigration to enter the discourse 
informing our professional practice. For example, Conwill’s (2010) study aims to 
generate a phenomenological understanding of Senegalese mental health beliefs and 
practices because self-report measures had suggested that while this group of 
immigrants were experiencing many psychological difficulties after immigration, they 
felt excluded from mainstream mental health practices. Conwill (2010, p. 210) 
indicates that “their reluctance was not simply fear of being misunderstood, derided or 
misinterpreted [by western psychologists and counsellors]. They were more 
disinclined to disclose the deep structure of their world to those without the apparent 
tools to fathom it.”  
 
This is a consistent theme in the more qualitative, immigrant-centred research (e.g. 
Ahmad et al., 2005; Djuretik et al., 2007; O’Mahoney & Donnelly, 2007). It indicates 
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that for many immigrants, having a western approach to mental illness and therapy 
imposed upon them is alienating, frightening and disempowering and thus may 
exacerbate distress. This research allows for this voice to be heard, and allows for us 
to start grappling with the power dynamics, assumptions and shortcomings of a 
westernised system of care, premised upon (arguably self-confirming) evidence.   
 
However, qualitative accounts examining the situated experiences of small pockets of 
immigrants cannot and does not aim to be generalizable at all. Thus while this type of 
research might better inform practice more appropriate to immigrant groups, it cannot 
tell psychologists definitively how to work with these immigrant groups, or how on 
earth to navigate the tricky terrain between the institutions in which we work and the 
specific needs of client groups whose difficulties we may be unable to understand, or 
indeed, for whom our type of intervention may be inappropriate. We are unable, for 
example to build houses, grant visas, address poverty and exclusion: well at least 
within the therapy room itself. Few papers suggest tangible policy or practice 
applications and all call out for a nebulous need for more research, with few 
suggesting what this entails and to what avail.  
 
A handful of papers explore how psychologists might work with immigrants in 
practice. For example, Conwill (2010) does in fact suggest some ways in which 
therapists might work with Senegalese immigrants in the USA based on themes that 
came out of his analysis. Although, unfortunately owing to the politics of knowledge, 
it would be unlikely that qualitative work of this nature in and of itself would hold 
sufficient weight to convince policy makers, course directors, and regulatory bodies of 
the need for changes in existing systems that might allow for such immigrants (and 
arguably their therapists) to find a more meaningful way of engaging. Perhaps this is 
what the call for more research is alluding to.   
 
Most of the papers that do suggest practice applications tend to collapse immigration 
under the rubric of cross-cultural difference and are centred on specific domains of 
difference, such as language or religious ideology. For example, Bowker & Richards 
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(2004) explore therapists’ experiences of working in English with bilingual clients and 
very helpfully (and bravely) put forward suggestions for ways of thinking about and 
working with the differences in language proficiency and meaning systems between 
client and therapist. They identify their sample from immigrant groups and yet are 
almost silent about the experience of immigration itself. Furthermore, they do not 
reflect upon the differences between immigrants in their sample. This fails to take into 
account the role of immigration in constructing the immigrant and his/her experiences.  
 
The few papers that examine the emotional and psychological experiences of 
immigrants explore how psychologists might work specifically with immigrant 
populations in an applied sense. This is excepting the case of refugee and asylum-
seekers, about whom which a great deal has been written, in all epistemological 
frameworks (e.g. Ai, Peterson & Ubelhor, 2002; Kirmayer, 2003; Mann & Fazil, 
2006). Arguably, refugee and asylum seekers, far from a homogenous group 
themselves, are more visible within the domain of research and policy because of the 
political landscapes that have fuelled their seeking asylum. War, genocide, famine and 
detention are highly visible and newsworthy. The understandably high incidence of 
trauma and distress which these individuals experience as a result brings them visibly 
and in high proportions into the remit of mental health care (Summerfield, 2003; 
Tribe, 2002).  
 
3.3. Negotiating immigrant positions: A critical, post-structural 
exploration 
Finally, within the current research output on immigrants and mental health is a subset 
of theoretical papers that overtly challenge the assumptions of the above research. 
They are critical of the imposition of a western psychological lens onto the 
experiences of immigrants and of either/or bicultural models and assumptions, which 
are very evident in most of the research reviewed above. These papers draw largely on 
the domain of cross-cultural psychology, where this tension between emic and etic 
and scientific truth and post-structuralism has been a key debate. More recent papers 
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call for the transcendence of the emic versus etic debate through understanding the 
individual as dialogically constructed, hybrid and in constant negotiation (Bhatia & 
Ram, 2001; Hermans, 2010; Hermans & Kempen, 1993). However, these papers are 
largely theoretical in nature, with very little primary empirical work fuelling them.  
 
For example, Hermans (2001) argues that the increase in immigration as a result of 
globalisation has thrown into relief the need to work with ideas of plural and hybrid 
identities, as opposed to the fixedness of categories of immigrant or similarity and 
difference. He contends that immigration itself has served to highlight the 
shortcomings of universalist assumptions about psychological processes. Certainly, 
this seems to be supported by a great deal of the more qualitative studies of particular 
experiences of immigrants – such as Conwill’s (2010) work on the experiences of 
Senegalese immigrants in the USA, and for example, the work of Wexler (2011) who 
explores the experience of cultural incongruity of Alaskan Native Communities in 
Euro-American mental health care services.  
 
Hermans (2001) goes on to argue that the very idea of the individual is thrown into 
question when working with immigrants, much in the vein of Nikolas Rose (1996), 
who deconstructs the notion of singular and unitary personhood by tracing its history. 
Hermans (2001) suggests that post-structural conceptualisations of the immigrant and 
the therapist allow for these identity positions to be deconstructed and understood as 
in flux, impacting upon one-another and constantly negotiated. This seems to make 
theoretical sense and addresses many of the critiques levelled at the research that 
seeks to quantitatively or qualitatively locate mental illness in the immigrant, or 
indeed as an outcome of a process of immigration itself. It allows for the complexities 
of the immigrant and the processes associated with immigration to emerge.  
 
However, how on earth to put this into practice within institutions or therapy rooms 
that must necessarily work with standardised or at least consistent processes, that are 
premised upon alleviating distress, and must treat groups and categories of people? 
Certainly, it raises a necessary critical awareness, and perhaps therein lies its merit: to 
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allow the practitioner or researcher to more fully question the assumptions he/she 
brings to therapy or research with immigrants and their experiences. However, while 
this point of view seemingly dismantles most established ways of working with and 
understanding immigrants, it does not suggest alternative workable practices and 
therein is the rub. 
 
3.4. Somewhere in between: Models of cultural competence and 
integrating emic and etic ways of working 
Ideas of cultural competence and culturally sensitive practice seem to be emerging 
from some of the more recent practice orientated literature as a way to begin grappling 
with how therapists might work with immigrant populations (Roysircar, 2009; 
Werkmeister & Smith, 2009). This seems to be premised on the assumption that it is 
cultural incongruities between therapist and client and between client and institution 
that seem to contribute more than any other factors to immigrant populations having 
difficulties engaging with systems of mental health care (Bhugra & Arya, 2005; 
Flaskerud, 2007; Griner & Smith, 2006). 
 
What exactly this kind of competence or practice entails is inconsistently described 
across the literature. Whaley’s (2008) meta-analysis highlights this inconsistency, but 
does extrapolate broad themes to inform practice. These include taking a stance 
between knowing and unknowing, examining one’s own and institutional socio-
cultural assumptions, and taking time to explore those held by the immigrant-client. 
When read through the more post-structural position explored in the previous section, 
consideration of these themes can allow for thinking about how same-ness and 
difference are being constantly negotiated between parties. This line of questioning 
offers a starting point for thinking about how one might work immigrant populations. 
Through its consideration of the mutuality involved in the construction of identity 
positions and assumptions, it cannot assume either an emic or an etic stance. Rather it 
begins a conversation between these approaches and offers an opportunity to integrate 
elements of both.  
 209 
 
The work of Vikram Patel, on integrating western-based meanings, diagnoses and 
treatments for depression, with local systems, idioms and expression of seemingly 
similar distress among the Shona immigrants from Zimbabwe is an excellent example 
of this kind of integrative work that moves beyond theory and into practice. 
Furthermore Patel and his colleagues are open about their own assumptions in the 
work coming from a western psychiatric background, and have co-developed ways of 
working with immigrants and also their communities in Zimbabwe. Moreover they 
have tracked the efficacy of these integrated ways of working, finding them to be 
more effective than purely westernised interventions for depression, and also more 
effective than purely indigenous interventions (Patel, Mutambirwa & Nhiwatiwa, 
1995; Patel, Simunyu, Gwanzura, Lewis & Mann, 1997; Patel, Abas, Broadhead, 
Todd & Reeler, 2001). This work lends some legitimacy to taking a more post-
structural and critical stance – one which suggests that both the immigrant and 
therapist are impacted by and impact on the socio-cultural systems they encounter in 
the intersubjective space. It understands them as relational and mutually dependent. 
The same can be said of immigrant and so-called native.   
 
Similar work has been conducted by Gone (2010a; 2010b) who has explored the 
process of integrating westernised mental health interventions and services with 
certain Native American cultural practices in a community substance misuse treatment 
centre in the north of Canada. The findings here too suggest that a collaborative, 
dialogical, integrated approach seems to have better outcomes on service access, use, 
interventions and outcomes. What is particularly interesting in this research is that 
integration is treated as an ongoing process as opposed to a fixed outcome. This again 
perhaps lends more credibility to thinking about working with immigrants within 
specific and situated contexts, and also to thinking about the identity positions of 
immigrants, therapists and indeed institutions as fluid, plural and dialogical.   
 
Adding more weight to this way of conceptualising immigrants, immigration and their 
relationship with mental health care systems and practitioners is research conducted 
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by Rodriguez, Baumann and Schwartz (2011). This examines the process and 
outcomes of adapting a Euro-American premised mental health care service to the 
more idiosyncratic and emic understandings of health and mental health held by the 
Latino immigrant community it serves. The researchers note that prior to intervention, 
the service was operating purely from a westernised etic stance and failed to engage 
with the community it was set up to serve. They use mixed methods to inform their 
research, using secondary statistical data to gain an overview of service-engagement 
and changes in this. They also use in-depth qualitative methods to grapple with what 
both the immigrant-client and the therapists and mental-health care providers 
understood to be relevant to better and more meaningful service provision. Following 
on from this, they participated in and evaluated an organic process of integrating the 
results of these qualitative interviews and focus groups, with existing evidence-based 
westernised understandings of psychological assessment, intervention and service 
provision. Both qualitative and quantitative outcomes measures suggest an improved 
experience for both the clients and the therapists, and moreover, increased 
engagement with services and a decrease in mental health difficulties. Again, the 
merit of such research is in its situated, integrative quality and its ability to use both 
emic and etic points of view to understand and evaluate the needs and meaning 
systems of the key stakeholders in the service. It is also particularly useful in its 
tracking of the process and possible outcomes.   
 
However, no perspective on understanding and working with immigrants and 
immigration seems without it shortcomings. Quite clearly, this work is contextually 
bound. Until sufficient studies are amassed to perhaps warrant some kind of meta-
analysis, we cannot extrapolate any general conclusions about the virtues of adopting 
a situated approach that integrates both westernised understandings of mental health 
and its concomitant interventions and the more emic understandings of the immigrant 
groups these interventions are aimed to serve. Moreover, it might not even be possible 
to conduct a meta-analysis on such specific, situated studies without undermining 
many of the epistemological premises that have informed them in the first place: such 
an analysis would detract from the specific and situated nature of this work.  
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Also at play in this domain of more applied research on working with immigrants in 
mental health care settings, might be the specific investments of the researchers in the 
outcomes of the research. In all of the research explored, the researchers have 
occupied dual roles as clinician-researchers. They have sought both to develop more 
collaborative way of working with particular immigrant populations and to evaluate 
the processes and outcomes of such ways of working. While in no way undermining 
the merits of these studies, it would seem that the clinical reputations of the 
researchers might in fact rely upon producing effective clinical interventions that 
adhere to principles of cultural sensitivity and competence. Such a deep investment 
must undoubtedly affect a research process, especially its qualitative aspects where 
researcher interpretation and researcher-participants interaction are key in informing 
the outcomes of the research (Terre Blanche & Kelly, 1999).  
 
3.5. Pulling these strands of research together: Questioning a few 
assumptions  
A very glaring assumption that all of this research makes is that immigration is a 
traumatic or difficult experience for most or all immigrants, thus warranting 
investigation for psychopathology and distressing experiences. Perhaps this is not the 
case for all immigrants, and might be an interesting domain for future research to 
explore.  
 
Furthermore, most attention in the research seems to be paid to the experiences of 
those immigrants who appear to the researchers to be markedly different from the 
natives of the countries to which they immigrate. This is understandable, as the 
research indicates that it is these groups that seem to be faced with more adverse 
challenges when immigrating and subsequently, suffer a higher proportion of mental 
illness. In addition, the research suggests that these groups impose more difference on 
the therapeutic encounter and this is assumed to be problematic to therapeutic alliance 
(Claassen et al., 2005; Constantine & Kwan, 2003).  
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However, it seems that merely paying attention to immigrants who are noticeably 
different renders those who might be a bit more similar invisible in the research 
enterprise. This resonates with the recent moves in the social sciences to turn the gaze 
towards exploring the experiences of more hegemonic identities. Research and 
theorising in this vein suggests that the difficulties of those perceived to hold more 
dominant identities are often overlooked in psychological research (Bonnett, 1997; 
Hopkins & Noble, 2009; Steyn, 2001).  
 
It might be useful to explore the nuances in experiences of immigration and adjust the 
gaze of the research to include the immigrant who moves from developed world to 
developed world, of similar language and seemingly similar culture. There is only one 
strand of research that seems to do this, exploring the experiences of Irish immigrants 
in the UK and particularly, the relationship between immigration and depression 
(Ryan, Leavey, Golden, Blizard & King, 2006).  
 
However, the same critiques that may be levelled at the research explored in the 
‘Diagnosing immigrants’ section of this paper may be levelled at this research. 
Particularly problematic is that it does not screen for other psychological and 
emotional difficulties in its sample before measuring for depression. This a powerful 
possible confounding variable for a quantitative study aiming to produce a statistically 
significant correlation. However, it is the beginnings of turning the gaze onto more 
similar immigrants and would suggest by its findings, however methodologically 
problematic, that the Irish sample measured does indeed suffer higher depression rates 
than the mean. As such, indicating perhaps that cultural similarity cannot be presumed 
and also may not act as a buffering factor at all. This is but one paper. It would be 
interesting to explore this further and to how perceived cultural similarity (and by 
extension dissimilarity) affects attributions of mental illness and how it mediates a 
therapeutic alliance. The bulk of current research, seems to assume that it would have 
a positive impact on both. It might also be an interesting exercise to shift the 
 213 
geography of the research and look at the experiences of those who immigrate from 
the centre to the margin.  
 
There is also very little research on gendered differences in the emotional and psycho-
social experiences of immigration and its impact on mental health and well-being. 
Some quantitative epidemiological work does offer descriptive statistical 
comparisons. However, the qualitative work that does address gender in some form 
tends to focus on the situated experiences of women. It does not offer the masculine 
experience, or indeed possible comparisons and contrasts between the two. For 
example Shin & Shin (1999) explore only the experiences of Korean women after 
immigration to the USA. Exploring the gendered nature of the experiences of 
immigration seems to be asking for further exploration. 
 
Very little research looks explicitly at the inter-generational experiences of 
immigration and how this relates to mental health care and practice. What of the 
children of first generation immigrants, or their grandchildren? The research seems to 
limit the immigrant-subject to that person who was born in another country and then 
relocated permanently. Again this seems to relate to the difficulties in defining who is 
or who is not an immigrant for the purposes of study. However, it seems like an 
interesting consideration for future research. Following on from this, another notable 
silence in the research is one of the impact of immigration on family, friends and 
communities who are left behind. What of the psychological impact of immigration on 
them? Only one paper begins to explore this population, but does so in the context of 
how they may offer social support to the immigrant (Messent, Saleh & Solomon, 
2005).  
4. In conclusion 
All research reviewed in this paper indicates that immigration and mental health 
difficulties are linked, and that working with immigrant populations present 
challenges for psychologists, immigrant-clients and mental health care institutions. 
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Throughout the review, three key issues seem to predominate: firstly, does 
immigration act as a precipitating factor for mental illness in the migrant, and as such, 
should research and treatment focus on the mental illness as opposed to the experience 
of immigration? Might it be the experience of immigration in and of itself something 
that warrants more understanding and exploration within the counselling and research 
contexts? And finally, what is the most ethical, sensitive and parsimonious approach 
to take in understanding the experience of immigration and any concomitant mental 
health difficulties suffered by the immigrant?  
 
No single type of research seems to be able to address all of these questions 
completely. However, it would seem that approaches that draw upon westernised 
taxonomies and practices as well as more situated emic understandings and practices 
and integrate these into situated application can offer a step towards a work-able 
solution. Especially, if combined with a critical ‘thinking space’ about power and the 
fluidity of identities, this way of working can present practitioners with helpful 
insights for applied work. Counselling psychology is appreciably well-placed to 
straddle these binaries, given its emphasis on relational collaboration not only with the 
client but also with institutions and systems of knowledge.   
 
Nonetheless, given the projected increases in global mobility and immigration over 
the next decade, thinking about immigration and mental health care is a vital 
enterprise for psychology as a whole. Practitioners will be increasingly required to 
work with immigrants, while simultaneously situated in the web of our institutions, 
regulatory bodies and repertoires of personal identities. Indeed, it seems not only 
futile but impossible to separate ourselves from the context of immigrant and 
immigration.  
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5. Reflections on this piece of work 
Three years on, this paper still strikes a personal chord. The idea of the immigrant 
seems both absurd and also highly relevant. It seems absurd because the complexities 
of same and different, alien and native, and staying and leaving seem to apply to 
everyone, in the minutiae of all encounters. Borders, binaries and the confusion in 
between seem to me to be emergent, and wholly necessary, in almost every 
intersubjective exchange. The therapeutic space particularly can be described as in 
continual positional flux, knowing and un-knowing, and bordered and boundaried. 
The boundary of the relationship is considered sacred, and is discussed in almost 
every supervision or MDT meeting I have been in. This is a line of critique I might 
have pursued in this review had I written it now. I might have asked more about 
boundaries, borders and migrating and whether the enquiry levelled at trans-national 
immigrants might also be levelled at all people who cross borders into spaces that are 
other to them.  
 
Re-reading this piece, I found some of the terms used to be jarring. I felt the desire to 
put almost everything into quotation marks, and to denote that they were problematic 
constructs. Undoubtedly this is a result of having travelled further and further into 
social constructionism. Yet, in practice, I have seen many clients who had migrated to 
the UK and who were struggling with the process: with social isolation and loneliness, 
with xenophobia and the loss of habitual markers of meaning. However 
individualising or clumsy this practice might be, many of these clients told me that 
that they had found some comfort in the space of the therapeutic relationship. The 
trajectories of these academic and clinical journeys have now positioned me in a space 
somewhere between the intellectual pursuit of critical deconstruction and a desire to 
still have a way in which to practice therapeutically. It seems all too easy to 
deconstruct the system of mental health care without offering an alternative. For all of 
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its shortcomings and insensitivities, it is still one of few spaces available to people 
who experience the distress associated with all manner of violations of boundaries, 
borders and norms.  
 
This paper raises that dilemma for me: how does one problematise the constructs of 
mental health and the immigrant and yet still hold onto a space of practice that can 
offer support for difficulties and distress of people who immigrate? The latter 
demands that one holds onto something as-if real and that one treats the labels of 
immigrant and mental health with some degree of legitimacy. I have attempted to 
address this in part in this paper by emphasising the merits of a marriage of critical 
and integrative work. However, were I to re-write the paper now, I would address my 
position in this liminal space more conspicuously, clearly stating this as motivation for 
the review beyond its more obvious academic merits.  
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